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Cambridge Military Histories
How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II
World War II is usually seen as a titanic land battle, decided by mass armies, most importantly those on the Eastern Front. Phillips Payson O'Brien shows us the war in a completely different light. In this compelling new history of the Allied path to victory, he argues that in terms of production, technology and economic power, the war was far more a contest of air and sea than land supremacy. He shows how the Allies developed a predominance of air and sea power which put unbearable pressure on Germany and Japan's entire war-fighting machine from Europe and the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Air and sea power dramatically expanded the area of battle and allowed the Allies to destroy over half the Axis' equipment before it had even reached the traditional 'battlefield'. Battles such as El Alamein, Stalingrad and Kursk did not win World War II; air and sea power did.
640 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2015
About the author
Phillips Payson O'Brien
8 books19 followersPhillips Payson O’Brien is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of St. Andrews in Fife, Scotland, where he has taught since 2016. A graduate of Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, O'Brien earned a PhD in British and American politics and naval policy before being selected as Cambridge University’s Mellon Research Fellow in American History, and a Drapers Research Fellow at Pembroke College.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 41 reviews
April 21, 2022
I'm not a World War II buff. While I have fond memories of watching The World at War each week as a kid in the early 1970s, and more recently I read Liddle Hart's conventional history, military history is not my thing, though as a specialist in Eastern Europe I read a fair amount about Eastern Europe in WW II. In any case, I would likely never have learned about this book had it not been for Professor O'Brien's posts about the war and Ukraine, where he has highlighted the importance of logistics and the desirability of preventing weