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The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream
Since Alexis de Tocqueville, restlessness has been accepted as a signature American trait. Our willingness to move, take risks, and adapt to change have produced a dynamic economy and a tradition of innovation from Ben Franklin to Steve Jobs.
The problem, according to legendary blogger, economist and bestelling author Tyler Cowen, is that Americans today have broken from this tradition—we’re working harder than ever to avoid change. We're moving residences less, marrying people more like ourselves and choosing our music and our mates based on algorithms that wall us off from anything that might be too new or too different. Match.com matches us in love. Spotify and Pandora match us in music. Facebook matches us to just about everything else.
Of course, this “matching culture” brings tremendous positives: music we like, partners who make us happy, neighbors who want the same things. We’re more comfortable. But, according to Cowen, there are significant collateral downsides attending this comfort, among them heightened inequality and segregation and decreased incentives to innovate and create.
The Great Social Stagnation argues that this cannot go on forever. We are postponing change, due to our near-sightedness and extreme desire for comfort, but ultimately this will make change, when it comes, harder. The forces unleashed by the Great Stagnation will eventually lead to a major fiscal and budgetary crisis: impossibly expensive rentals for our most attractive cities, worsening of residential segregation, and a decline in our work ethic. The only way to avoid this difficult future is for Americans to force themselves out of their comfortable slumber—to embrace their restless tradition again.
The problem, according to legendary blogger, economist and bestelling author Tyler Cowen, is that Americans today have broken from this tradition—we’re working harder than ever to avoid change. We're moving residences less, marrying people more like ourselves and choosing our music and our mates based on algorithms that wall us off from anything that might be too new or too different. Match.com matches us in love. Spotify and Pandora match us in music. Facebook matches us to just about everything else.
Of course, this “matching culture” brings tremendous positives: music we like, partners who make us happy, neighbors who want the same things. We’re more comfortable. But, according to Cowen, there are significant collateral downsides attending this comfort, among them heightened inequality and segregation and decreased incentives to innovate and create.
The Great Social Stagnation argues that this cannot go on forever. We are postponing change, due to our near-sightedness and extreme desire for comfort, but ultimately this will make change, when it comes, harder. The forces unleashed by the Great Stagnation will eventually lead to a major fiscal and budgetary crisis: impossibly expensive rentals for our most attractive cities, worsening of residential segregation, and a decline in our work ethic. The only way to avoid this difficult future is for Americans to force themselves out of their comfortable slumber—to embrace their restless tradition again.
241 pages, Hardcover
First published February 28, 2017
About the author
Tyler Cowen
93 books755 followersTyler Cowen (born January 21, 1962) occupies the Holbert C. Harris Chair of economics as a professor at George Mason University and is co-author, with Alex Tabarrok, of the popular economics blog Marginal Revolution. He currently writes the "Economic Scene" column for the New York Times and writes for such magazines as The New Republic and The Wilson Quarterly.
Cowen's primary research interest is the economics of culture. He has written books on fame (What Price Fame?), art (In Praise of Commercial Culture), and cultural trade (Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World's Cultures). In Markets and Cultural Voices, he relays how globalization is changing the world of three Mexican amate painters. Cowen argues that free markets change culture for the better, allowing them to evolve into something more people want. Other books include Public Goods and Market Failures, The Theory of Market Failure, Explorations in the New Monetary Economics, Risk and Business Cycles, Economic Welfare, and New Theories of Market Failure.
Cowen's primary research interest is the economics of culture. He has written books on fame (What Price Fame?), art (In Praise of Commercial Culture), and cultural trade (Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World's Cultures). In Markets and Cultural Voices, he relays how globalization is changing the world of three Mexican amate painters. Cowen argues that free markets change culture for the better, allowing them to evolve into something more people want. Other books include Public Goods and Market Failures, The Theory of Market Failure, Explorations in the New Monetary Economics, Risk and Business Cycles, Economic Welfare, and New Theories of Market Failure.
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March 2, 2020
Wasn’t really a fan of this book. Cowen just lists a bunch of problems in our economy but offers no blueprint on how to solve them. The only time he does is in the second chapter where he presents a study showing that deregulation in America’s largest cities would increase GDP by 9.5%. Really would’ve have been nice of some more solutions were offered. I will say this though: the writing style was very nice. Other than that this book isn’t very good.
March 4, 2017
Incoherent. It is an overly long blog post. I don't disagree with the premise that the country is suffering from a lack of striving. We value safety and relative comfort of the conditions that we have. There is no need, in our complacent minds, to risk or strive for something better. Cite a few facts, stats and resources and the book would be complete. Cowen doesn't offer any solutions. It's a downer of a book. For a country locked in complacency, wouldn't some solutions help? I'd recommend reading his blog and the various reviews of the book instead of reading the actual book.
January 18, 2022
As a profession, economists could be said to have the imagination and creativity of a fart. Please forgive the vulgarism, which I have loved for fifty years, though it is normally applied to intelligence, as in Trump has the brains of a fart. Tyler Cowen is the joyful exception, and that pushed this book from a grudging two stars to three.
I guess that New York Times Bestselling Authors probably get multi-book deals and generous advances that make it necessary to sometimes squeeze them out before the thesis is fully formed. Coming, ready or not. Not until very late in the book, did I understand what The Complacent Class was meant to mean, and why the quest for the American dream was self-defeating. Perhaps it's because I am not American, but it seems to me that The American Dream was an anemic abstraction when it was coined (up there with The Greatest Generation), and usage of it should excuse attempted strangulation, if not more.
In the first chapter, titled The Complacent Class and Its Dangers, Mr. Cowen does explain, "And I've coined the phrase the complacent class to describe the growing number of people in our society who accept, welcome, or even enforce a resistance to things different or challenging. These people might in the abstract like some things to change, they might even consider themselves progressive or even radical politically, but in fact they have lost the capacity to imagine or embrace a world where things do change rapidly for most if not all people." He goes on to break the complacent class into The Privileged Class, Those Who Dig In, and Those Who Get Stuck. That really helps! He never makes a strong case that people who embrace change with rosy cheeks and towel-snapping in the locker room of life actually exist. I vote with H.L. Mencken, who wrote:
Mr. Cowen goes on to try to prove his thesis by showing that Americans don't move house as much as they used to, and when they do they are segregating themselves in most lamentable ways—or at least Richard Florida, the popular denunciator of wilful tribalism and gentrification, and dean of social engineering, whom Mr. Cowen references, thinks so. Americans have stopped creating, as evidenced by a few orphaned facts and scrupulously chosen data. And now, I am shocked to relate, we use information technology to match ourselves, as he shows in The Respite of the Well-Ordered Match: Love, Music, and Even Your Dog, as though having more and better information than we used to have is a sign of arrogant complacency. Think of the good old days when we would marry Doreen from the typing pool, because she spoke to us in the cafeteria once. Finally, he points to the riots and protest marches of the 60's and 70's as proof that we have now lost that sweet spirit of rebellion. Many post-Trumpian marches and demonstrations prove otherwise, but perhaps didn't happen in time for the book's publication. University and college men in the 50's and early 60's still wore ties and sport jackets, the very picture of complacency, but extreme racial injustice and murderous American militarism demanded desperate responses, and thus we lost a societal trust and a commitment to common decency that have probably never recovered.
From Chapter 7 (How a Dynamic Society Looks and Feels) onward, having poorly proved his point, Mr. Cowen exercises his creativity and powers of prognostication very well, and I enjoyed the rest of the book. His editor should have moved Chapter 7 upfront. It would have given him a point of reference to build some credible arguments and come up with a better word than complacency
I guess that New York Times Bestselling Authors probably get multi-book deals and generous advances that make it necessary to sometimes squeeze them out before the thesis is fully formed. Coming, ready or not. Not until very late in the book, did I understand what The Complacent Class was meant to mean, and why the quest for the American dream was self-defeating. Perhaps it's because I am not American, but it seems to me that The American Dream was an anemic abstraction when it was coined (up there with The Greatest Generation), and usage of it should excuse attempted strangulation, if not more.
In the first chapter, titled The Complacent Class and Its Dangers, Mr. Cowen does explain, "And I've coined the phrase the complacent class to describe the growing number of people in our society who accept, welcome, or even enforce a resistance to things different or challenging. These people might in the abstract like some things to change, they might even consider themselves progressive or even radical politically, but in fact they have lost the capacity to imagine or embrace a world where things do change rapidly for most if not all people." He goes on to break the complacent class into The Privileged Class, Those Who Dig In, and Those Who Get Stuck. That really helps! He never makes a strong case that people who embrace change with rosy cheeks and towel-snapping in the locker room of life actually exist. I vote with H.L. Mencken, who wrote:
The average man never really thinks from end to end of his life. The mental activity of such people is only a mouthing of cliches. What they mistake for thought is simply a repetition of what they have heard. My guess is that well over 80 percent of the human race goes through life without having a single original thought.
Mr. Cowen goes on to try to prove his thesis by showing that Americans don't move house as much as they used to, and when they do they are segregating themselves in most lamentable ways—or at least Richard Florida, the popular denunciator of wilful tribalism and gentrification, and dean of social engineering, whom Mr. Cowen references, thinks so. Americans have stopped creating, as evidenced by a few orphaned facts and scrupulously chosen data. And now, I am shocked to relate, we use information technology to match ourselves, as he shows in The Respite of the Well-Ordered Match: Love, Music, and Even Your Dog, as though having more and better information than we used to have is a sign of arrogant complacency. Think of the good old days when we would marry Doreen from the typing pool, because she spoke to us in the cafeteria once. Finally, he points to the riots and protest marches of the 60's and 70's as proof that we have now lost that sweet spirit of rebellion. Many post-Trumpian marches and demonstrations prove otherwise, but perhaps didn't happen in time for the book's publication. University and college men in the 50's and early 60's still wore ties and sport jackets, the very picture of complacency, but extreme racial injustice and murderous American militarism demanded desperate responses, and thus we lost a societal trust and a commitment to common decency that have probably never recovered.
From Chapter 7 (How a Dynamic Society Looks and Feels) onward, having poorly proved his point, Mr. Cowen exercises his creativity and powers of prognostication very well, and I enjoyed the rest of the book. His editor should have moved Chapter 7 upfront. It would have given him a point of reference to build some credible arguments and come up with a better word than complacency
January 8, 2017
In the realm of "why Trump/Sanders in 2016", this book has one of the best takes I've encountered. It fits with the general Cowen theme of stagnation but expands on how and why America has come to prefer stability to dynamism and what that means for the cyclical nature of civilizations, with ours in particular. I find myself yearning for stability as I grow older so this book prodded me in an important way.
March 6, 2017
This book was more thought-provoking than I expected, and provides timely hypotheses regarding the current politico-economic status quo and its future. Cowen argues that too many in the United States – including the wealthy, those in the middle class who are comfortable, and those without many resources – are content with the way things are politically and economically. This complacency is distinctly opposed to the American dream, which is built on the premise that Americans can raise their position on the economic ladder with ingenuity and hard work. Instead, opportunities for social mobility are increasingly drying up, and people are either happy (because they're comfortable in their own economic position) or too disadvantaged to do anything about it (the underclass doesn't really have time or resources to upset the status quo).
One of the most intriguing arguments made by the author is that President Trump, in spite of his uniqueness, actually was voted into office to maintain the status quo of America rather than engage in revolutionary policymaking. Cowen posits that the status quo cannot continue indefinitely; however, it's going to take a large outside event, such as a tremendous natural disaster or a war on multiple fronts, to provoke citizens of the United States into change. Although cracks in the current system – like the protests in Ferguson, Missouri – are cracks in societal complacency, Cowen appears to think we'll have to wait 15 to 20 years for a genuine shift.
One of the most intriguing arguments made by the author is that President Trump, in spite of his uniqueness, actually was voted into office to maintain the status quo of America rather than engage in revolutionary policymaking. Cowen posits that the status quo cannot continue indefinitely; however, it's going to take a large outside event, such as a tremendous natural disaster or a war on multiple fronts, to provoke citizens of the United States into change. Although cracks in the current system – like the protests in Ferguson, Missouri – are cracks in societal complacency, Cowen appears to think we'll have to wait 15 to 20 years for a genuine shift.
August 11, 2017
This is a book that's worth reading just to become aware of the data that Cowen has accumulated, which is often jarring and definitely worth further study. It's a good companion to Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010, as it helps to put Murray's findings on the white working class into the context of the issues facing America more broadly.
As is sometimes the case when I read Cowen, while I appreciate the pattern that he's identified here, I do not think he makes a compelling case for his narrative. It's unclear much of the time whether he thinks he's providing causal data or simply reporting effects. Either way, he gives very little (and sometimes no) consideration to alternative causal relationships, creating the impression that these data are simple to interpret. To his credit, he makes it clear that addressing the problem is not simple, though his suggestion that phasing out antidepressants, which are "tranquillizing" the population, makes me worry that he has not taken the time to learn enough about other potential steps toward a solution that he suggests.
Cowen's case for taking a cyclical view of history is especially weak. I was frustrated that he didn't take more time to seriously consider how Dierdre N. McCloskey's Great Enrichment affects his claim, and think that his consideration of Steven Pinker's narrative about declining violence was disappointingly superficial.
Overall a useful, but frustrating, book.
As is sometimes the case when I read Cowen, while I appreciate the pattern that he's identified here, I do not think he makes a compelling case for his narrative. It's unclear much of the time whether he thinks he's providing causal data or simply reporting effects. Either way, he gives very little (and sometimes no) consideration to alternative causal relationships, creating the impression that these data are simple to interpret. To his credit, he makes it clear that addressing the problem is not simple, though his suggestion that phasing out antidepressants, which are "tranquillizing" the population, makes me worry that he has not taken the time to learn enough about other potential steps toward a solution that he suggests.
Cowen's case for taking a cyclical view of history is especially weak. I was frustrated that he didn't take more time to seriously consider how Dierdre N. McCloskey's Great Enrichment affects his claim, and think that his consideration of Steven Pinker's narrative about declining violence was disappointingly superficial.
Overall a useful, but frustrating, book.
May 4, 2017
Friends
Romans
Countrymen!
I come to praise Tyler Cowen, not to bury him.
I don’t want to bury anyone, really. But the praise will be faint.
I like Tyler. He’s good on the blogs. He’s good on the Twitter.
I just think he’s wrong a lot. And in his book, he over-reaches his thesis.
I’m not sure if this is a failure of me as a reader or of Tyler as a writer, but I’m not really sure who falls in the circle of his “Complacent Class”.
The whole thing reads as someone who decided on a thesis and then tried to marshal some evidence to support it. It didn’t sell me. But that is not to say that the things he looks at are not a problem of cultural and economic dynamism. What I worry about is the direction of power and the decisions that are made.
For example: Tyler looks at the fact that fewer people are moving over time. This might be a problem. But is it because people are complacent? Or is it because people have fuller information. The Joads went to California because they thought that there were jobs there. They were wrong.
There have been some regional booms in my lifetime. Land is cheap in the south and so are taxes so some people go there. But there’s no great migration because people are leaving sharecropping for manufacturing work. Not sure that that represents any kind of Complacency.
And this is in the face of Occupy and Ferguson and Baltimore and the Women’s marches in response to Trump. It’s too clean, and feels so wrong.
Romans
Countrymen!
I come to praise Tyler Cowen, not to bury him.
I don’t want to bury anyone, really. But the praise will be faint.
I like Tyler. He’s good on the blogs. He’s good on the Twitter.
I just think he’s wrong a lot. And in his book, he over-reaches his thesis.
I’m not sure if this is a failure of me as a reader or of Tyler as a writer, but I’m not really sure who falls in the circle of his “Complacent Class”.
The whole thing reads as someone who decided on a thesis and then tried to marshal some evidence to support it. It didn’t sell me. But that is not to say that the things he looks at are not a problem of cultural and economic dynamism. What I worry about is the direction of power and the decisions that are made.
For example: Tyler looks at the fact that fewer people are moving over time. This might be a problem. But is it because people are complacent? Or is it because people have fuller information. The Joads went to California because they thought that there were jobs there. They were wrong.
There have been some regional booms in my lifetime. Land is cheap in the south and so are taxes so some people go there. But there’s no great migration because people are leaving sharecropping for manufacturing work. Not sure that that represents any kind of Complacency.
And this is in the face of Occupy and Ferguson and Baltimore and the Women’s marches in response to Trump. It’s too clean, and feels so wrong.
May 3, 2017
Cowen's Complacent Class seems pretty tired if you read it in one sense -- the old man who looks at the changed world, thinking "how did they get it so wrong?" Here are two quotes to substantiate that observation:
"The forces behind the rise of the complacent class are quite general. For better or worse, the truth is that peace and high incomes tend to drain the restlessness of people."
Who cares about restlessness? And this from someone who has clearly cashed in on the boomer generation's expanding economy? It's not so much that this book is difficult to find credible as it is easy to dismiss its credibility. Here is Cowen on how Millennials seem less like to drive cars or get a driver's license:
"America's future is likely to bring a much greater use of driverless cars, which will be a major gain in terms of safety and convenience. But just think of the reorientation in terms of cultural and emotional significance: It will be the cars controlling us rather than vice versa. The driver of the American car used to drive an entire economy, but now the driver will be passive, and what will the culture become?"
I can't imagine a more gratifying statistic than one that shows younger generations are driving less.
But the book is still interesting. By "restlessness," Cowen means something more general. It's worth noting that he feels America is the driver of the planet's innovation, so he sees in the country an exceptional role that makes the world a better place, though not a divinely granted one. He's very upfront about his suburban, hardly at all restless upbringing. I'm not sure he's read This is Where You Belong, but he's read a lot else.
Other thoughts:
The statistics often seem under explored, but whether they hold up individually -- and I think they sometimes, perhaps often, don't -- on the whole, they seem very convincing. At one point, he points out that the children of parents who moved do better in the long run. Well, my first thought is that those parents would probably have high paying jobs and growing up in a wealthy household succeed in terms of status or career. So the statistic seems less impressive than it could or should. And yet, tied to all these other trends, I still find myself thinking about whether the larger thesis holds.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this book is that it appears designed to communicate to both liberals and conservatives.
What if the restlessness that he values was always an illusion? It once was as simple as"Go west young man," but that doesn't apply anymore -- at least, not in the sense that it once did.
What if his understanding of dynamism is just oil and its technologies? At one point, he discusses dynamism in China and I found myself thinking "they're going through their oil process."
Cowen's point on the American federal budget was interesting. He suggests that the majority of the American budget is now locked in and that politics focuses on what's left to spend. The reason people are so intransigent about politics is maybe because there is less money over which people can argue.
The ending chapters are maybe the most interesting. I wondered if they were the chapters Cowen most wanted to discuss and if everything that came before was a sort of set up for the final arguments.
Still hesitant? I recommend listening to some podcasts with the author. The one with Ezra Klein on the latter's pod is very fun and interesting from start to finish.
"The forces behind the rise of the complacent class are quite general. For better or worse, the truth is that peace and high incomes tend to drain the restlessness of people."
Who cares about restlessness? And this from someone who has clearly cashed in on the boomer generation's expanding economy? It's not so much that this book is difficult to find credible as it is easy to dismiss its credibility. Here is Cowen on how Millennials seem less like to drive cars or get a driver's license:
"America's future is likely to bring a much greater use of driverless cars, which will be a major gain in terms of safety and convenience. But just think of the reorientation in terms of cultural and emotional significance: It will be the cars controlling us rather than vice versa. The driver of the American car used to drive an entire economy, but now the driver will be passive, and what will the culture become?"
I can't imagine a more gratifying statistic than one that shows younger generations are driving less.
But the book is still interesting. By "restlessness," Cowen means something more general. It's worth noting that he feels America is the driver of the planet's innovation, so he sees in the country an exceptional role that makes the world a better place, though not a divinely granted one. He's very upfront about his suburban, hardly at all restless upbringing. I'm not sure he's read This is Where You Belong, but he's read a lot else.
Other thoughts:
The statistics often seem under explored, but whether they hold up individually -- and I think they sometimes, perhaps often, don't -- on the whole, they seem very convincing. At one point, he points out that the children of parents who moved do better in the long run. Well, my first thought is that those parents would probably have high paying jobs and growing up in a wealthy household succeed in terms of status or career. So the statistic seems less impressive than it could or should. And yet, tied to all these other trends, I still find myself thinking about whether the larger thesis holds.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this book is that it appears designed to communicate to both liberals and conservatives.
What if the restlessness that he values was always an illusion? It once was as simple as"Go west young man," but that doesn't apply anymore -- at least, not in the sense that it once did.
What if his understanding of dynamism is just oil and its technologies? At one point, he discusses dynamism in China and I found myself thinking "they're going through their oil process."
Cowen's point on the American federal budget was interesting. He suggests that the majority of the American budget is now locked in and that politics focuses on what's left to spend. The reason people are so intransigent about politics is maybe because there is less money over which people can argue.
The ending chapters are maybe the most interesting. I wondered if they were the chapters Cowen most wanted to discuss and if everything that came before was a sort of set up for the final arguments.
Still hesitant? I recommend listening to some podcasts with the author. The one with Ezra Klein on the latter's pod is very fun and interesting from start to finish.
June 30, 2017
Tyler Cowen is one of the handful of economists I follow and read regularly (his blog is http://marginalrevolution.com/). I was excited to read his new book and got my hands on an Advanced copy (set for release on 2/28). As the book jacket summarizes, "We're more comfortable, but there are downsides to this comfort: heightened inequality and segregation, and decreased incentives to innovate and create. The Complacent Class argues that convenience will lead to crisis and that Americans must re-brace change--or else."
Cowen delivers in his new book in a variety of ways: from his commentary and analysis on "Why Americans Stopped Creating" and also "Moving" along with "The Reemergence of Segregation" to "Political stagnation...and [why] Alexis de Tocqueville [was] a Prophet of Our Time".
The key point that Cowen conveys in the book is found on Page 13:
"There is a Zeitgeist and cultural shift well under way, so far underway in fact that it probably needs to play itself out before we can be cured of it. The American economy is less productive and dynamic, Americans challenge fundamental ideas less, we move around less and change our lives less and we are all the more determined to hold on to what we have, dig in and hope (in vain) that, in this growing stagnation, nothing POSSIBLY [emphasis mine] can disturb our sense of calm."
Those concerned with the future trajectory of the country and wanting to keep America great and prosperous should check out this book. Set for official release on February 28!
Cowen delivers in his new book in a variety of ways: from his commentary and analysis on "Why Americans Stopped Creating" and also "Moving" along with "The Reemergence of Segregation" to "Political stagnation...and [why] Alexis de Tocqueville [was] a Prophet of Our Time".
The key point that Cowen conveys in the book is found on Page 13:
"There is a Zeitgeist and cultural shift well under way, so far underway in fact that it probably needs to play itself out before we can be cured of it. The American economy is less productive and dynamic, Americans challenge fundamental ideas less, we move around less and change our lives less and we are all the more determined to hold on to what we have, dig in and hope (in vain) that, in this growing stagnation, nothing POSSIBLY [emphasis mine] can disturb our sense of calm."
Those concerned with the future trajectory of the country and wanting to keep America great and prosperous should check out this book. Set for official release on February 28!
March 4, 2017
I am a big fan of Tyler Cowen. His blog, Marginal Revolution, his columns for Bloomberg and especially his podcast demonstrate his wide-ranging intelligence. This book, however, seems to be in the big idea mode of Gladwellian best sellers, but without the central narrative or point of view. I found it vastly inferior to Cowen's other (and free) discourses.
If you can get past the 'maybes' 'probablys' and 'perhapses' - Cowen's argument is a simple corollary to his previous Great Stagnation and Average Is Over thesis. America is losing its dynamism by many measures and a veneer of peace and prosperity may fall away soon.
There is definitely a narrative that could be woven from Cowen's assemblage of anecdote and data, but his arguments are not carefully built, rather they are scattershot and parts are hedged to the point you wonder why the editor did not just remove them for clarity.
After the opening chapter, which is a barrage of pessimism, all the reader wants is some arrows toward solutions. Unfortunately, the book continues deeper into the darkness, with barely the hint of a silver lining at the end. Perhaps we will all stop taking psychiatric drugs, embrace artificial intelligence and African Americans will lead a charge to overturn the complacent areas of the system, Cowen offers -- in a few characteristically undeveloped bullet points.
As a fan of Cowen, I am disappointed his intellect and breadth of knowledge has not been better put to use with this longform book-length essay. I could easily see him composing something worthy of John Gray, Nassim Taleb or even Montaigne. Your time and dollar would be much better spent reading the summaries and excerpts from this book on his website than the book itself. This book made me fear for Cowen's complacency of thought more than America's.
If you can get past the 'maybes' 'probablys' and 'perhapses' - Cowen's argument is a simple corollary to his previous Great Stagnation and Average Is Over thesis. America is losing its dynamism by many measures and a veneer of peace and prosperity may fall away soon.
There is definitely a narrative that could be woven from Cowen's assemblage of anecdote and data, but his arguments are not carefully built, rather they are scattershot and parts are hedged to the point you wonder why the editor did not just remove them for clarity.
After the opening chapter, which is a barrage of pessimism, all the reader wants is some arrows toward solutions. Unfortunately, the book continues deeper into the darkness, with barely the hint of a silver lining at the end. Perhaps we will all stop taking psychiatric drugs, embrace artificial intelligence and African Americans will lead a charge to overturn the complacent areas of the system, Cowen offers -- in a few characteristically undeveloped bullet points.
As a fan of Cowen, I am disappointed his intellect and breadth of knowledge has not been better put to use with this longform book-length essay. I could easily see him composing something worthy of John Gray, Nassim Taleb or even Montaigne. Your time and dollar would be much better spent reading the summaries and excerpts from this book on his website than the book itself. This book made me fear for Cowen's complacency of thought more than America's.
April 1, 2017
“I tell you: one must still have chaos in oneself, to give birth to a dancing star. I tell you: you have still chaos in yourselves. Alas! There comes the time when man will no longer give birth to any star. Alas! There comes the time of the most despicable man, who can no longer despise himself.
Lo! I show you the Last Man.”
- Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, (1891).
Worries about the decline of spirit in modernity are not new. It forms the basis of Nietzsche’s famous critique of the last man, it’s inherent in communist worries about alienation and right wing critiques of the welfare state.
What’s slightly surprising is to read a book complaining about it now. 2017 seems a world aflame. If there was such a thing as the poem-of-the-time, it would be Yeat’s Second Coming, ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold…The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity’.
Still, as Tyler Cowen writes, it’s clear something has gone wrong in modern America. The Complacent Class (2017) forms part of a trilogy of widely-read books Cowen has written to understand why. The Great Stagnation (2011) argued that America had already eaten the easy ‘low hanging fruit’ of political, social and technological development, hence the stagnation of wages. Average is Over (2013) attempted to look ahead at how the economy was changing, suggesting a minority of talented and IT-savy elites would do very well, and the majority would backslide.
In this final volume, Cowen asks whether a loss of spirit is at fault. He identifies a ‘complacent class’ who have decided life at the end of history is very good and like Faust have yelled ‘stop’. As such, more and more of the Federal budget is locked down with automatic spending (social and health services), more regulations and NIMBYism prevents urban change, and a mix of clear and unclear factors have led Americans to move less, start less businesses, and opt to stay on the couch with delivery and Netflix.
Cowen is one of the most engaging public intellectuals of our age, and there are interesting ideas and studies on every second page. My copy of the book is heavily underlined with notes I want to come back to later. But while I was ready to embrace the book after 50 pages, at its end I’m less certain.
Cown rightly worries that better matching techniques is leading to defacto segregation (with rich marrying rich, black marrying black, etc). Yet he also notes that in Philadelphia in the 1930s, 1/3rd of people married someone who lived within five blocks of themselves (p15). Later he worries that the list of elite higher education institutions in the USA has hardly changed, with most names identical to similar lists from 100 years ago (p77).
So was the past that much more vibrant? Or rather, if cultural issues are the problem, then is human culture very different and less ‘complacent’ today? Or, are other factors at work that may have driven a rare flexibility in the post-war years? And are we perhaps far more flexible on some issues (identity, music etc) and far less on others (physical space). Unfortunately, while The Complacent Class often hints towards such complexity it never seems to get to the nub of these issues.
Economic policy plays a surprisingly small role given this book is by a famous economist. It’s possible to read strong critiques of both government and markets into this book. Which makes it more interesting and fresh, but also leaves the reader asking what exactly Cowen believes are the key mechanisms that are driving the change, whether some trade-offs (such as a basic welfare system) are worth it. This is not only a practical question (such as what we should do next), but goes to the vibrancy of our ideas. Is there an inspiring vision left on either side of the old Keynes/Hayek divide? Are new thinkers of that ilk needed to inspire politics and policy in the 21st century or has that well run dry?
As such, pinning down what exactly Cowen sees as the cause here is unclear. The book’s notion of a class is deliberately amorphous, not based on wealth or even identity, and possibly involving as much as 70% of the US. How this mindset came about is never really explained, beyond a sense of comfort and growing unwillingness to accept risk and difference. I don't know if Cowen thinks this is an American phenomenon alone (much of it seemed familiar as an Australian), or when he thinks it began. Finally, he makes a frustrating nod to the idea that history is cyclical in the final chapter, but why this might be so, and what length the cycles are is never stated.
This is a shame, as this is an interesting and engaging book. Of all western nations, America has always had the greatest struggles with modernity. That is what makes it such a fascinating and inspiring place. If that vibrancy is being lost, the world becomes a bit dimmer for everyone else. We don’t need to embrace Nietzsche’s übermensch notions to want a future where humans grow, change, and create and to hope that America will help to lead the way.
I still believe the modern world is more welcoming of eccentricity and risk taking than its 19th century or even mid-20th century predecessors. But this book is an important caution that for too many of us, change and difference are still seen as too hard, too risky, too immoral even. Even if not a class, even if not the defining character of our era, the appeal of complacency has risen, and Cowen is right to call it out.
Lo! I show you the Last Man.”
- Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, (1891).
Worries about the decline of spirit in modernity are not new. It forms the basis of Nietzsche’s famous critique of the last man, it’s inherent in communist worries about alienation and right wing critiques of the welfare state.
What’s slightly surprising is to read a book complaining about it now. 2017 seems a world aflame. If there was such a thing as the poem-of-the-time, it would be Yeat’s Second Coming, ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold…The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity’.
Still, as Tyler Cowen writes, it’s clear something has gone wrong in modern America. The Complacent Class (2017) forms part of a trilogy of widely-read books Cowen has written to understand why. The Great Stagnation (2011) argued that America had already eaten the easy ‘low hanging fruit’ of political, social and technological development, hence the stagnation of wages. Average is Over (2013) attempted to look ahead at how the economy was changing, suggesting a minority of talented and IT-savy elites would do very well, and the majority would backslide.
In this final volume, Cowen asks whether a loss of spirit is at fault. He identifies a ‘complacent class’ who have decided life at the end of history is very good and like Faust have yelled ‘stop’. As such, more and more of the Federal budget is locked down with automatic spending (social and health services), more regulations and NIMBYism prevents urban change, and a mix of clear and unclear factors have led Americans to move less, start less businesses, and opt to stay on the couch with delivery and Netflix.
Cowen is one of the most engaging public intellectuals of our age, and there are interesting ideas and studies on every second page. My copy of the book is heavily underlined with notes I want to come back to later. But while I was ready to embrace the book after 50 pages, at its end I’m less certain.
Cown rightly worries that better matching techniques is leading to defacto segregation (with rich marrying rich, black marrying black, etc). Yet he also notes that in Philadelphia in the 1930s, 1/3rd of people married someone who lived within five blocks of themselves (p15). Later he worries that the list of elite higher education institutions in the USA has hardly changed, with most names identical to similar lists from 100 years ago (p77).
So was the past that much more vibrant? Or rather, if cultural issues are the problem, then is human culture very different and less ‘complacent’ today? Or, are other factors at work that may have driven a rare flexibility in the post-war years? And are we perhaps far more flexible on some issues (identity, music etc) and far less on others (physical space). Unfortunately, while The Complacent Class often hints towards such complexity it never seems to get to the nub of these issues.
Economic policy plays a surprisingly small role given this book is by a famous economist. It’s possible to read strong critiques of both government and markets into this book. Which makes it more interesting and fresh, but also leaves the reader asking what exactly Cowen believes are the key mechanisms that are driving the change, whether some trade-offs (such as a basic welfare system) are worth it. This is not only a practical question (such as what we should do next), but goes to the vibrancy of our ideas. Is there an inspiring vision left on either side of the old Keynes/Hayek divide? Are new thinkers of that ilk needed to inspire politics and policy in the 21st century or has that well run dry?
As such, pinning down what exactly Cowen sees as the cause here is unclear. The book’s notion of a class is deliberately amorphous, not based on wealth or even identity, and possibly involving as much as 70% of the US. How this mindset came about is never really explained, beyond a sense of comfort and growing unwillingness to accept risk and difference. I don't know if Cowen thinks this is an American phenomenon alone (much of it seemed familiar as an Australian), or when he thinks it began. Finally, he makes a frustrating nod to the idea that history is cyclical in the final chapter, but why this might be so, and what length the cycles are is never stated.
This is a shame, as this is an interesting and engaging book. Of all western nations, America has always had the greatest struggles with modernity. That is what makes it such a fascinating and inspiring place. If that vibrancy is being lost, the world becomes a bit dimmer for everyone else. We don’t need to embrace Nietzsche’s übermensch notions to want a future where humans grow, change, and create and to hope that America will help to lead the way.
I still believe the modern world is more welcoming of eccentricity and risk taking than its 19th century or even mid-20th century predecessors. But this book is an important caution that for too many of us, change and difference are still seen as too hard, too risky, too immoral even. Even if not a class, even if not the defining character of our era, the appeal of complacency has risen, and Cowen is right to call it out.
May 1, 2023
Not bad. Being written in 2016, it was funny to see what he got right and what he got wrong with a couple predictions. Overall, it’s a worrisome problem, and almost all the issues he weighed in on have gotten worse over the last 7 years
May 7, 2017
I was pretty cynical at first. Americans complacent? Tocqueville had observed that America is restless and striving. But I was quite convinced by the end of the book.
So Americans are not moving, not building, not mixing, not taking risks with new businesses. Eventually that will leads to stasis of the economy and thus lack of opportunities for young people etc.
Obviously it does not only apply to America; all advanced countries suffer the same problem. One only needs to look at Japan and Europe. Singapore is facing exactly the same problem.
Cowen is pessimistic about any easy solutions. Discretionary spending is already decreasing as commitment to welfare spending increases. Also with great inequality comes disengagement. So things are going turn pretty ugly eventually. He thinks increased crime and world chaos will ensue and he offers no solution. So growth will become more cyclical and paradoxically, the more security we look for, the worse chaos will come.
So Americans are not moving, not building, not mixing, not taking risks with new businesses. Eventually that will leads to stasis of the economy and thus lack of opportunities for young people etc.
Obviously it does not only apply to America; all advanced countries suffer the same problem. One only needs to look at Japan and Europe. Singapore is facing exactly the same problem.
Cowen is pessimistic about any easy solutions. Discretionary spending is already decreasing as commitment to welfare spending increases. Also with great inequality comes disengagement. So things are going turn pretty ugly eventually. He thinks increased crime and world chaos will ensue and he offers no solution. So growth will become more cyclical and paradoxically, the more security we look for, the worse chaos will come.
March 4, 2017
I never considered the "Complacent Class" thesis before opening this book, but found it to be obviously true after only one chapter. The idea is important and deserves wider recognition.
As a chief member of the complacent class, now i'm left to ponder what this means for both myself and my society; unfortunately, Dr. Cowen provides few answers to this.
This books reads very similar to the other Cowen books, but none the less, is very insightful, interesting and (most importantly) a quick read.
See you folks over at the greatest website on the internet - Marginal Revolution!
As a chief member of the complacent class, now i'm left to ponder what this means for both myself and my society; unfortunately, Dr. Cowen provides few answers to this.
This books reads very similar to the other Cowen books, but none the less, is very insightful, interesting and (most importantly) a quick read.
See you folks over at the greatest website on the internet - Marginal Revolution!
December 15, 2017
For an idea-driven book, there wasn't that much of a thesis. Americans are more complacent now. sure, but why? Answer kept coming back to how different things were. It's a very compelling idea and the prose is very readable so i kept on reading, but in the end I was confused because I am not sure he convinced me of anything. Not that I'm not convinced by the idea, but that there wasn't much convincing going on.
June 27, 2021
It’s hard to think of a book that has aged better in the post-COVID world than The Complacent Class. Cowen’s analysis is well-researched, insightful, and – most impressively – clairvoyantly predictive. Does he predict a virus-borne global pandemic? No, but he predicts that our cultural stasis could be shaken by an external force which challenges the legitimacy of our lethargic institutions and reorganizes our society economically and culturally. The question is: would we be up to the challenge?
In some ways, we have risen to the occasion. Americans have adapted to remote work and schooling, started new businesses at an astounding rate, and broken free from coastal super cities to pursue new lives in the American interior. From our stock buying to our DIY home improvement, we have been dynamic and rambunctious – a doppelganger of the vibrant nation we once claimed to be.
In others, we have failed miserably. Faith in public institutions – most notably the government – continues to decline, and not for lack of good reason. Bureaucracies designed to serve us seem mostly self-interested and totally incapable of working effectively. The only thing we could all agree on was to print more money, borrowing from tomorrow to placate the anxieties of today. We are incapable of uniting as a nation unless under the direst of circumstances, and even then, only to a paltry degree (note: I don’t think that the stimulus was a bad idea – just one whose ease lulled us away from more creative structural reforms).
Was COVID a sufficient force to knock us from our decadent stupor? Did cheap money take away enough of the edge to keep us complacent? I don’t know. We have to wait and see. I’d love to wake up 5 years from now in an America where education is decentralized, entrepreneurship is contagious, NIMBYism has faded, and former economic backwaters have been flooded with human and financial capital. Perhaps, rather than ask the question our job is to manifest the answer. Let’s get to work!
Other musings:
- TC was spot-on with his prediction that racial tensions would continue to boil over. I’m hopeful we do not waste this moment.
- It is hard to read this book and not ask, “Am I the complacent class?” As a highly-educated, suburban meritocrat who tends to date within his own social class, it’s hard not to begrudgingly answer in the affirmative. The next question is, “am I the problem?” I don’t think the answer is obvious or helpful – for me or anyone else. We are all making honest decisions that we perceive to be in our best interest. That doesn’t make us bad people. I think a better question is, “how can I be more dynamic?” As someone who has very intentionally made risk-averse career decisions, betting that it would be easier to slowly, strategically climb the ladder than spring out on my own, I am struck with a desire to take more chances with my work. How can I build something, start a company, or shake up an institution that has become arthritic and impotent? How can I free others to do the same?
There is something romantic about this idea, something beautiful about breaking away from complacency. To me, it is TR’s “Man in the Arena,” JFK’s “Ask Not…,” and Jesus’ willingness to endure the cross. We shouldn’t be reckless, but we must be bold.
In some ways, we have risen to the occasion. Americans have adapted to remote work and schooling, started new businesses at an astounding rate, and broken free from coastal super cities to pursue new lives in the American interior. From our stock buying to our DIY home improvement, we have been dynamic and rambunctious – a doppelganger of the vibrant nation we once claimed to be.
In others, we have failed miserably. Faith in public institutions – most notably the government – continues to decline, and not for lack of good reason. Bureaucracies designed to serve us seem mostly self-interested and totally incapable of working effectively. The only thing we could all agree on was to print more money, borrowing from tomorrow to placate the anxieties of today. We are incapable of uniting as a nation unless under the direst of circumstances, and even then, only to a paltry degree (note: I don’t think that the stimulus was a bad idea – just one whose ease lulled us away from more creative structural reforms).
Was COVID a sufficient force to knock us from our decadent stupor? Did cheap money take away enough of the edge to keep us complacent? I don’t know. We have to wait and see. I’d love to wake up 5 years from now in an America where education is decentralized, entrepreneurship is contagious, NIMBYism has faded, and former economic backwaters have been flooded with human and financial capital. Perhaps, rather than ask the question our job is to manifest the answer. Let’s get to work!
Other musings:
- TC was spot-on with his prediction that racial tensions would continue to boil over. I’m hopeful we do not waste this moment.
- It is hard to read this book and not ask, “Am I the complacent class?” As a highly-educated, suburban meritocrat who tends to date within his own social class, it’s hard not to begrudgingly answer in the affirmative. The next question is, “am I the problem?” I don’t think the answer is obvious or helpful – for me or anyone else. We are all making honest decisions that we perceive to be in our best interest. That doesn’t make us bad people. I think a better question is, “how can I be more dynamic?” As someone who has very intentionally made risk-averse career decisions, betting that it would be easier to slowly, strategically climb the ladder than spring out on my own, I am struck with a desire to take more chances with my work. How can I build something, start a company, or shake up an institution that has become arthritic and impotent? How can I free others to do the same?
There is something romantic about this idea, something beautiful about breaking away from complacency. To me, it is TR’s “Man in the Arena,” JFK’s “Ask Not…,” and Jesus’ willingness to endure the cross. We shouldn’t be reckless, but we must be bold.
September 1, 2020
Unsatisfying, undialectical, and boring. Mr. Cowen seems to prefer a life of opinion column-making over actual economic analysis.
May 3, 2017
In a couple of recent interviews Tyler brought up his worry that too much flexibility in one’s opinions can result in ossification of one’s world view. And I suppose an argument can be made that today’s obsession with ‘causal density’ of complex domains and increasing public awareness of various careful but conflicting studies seems to result in too many intellectuals taking pride in being fastidiously non-dogmatic which in turn can yield dogmatism of higher caliber. In ‘Complacent Class’ Tyler does take a stand in a welcome contrast to his blog where contrariness tends to rule the day.
The book is an extended diagnosis of Tocqueville’s main fear for American democracy coming to fruition – the fear of democratization and broad material well-being leading to mediocrity of the spirit and paucity of the will. To put it another way the book is an extended meditation of status quo bias that has enveloped American spirit and politics. It also channels a Talebian flair in describing various ways in which we are living in a regime where artificial stability is bound to be disrupted. Tyler predicts a “great reset” in the near future that will be painful and possibly prolonged (10-20 years), but he is optimistic about long term unlike say Robert Gordon. He warns that due to our long decent run we may have forgotten that history moves in cycles, but I was a little surprised that he himself was somewhat disturbed by that realization. Perhaps by going out of his way to warn the reader Tyler was revealing a form of transference on his part…
Despite the obvious debt to ideas of Tocqueville and Taleb the book is an excellent read with great tidbits about economic and social history, plenty of side themes and original thought vignettes that I very much enjoyed. Recommended, especially for someone not too familiar with Tyler’s style of thinking and writing.
Rest are notes to self:
- Innovation in information space causing the slowdown in physical space.
o Less moving across state lines/cities
o Decreased need to leave the house when anything and everything can be delivered/provided
o Favoring reshuffling over creation
- Increased self-segregation as a flip side of matching in every domain. Big theme. Nicely explored via:
o Assortative mating
o Cities less diverse than suburbs
o Political polarization as increase in sorting density rather than opinion difference (clustering)
�� o Matching in everything as a “grand project” of our time?
- Riots and complacency. 50s prosperity and broad income gains boil over into Weather Underground, Youth rioting, Black Panthers. 1971-72 US witnessed 2500 domestic bombings.
o Income gains no guarantee of peace.
o Argues that Americans having learned their lessons have over-prioritized public order over free speech.
o These days it is bureaucracy and public space regulations rather than brute force that tend to prevent protest in physical space.
- Complacency is the price you inevitably pay for broad societal success.
o Income mobility is expected to decline even in a dynamic society that is doing everything right.
o Conversely high mobility is a marker of instability (Tyler totally credits Tocqueville here)
o Am surprised he didn’t tie to assortative mating, but then maybe Cowen didn’t want to get too close to genetic meritocracy…
- Countersignalling. Helps preserve the status quo for elites and makes it harder to get ahead for underclass. Sweatpants to the office!
- Politics
o Bernie/Trump is less of a signal for change but mostly a push for a return to the past. Yuval Levin in ‘Fractured Republic’ would describe it as “mythical” past.
o Only 20% of gov’t budget is negotiable today (or rather Fiscal Democracy Index is at 20% relative to about 65% in 1962)
o Argues that today inequality doesn’t breed too many calls for redistribution, but rather entails political disengagement. (Maybe, not fully convincing – listened to our next president Warren lately?)
o Loss of trust/faith in gov’t (smells a lot like Fukuyama who explores this very American trait quite a bit in his “Political Order and Political Decay”. We aren’t as bad as Greece though :))
- Nice sidetrack on dwindling of democracy and nature of sovereignty which culminates with this perfect Tocqueville quote: “They console themselves for being under schoolmasters by thinking that they have chosen them themselves”
The book is an extended diagnosis of Tocqueville’s main fear for American democracy coming to fruition – the fear of democratization and broad material well-being leading to mediocrity of the spirit and paucity of the will. To put it another way the book is an extended meditation of status quo bias that has enveloped American spirit and politics. It also channels a Talebian flair in describing various ways in which we are living in a regime where artificial stability is bound to be disrupted. Tyler predicts a “great reset” in the near future that will be painful and possibly prolonged (10-20 years), but he is optimistic about long term unlike say Robert Gordon. He warns that due to our long decent run we may have forgotten that history moves in cycles, but I was a little surprised that he himself was somewhat disturbed by that realization. Perhaps by going out of his way to warn the reader Tyler was revealing a form of transference on his part…
Despite the obvious debt to ideas of Tocqueville and Taleb the book is an excellent read with great tidbits about economic and social history, plenty of side themes and original thought vignettes that I very much enjoyed. Recommended, especially for someone not too familiar with Tyler’s style of thinking and writing.
Rest are notes to self:
- Innovation in information space causing the slowdown in physical space.
o Less moving across state lines/cities
o Decreased need to leave the house when anything and everything can be delivered/provided
o Favoring reshuffling over creation
- Increased self-segregation as a flip side of matching in every domain. Big theme. Nicely explored via:
o Assortative mating
o Cities less diverse than suburbs
o Political polarization as increase in sorting density rather than opinion difference (clustering)
�� o Matching in everything as a “grand project” of our time?
- Riots and complacency. 50s prosperity and broad income gains boil over into Weather Underground, Youth rioting, Black Panthers. 1971-72 US witnessed 2500 domestic bombings.
o Income gains no guarantee of peace.
o Argues that Americans having learned their lessons have over-prioritized public order over free speech.
o These days it is bureaucracy and public space regulations rather than brute force that tend to prevent protest in physical space.
- Complacency is the price you inevitably pay for broad societal success.
o Income mobility is expected to decline even in a dynamic society that is doing everything right.
o Conversely high mobility is a marker of instability (Tyler totally credits Tocqueville here)
o Am surprised he didn’t tie to assortative mating, but then maybe Cowen didn’t want to get too close to genetic meritocracy…
- Countersignalling. Helps preserve the status quo for elites and makes it harder to get ahead for underclass. Sweatpants to the office!
- Politics
o Bernie/Trump is less of a signal for change but mostly a push for a return to the past. Yuval Levin in ‘Fractured Republic’ would describe it as “mythical” past.
o Only 20% of gov’t budget is negotiable today (or rather Fiscal Democracy Index is at 20% relative to about 65% in 1962)
o Argues that today inequality doesn’t breed too many calls for redistribution, but rather entails political disengagement. (Maybe, not fully convincing – listened to our next president Warren lately?)
o Loss of trust/faith in gov’t (smells a lot like Fukuyama who explores this very American trait quite a bit in his “Political Order and Political Decay”. We aren’t as bad as Greece though :))
- Nice sidetrack on dwindling of democracy and nature of sovereignty which culminates with this perfect Tocqueville quote: “They console themselves for being under schoolmasters by thinking that they have chosen them themselves”
October 11, 2019
Published in 2017, Cowen presents a compelling thesis - a product of our times - seeking to describe the economic and social strifes/unease/tensions characterising America and the Western world.
That we have as a society become more 'complacent' - more stuck in our ways. Despite the voices for equity/equality/'social progress', Cowen presents a story where the people of America suffer from reduced income, geographical, and social mobility. This loss of 'dynamism' is good for those that have 'made it' (a 'complancent class'): the educated, the rich. It means they (and their children) live in a period of stability. But means that the poor (who are also branded as another 'complacent class') are stuck (whether by their own choice or of their economic circumstances/systems (after all individual choices are products of the incentives in the economic system).
At first, the way Cowen presented this sat strangely with me. Cowen critiques 'complacency' but suggests this has been fuelled/come about as a result of ?inevitable? underlying structural economic and social factors. After all, some of these underlying factors appear to be beneficial e.g. the decline of geographical diversity with greater equality in the nature of goods and services available to everyone in different parts of the country; people being more settled into jobs that they like and would rather not leave (a facet of another compelling hypothesis explored later in this book called 'matching'). Furthermore, the book started off anecdotal in its evidence. Continuing on, Cowen presents more 'hard figures' data, but as with most non-fiction bestsellers, I am always left wondering whether/how much this data is cherry-picked to fit the thesis, whether Cowen picks particular arbitrary time periods, or the extent to which datasets from which he draws may be biased in their methodologies. Perhaps the inclusion of visual data graphing over sizeable time periods may assist with reducing the feeling of picking 'arbitrary points'. However, extensive footnoting and a reference list was provided at the end of the book. Although I doubt I will be sifting through this - a sign of 'complacency'.
The enjoyability of reading this book picked up for me after around pg.50. Cowen's perspectives become more fleshed out - providing a perspective of the negative aspects of our times (a loss of dynamism/innovation; a sense of stasis; lower productivity) and the positive (better 'matching'). Compellingly, Cowen argues that this low productivity has arisen out of reduced innovation i.e. more 'stasis'/'complacency' (despite seemingly vast improvements in our IT/technology-scape). For example, there hasn't quite been any innovation in health that parallels the impact/disruption of vaccination, or antibiotics, or sanitation; there hasn't quite been any innovation in transportation that parallels the impact/disruption of cars, railway.
Cowen's ideas that our technological progress - although hasn't resulted in as much productivity/GDP growth as we'd expect. It has improved our 'quality of lives' through better 'matching' of our preferences to products. Other provoking ideas: that although we have seen a decline of crime since the 1960s, we will see a resurgence of crime -> in the form of cybercrime (more difficult to quantify the impact in traditional statistics).
In the end, Cowen maintains that our social and economic progress and selves are governed by cyclical trends. The end of the current state of 'complacency' shall herald a new 'Great Reset' - where winds can push forth a new burst of innovation and progress. Although at the cost of our current stability and content.
Should we really expect a REAL deep and painful downturn? How far will we stray off current trajectories of 'progress' (we have already strayed somewhat) or are we just cyclical about a particular (hopefully forever upward) trajectory? Is this all inevitable? As a society, what should the balance be between stability and complacency? Is this something we can dictate?
That we have as a society become more 'complacent' - more stuck in our ways. Despite the voices for equity/equality/'social progress', Cowen presents a story where the people of America suffer from reduced income, geographical, and social mobility. This loss of 'dynamism' is good for those that have 'made it' (a 'complancent class'): the educated, the rich. It means they (and their children) live in a period of stability. But means that the poor (who are also branded as another 'complacent class') are stuck (whether by their own choice or of their economic circumstances/systems (after all individual choices are products of the incentives in the economic system).
At first, the way Cowen presented this sat strangely with me. Cowen critiques 'complacency' but suggests this has been fuelled/come about as a result of ?inevitable? underlying structural economic and social factors. After all, some of these underlying factors appear to be beneficial e.g. the decline of geographical diversity with greater equality in the nature of goods and services available to everyone in different parts of the country; people being more settled into jobs that they like and would rather not leave (a facet of another compelling hypothesis explored later in this book called 'matching'). Furthermore, the book started off anecdotal in its evidence. Continuing on, Cowen presents more 'hard figures' data, but as with most non-fiction bestsellers, I am always left wondering whether/how much this data is cherry-picked to fit the thesis, whether Cowen picks particular arbitrary time periods, or the extent to which datasets from which he draws may be biased in their methodologies. Perhaps the inclusion of visual data graphing over sizeable time periods may assist with reducing the feeling of picking 'arbitrary points'. However, extensive footnoting and a reference list was provided at the end of the book. Although I doubt I will be sifting through this - a sign of 'complacency'.
The enjoyability of reading this book picked up for me after around pg.50. Cowen's perspectives become more fleshed out - providing a perspective of the negative aspects of our times (a loss of dynamism/innovation; a sense of stasis; lower productivity) and the positive (better 'matching'). Compellingly, Cowen argues that this low productivity has arisen out of reduced innovation i.e. more 'stasis'/'complacency' (despite seemingly vast improvements in our IT/technology-scape). For example, there hasn't quite been any innovation in health that parallels the impact/disruption of vaccination, or antibiotics, or sanitation; there hasn't quite been any innovation in transportation that parallels the impact/disruption of cars, railway.
Cowen's ideas that our technological progress - although hasn't resulted in as much productivity/GDP growth as we'd expect. It has improved our 'quality of lives' through better 'matching' of our preferences to products. Other provoking ideas: that although we have seen a decline of crime since the 1960s, we will see a resurgence of crime -> in the form of cybercrime (more difficult to quantify the impact in traditional statistics).
In the end, Cowen maintains that our social and economic progress and selves are governed by cyclical trends. The end of the current state of 'complacency' shall herald a new 'Great Reset' - where winds can push forth a new burst of innovation and progress. Although at the cost of our current stability and content.
Should we really expect a REAL deep and painful downturn? How far will we stray off current trajectories of 'progress' (we have already strayed somewhat) or are we just cyclical about a particular (hopefully forever upward) trajectory? Is this all inevitable? As a society, what should the balance be between stability and complacency? Is this something we can dictate?
Read
April 17, 2017For most of American history it seemed that anything was possible—that the next generation would live significantly different and better lives. Today that sense of dynamism is waning. We are more anxious to keep what we have, and to avoid others who might see the world differently or threaten our status, than we are eager to create something new.
The only major exception is information technology, which has spawned a stunning revolution over the past several decades. But paradoxically the internet compounds the problem in many ways—keeping us indoors, entertaining us, distracting us from the lack of improvement in the rest of our lives. It efficiently matches us to the people most like us. It adds to the country’s already growing sense of complacency.
In The Complacent Class, the celebrated economist Tyler Cowen backs this view of today’s America with a startling array of evidence. He depicts a sclerosis that is severe but ultimately not capable of paralyzing us entirely. He argues that complacency contains the roots of its own demise, and that we are already seeing a rebellion against the lack of initiative that took over the country starting around the 1980s.
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
The only major exception is information technology, which has spawned a stunning revolution over the past several decades. But paradoxically the internet compounds the problem in many ways—keeping us indoors, entertaining us, distracting us from the lack of improvement in the rest of our lives. It efficiently matches us to the people most like us. It adds to the country’s already growing sense of complacency.
In The Complacent Class, the celebrated economist Tyler Cowen backs this view of today’s America with a startling array of evidence. He depicts a sclerosis that is severe but ultimately not capable of paralyzing us entirely. He argues that complacency contains the roots of its own demise, and that we are already seeing a rebellion against the lack of initiative that took over the country starting around the 1980s.
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
June 19, 2017
Tyler presents a really interesting premise in this book. Although many of the points seem to rely on anecdotal evidence, his conclusions are really plausible. Having grown up in the 50s and 60s I had a chance to participate (or at least witness) in the turmoil on campus and in the country. I think he's right in his assessment that we've been coddling ourselves for years. Increased focus on safety and risk reduction does make for weaker people and a less dynamic environment. We fight about problems instead of coming up with innovative ways to solve them. We are polarized to the point where compromise is almost impossible, even when it's in everyone's best interest. I think that politics and political conversations have come to dominate our thoughts, where they were once only minor interests to most non politicians. We have more important things to think about than politics and we need to remember that politics can solve far fewer problems that politicians would lead you to believe. Good book Tyler.
September 4, 2017
There is little doubt that America is slowly crumbling, as each empire which preceded it has. In his newest analytical critique, Mr. Cowen has cast his perceptive light on what initially seems to be a minor crack in America's foundation, and reveals an intricate mosaic of phenomena exposing dangers of a most serious nature. There are a great many well researched statistics bandied about to buttress his observations, and to his credit he does not submerge himself so deeply in them that they cripple his insight and obscure reality.
Unfortunately, his gifts end at perceiving well camouflaged problems, and does not extend to offering solutions. Of course no one presently has any answers to the issues he addresses, but he is clearly a very clever fellow, and I thought perhaps he might have more to say regarding what actions might be taken to right the ship.
This a certainly a book worth reading, and is an important wake up call to our nation of sleepwalkers.
Unfortunately, his gifts end at perceiving well camouflaged problems, and does not extend to offering solutions. Of course no one presently has any answers to the issues he addresses, but he is clearly a very clever fellow, and I thought perhaps he might have more to say regarding what actions might be taken to right the ship.
This a certainly a book worth reading, and is an important wake up call to our nation of sleepwalkers.
April 5, 2020
I really liked it. Really good book. Must read. I read "Average Is Over" first and after that "The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All The Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History" and finally The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream. I think these books are like a puzzle that build a strong foundation to understand economics and being a better person. Thank you Tyler for helping me to understand a new horizon view that without you I believe that I couldn't see it. Great job :)
March 6, 2017
A good exposition of how our society has become less dynamic. Lots of good statistics and arguments. Kind of a grim expectation for the near future that our society (both in the US and globally) will be forced out of its stasis. Definitely recommend!
January 21, 2022
Central claim: There's a lack of urgency to change anything
How it shows
- Lower mobility, both in moving and in investments in intercity travel
- Less founding of companies
- Bias towards less disruptive (?) IT and away from construction and technology
- Higher segregation due to self-sorting (people prefer living with similar people, economic but also cultural and with that ethnic and plausibly racism-biased)
- Less switching jobs
- Less civil unrest, less violence, less adhesion to revolutionary ideologies like communism
Why?
- Disillusionment of the poor: violence and ideologies won't pay off
- Happiness with state of affairs of well-off
- Complacent oligopolies, areas where there's no path in for outsiders (car, plane manufacturing)
- Increased interest in safety and stability
- NIMBY, restricting demonstrations, wearing down political protests with bureaucratic measures
Other notes
- Lack of social mobility might be explained by people with genes for intelligence and conscientiousness all having assumed stable wealthy family lines
- Europe has occupied this stage much longer
Rant about complacency
A part of me wants to be complacent. To stop investing effort in things, chill and watch how everything goes my way anyway. It wants to think that everything is going well enough, no reason to do anything differently.
This general pattern frustrates me, as I don't think things are going well enough at all. I think there is much to do, and to do differently. I want to live on an Earth that is much more impatient with things worth caring about: the suffering of the poor, the suffering of the elderly and sick, the suffering of both wild and farm animals, the bright future we are risking to never arrive at. So much misery and wasted beauty.
Why am I so preoccupied with finding a safe career, owning a house and having a small family? Maybe we used to have little caring left for distant strangers. Many people today don't have the slack to care for much more than themselves. And caring is demanding. While allowing myself to care comes with meaning and drive, it sure comes with heavy demands to act on it. It's the Copenhagen interpretation of Ethics, just acknowledging the problem gives you responsibility for working on it. It's also heartbreaking to grasp the suffering. And historically speaking, caring too much can go very wrong if you are not remarkably careful about what you're doing with all the energy you are releasing. And evolutionarily speaking, probably people who care too much for distant strangers tended to not reproduce enough to become my ancestors. (... is the Catholic Church with its celibacy rules a machine to weed out the most caring ones from the gene pool?)
Anyway. There is so insanely much to do. I don't want to be happy just by being relatively well off on this Earth. I hope I never lose sight of the insight that my comfort really matters as much as the comfort of everyone else's.
How it shows
- Lower mobility, both in moving and in investments in intercity travel
- Less founding of companies
- Bias towards less disruptive (?) IT and away from construction and technology
- Higher segregation due to self-sorting (people prefer living with similar people, economic but also cultural and with that ethnic and plausibly racism-biased)
- Less switching jobs
- Less civil unrest, less violence, less adhesion to revolutionary ideologies like communism
Why?
- Disillusionment of the poor: violence and ideologies won't pay off
- Happiness with state of affairs of well-off
- Complacent oligopolies, areas where there's no path in for outsiders (car, plane manufacturing)
- Increased interest in safety and stability
- NIMBY, restricting demonstrations, wearing down political protests with bureaucratic measures
Other notes
- Lack of social mobility might be explained by people with genes for intelligence and conscientiousness all having assumed stable wealthy family lines
- Europe has occupied this stage much longer
Rant about complacency
A part of me wants to be complacent. To stop investing effort in things, chill and watch how everything goes my way anyway. It wants to think that everything is going well enough, no reason to do anything differently.
This general pattern frustrates me, as I don't think things are going well enough at all. I think there is much to do, and to do differently. I want to live on an Earth that is much more impatient with things worth caring about: the suffering of the poor, the suffering of the elderly and sick, the suffering of both wild and farm animals, the bright future we are risking to never arrive at. So much misery and wasted beauty.
Why am I so preoccupied with finding a safe career, owning a house and having a small family? Maybe we used to have little caring left for distant strangers. Many people today don't have the slack to care for much more than themselves. And caring is demanding. While allowing myself to care comes with meaning and drive, it sure comes with heavy demands to act on it. It's the Copenhagen interpretation of Ethics, just acknowledging the problem gives you responsibility for working on it. It's also heartbreaking to grasp the suffering. And historically speaking, caring too much can go very wrong if you are not remarkably careful about what you're doing with all the energy you are releasing. And evolutionarily speaking, probably people who care too much for distant strangers tended to not reproduce enough to become my ancestors. (... is the Catholic Church with its celibacy rules a machine to weed out the most caring ones from the gene pool?)
Anyway. There is so insanely much to do. I don't want to be happy just by being relatively well off on this Earth. I hope I never lose sight of the insight that my comfort really matters as much as the comfort of everyone else's.
November 16, 2018
I picked this book up because I have really enjoyed Tyler Cowen’s podcast (Conversations with Tyler), and wanted to see what a book by him would be like. Although way more economic/social science-y in content, it also fit into a larger constellation of books I have been reading that generally argue that systems are like other systems and systems work best when not hampered down by artificial processes. The angle is completely different, but the general point (that I got out of it) was actually quite similar to Anti-fragile, The Misbehavior of Markets, and Systems. Tyler himself gives a nod to Taleb in the final chapter of the book - agreeing with his point that volatility signals stability, and vice versa. He also gives one to Minsky, saying that periods of financial stability contained the seeds of their own destrcution, because eventually all that stability would cause investors to let down their collective guard and take too much risk
Anyways, the argument of the book is that America used to be quite active, which had a lot of bad side effects, but so many good ones too. Now we live in a safer environment where our actions are constrained by our own comfort and laziness, that we are static and stagnant. Short term comfort, Cowen contends, will lead to our long-term demise. He proves his argument (America is becoming more complacent at every socio economic class as evidenced by several factors), chapter by chapter. He demonstrates that people move less (literally becoming more stagnant, whereas people used to move for new opportunities), we are more segregated (a particularly interesting chapter in which he demonstrates the “liberal” minded people are also the one’s leading the NIMBY-not in my back yard-crusade ), we’re less creative (silicon valley is doing less cool stuff than they used to, despite the hype), lazy (constantly getting matched - with music, dating, entertainment- everything is given to us on a platter), and we riot less and smoke more weed (probably the worst chapter of the book).
Cowen reveals toward the end of the book that he approaches America from a Tocquevillian point of view. He quotes him: “People suppose that the new societies are going to change shape daily, but my fear is that they will end up being too unalterably fixed with the same institutions, prejudices, and mores, so that mankind will stop progressing and will dig itself in. I fear that the mind may keep folding itself up in a narrower compass forever without producing new ideas, that men will wear themselves out in trivial, lonely, futile activity, and that for all its constant agitation humanity will make no advance.” American Democracy and society in both de Tocqueville and Cowen’s minds is an active process. As soon as we lose that activity, our society will fundamentally shift. And, if we take a systems-approach, that should lead us to believe that our system will die.
All the talk in the other comments about disorganized may be true, but the content - with a ton of stats and anecdotes - made up for the sub-optimal organization.
Anyways, the argument of the book is that America used to be quite active, which had a lot of bad side effects, but so many good ones too. Now we live in a safer environment where our actions are constrained by our own comfort and laziness, that we are static and stagnant. Short term comfort, Cowen contends, will lead to our long-term demise. He proves his argument (America is becoming more complacent at every socio economic class as evidenced by several factors), chapter by chapter. He demonstrates that people move less (literally becoming more stagnant, whereas people used to move for new opportunities), we are more segregated (a particularly interesting chapter in which he demonstrates the “liberal” minded people are also the one’s leading the NIMBY-not in my back yard-crusade ), we’re less creative (silicon valley is doing less cool stuff than they used to, despite the hype), lazy (constantly getting matched - with music, dating, entertainment- everything is given to us on a platter), and we riot less and smoke more weed (probably the worst chapter of the book).
Cowen reveals toward the end of the book that he approaches America from a Tocquevillian point of view. He quotes him: “People suppose that the new societies are going to change shape daily, but my fear is that they will end up being too unalterably fixed with the same institutions, prejudices, and mores, so that mankind will stop progressing and will dig itself in. I fear that the mind may keep folding itself up in a narrower compass forever without producing new ideas, that men will wear themselves out in trivial, lonely, futile activity, and that for all its constant agitation humanity will make no advance.” American Democracy and society in both de Tocqueville and Cowen’s minds is an active process. As soon as we lose that activity, our society will fundamentally shift. And, if we take a systems-approach, that should lead us to believe that our system will die.
All the talk in the other comments about disorganized may be true, but the content - with a ton of stats and anecdotes - made up for the sub-optimal organization.
March 16, 2018
Cowen, a prolific blogger, has a lot of interesting insights and ideas. He writes and talks (he's a great podcast guest) frequently, and in this case he chose to expand one of these ideas into a book. While Cowen fills the book with interesting anecdotes and a few choice observations on American culture and society, the overall case that the culmination of years of progress toward automation, technological customization, and broader access to basic goods (internet, literacy, etc) has led to the rise of a complacent class that is both less dynamic and more boring is... well, muddied. Cowen scores plenty of points in favor of his argument, which, to be honest, sometimes reads as too self-evident to be truly novel. But Cowen simultaneously argues that the improvements in quality of life that have fostered complacency are in fact not really improvements. And in a bewildering final five pages he seems to change the thesis of the book to make the case that actually, the complacent class is probably fleeting due to impending chaos in the international system.
Cowen is at his best when using his gift for societal observation to offer hypotheticals on future economic or cultural trends. And he does have a way of spotting interesting signals in all of the noise. Take, for example, this observation on gentrification of urban areas that precedes examining statistics on growing pervasive racial re-segregation in public schools: "It is school systems that tell you what Americans care about and also where the country is headed. There is a common pattern of young, dual-earner couples deciding to live in cities and often choosing the funkier parts or mixed neighborhoods, in part to save money and in part because those areas may be interesting to live in. That is one factor driving down rates of residential segregation, and, to be sure, that is a positive development. Still, when they have children and it is time to send the kids to school, they often move to the suburbs, or to a more expensive part of the same city, or to a different city altogether. The integration is a kind of temporary experiment in white lives, to be reversed once the next generation comes along. It is good that so many people are willing to make this temporary experiment but bad that it doesn't have greater staying power or turn into a means of interesting young children." There is a lot to unpack there.
The Complacency Class is full of good ideas and interesting observations. I'm just not sure they work together as a book. If skipping this read, don't skip Cowen himself. I highly recommend both his blog and his appearance on various podcasts (his interview by Ezra Klein last year was particularly interesting).
Cowen is at his best when using his gift for societal observation to offer hypotheticals on future economic or cultural trends. And he does have a way of spotting interesting signals in all of the noise. Take, for example, this observation on gentrification of urban areas that precedes examining statistics on growing pervasive racial re-segregation in public schools: "It is school systems that tell you what Americans care about and also where the country is headed. There is a common pattern of young, dual-earner couples deciding to live in cities and often choosing the funkier parts or mixed neighborhoods, in part to save money and in part because those areas may be interesting to live in. That is one factor driving down rates of residential segregation, and, to be sure, that is a positive development. Still, when they have children and it is time to send the kids to school, they often move to the suburbs, or to a more expensive part of the same city, or to a different city altogether. The integration is a kind of temporary experiment in white lives, to be reversed once the next generation comes along. It is good that so many people are willing to make this temporary experiment but bad that it doesn't have greater staying power or turn into a means of interesting young children." There is a lot to unpack there.
The Complacency Class is full of good ideas and interesting observations. I'm just not sure they work together as a book. If skipping this read, don't skip Cowen himself. I highly recommend both his blog and his appearance on various podcasts (his interview by Ezra Klein last year was particularly interesting).
August 30, 2017
I've been reading Tyler Cowen's blog for a few years now, and also enjoy his podcast. I also happened to read a few book reviews when this was published a few years ago. So I was familiar with most of the book.
Some interesting facts, mostly copied verbatim:
- according to some, ~20% of boys aged 14-17 in the US today have been diagnosed with ADHD, although this diagnosis didn't exist in DSM until 1980
- the share of Americans under 30 who own a business has fallen by about 65% since the 1980s
- The inter-state migration rate in the US has fallen 51% below it's 1948-1971 average, and that number has been falling steadily since the mid-1980s
- Individuals spend more time at the same job than before, not less, which is the common belief (this is skewed by the aging of the workforce, though)
- In 1998, 44% of workers had 5+ years at their job. By 2014, this had increased to 51%. The % of workers with <1 year on the job had fallen from 21% to 28%
- American geographic diversity has diminished
- in the 1950's, only about 5% of workers required a government license to do their job. by 2008, it's 29%. This is partly because we shifted from manufacturing to service, but professions have also pushed for government protection from new entrants
- We spend a much higher share of our income on rent today. In the 1950's, a typical New Yorker spent ~10% of the national median salary on rent. Today it's 84% of the national median salary on rent
- Neighborhoods have segregated for Black and Hispanic families by pricing them out of neighborhoods and keeping them out of good schools
Some interesting facts, mostly copied verbatim:
- according to some, ~20% of boys aged 14-17 in the US today have been diagnosed with ADHD, although this diagnosis didn't exist in DSM until 1980
- the share of Americans under 30 who own a business has fallen by about 65% since the 1980s
- The inter-state migration rate in the US has fallen 51% below it's 1948-1971 average, and that number has been falling steadily since the mid-1980s
- Individuals spend more time at the same job than before, not less, which is the common belief (this is skewed by the aging of the workforce, though)
- In 1998, 44% of workers had 5+ years at their job. By 2014, this had increased to 51%. The % of workers with <1 year on the job had fallen from 21% to 28%
- American geographic diversity has diminished
- in the 1950's, only about 5% of workers required a government license to do their job. by 2008, it's 29%. This is partly because we shifted from manufacturing to service, but professions have also pushed for government protection from new entrants
- We spend a much higher share of our income on rent today. In the 1950's, a typical New Yorker spent ~10% of the national median salary on rent. Today it's 84% of the national median salary on rent
- Neighborhoods have segregated for Black and Hispanic families by pricing them out of neighborhoods and keeping them out of good schools
December 20, 2017
The book provides a comprehensive explanation for the growing trend of anti-globalism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-elitism (I'm mindful of the use of the word "populism", in fact I do not consider the polarizing events of 2016 to be populist at all) as observed in the past several years. The election of Trump into the White House and the supposedly surprising result of the Brexit referendum (duh!) are all good contemporary examples of this increasingly visible ideological drift. Cowen's contribution mainly lies in his analysis of the cause and effect of such phenomena -- instead of participating in the ongoing war of words and slurs, he demonstrated that current economic events, along with people's perception of these events, were nothing more than an anticipated recovery from the abnormalities of the 20th century. The real questions concerning alarmed readers should be, then, how might the country make a turn and revert to the track of universal growth instead of rising inequality? More importantly, will the U.S. be heading towards a vicious circle of class segregation (or worse, disintegration) and economic stagnation, or will the world's largest economy somehow resume its former prosperity? The author doesn't really have solid answers, either.
Apart from the aforementioned insights into the mechanism of the rise of alternative ideologies and minority awareness, the book didn't really have much valuable to present. Unfortunately, there were some really awkward moments throughout the book in which Cowen attempted to apply his overly economic logic to social issues -- mind I say, they were pretty bad!
Overall the book does worth some quality reading time, but you shouldn't expect too much for discovering insightful answers to any significant issues.
Apart from the aforementioned insights into the mechanism of the rise of alternative ideologies and minority awareness, the book didn't really have much valuable to present. Unfortunately, there were some really awkward moments throughout the book in which Cowen attempted to apply his overly economic logic to social issues -- mind I say, they were pretty bad!
Overall the book does worth some quality reading time, but you shouldn't expect too much for discovering insightful answers to any significant issues.
September 21, 2021
I was drawn in by this one’s title and cover — it seemed like it would be a fun, and possibly even controversial, take on where the country is headed. I’d never heard of the author before, but I was interested enough in the book’s description, so I gave it a shot.
You can never really know what a book is going to be like heading into it, but I do think I should’ve paid a bit more attention to the reviews of this one. They seem to reflect what I found in the end — a narrative that lacked cohesion, emotion, and much of a conclusion.
For most of the audiobook (I listened to this one, btw), I felt like I was hearing the passive reading of a research study’s results — there were loads of statistics, but none of them really linked to a larger narrative or made you feel connected to a central theme.
There were many different topics covered in it as well, but they all seemed somewhat disjointed. I heard a lot about “matching” and “segregation,” two things I didn’t expect when looking at the book’s title, but not enough about complacency. Sure, there’s a little bit of that subject in this one, but not enough.
On a closing note, I’ll say I did notice that some other reviews cited political arguments as the problem with this one. To be honest, I didn’t feel the same way; to me, it didn’t seem politically charged at all. It was just a bit boring.
You can never really know what a book is going to be like heading into it, but I do think I should’ve paid a bit more attention to the reviews of this one. They seem to reflect what I found in the end — a narrative that lacked cohesion, emotion, and much of a conclusion.
For most of the audiobook (I listened to this one, btw), I felt like I was hearing the passive reading of a research study’s results — there were loads of statistics, but none of them really linked to a larger narrative or made you feel connected to a central theme.
There were many different topics covered in it as well, but they all seemed somewhat disjointed. I heard a lot about “matching” and “segregation,” two things I didn’t expect when looking at the book’s title, but not enough about complacency. Sure, there’s a little bit of that subject in this one, but not enough.
On a closing note, I’ll say I did notice that some other reviews cited political arguments as the problem with this one. To be honest, I didn’t feel the same way; to me, it didn’t seem politically charged at all. It was just a bit boring.
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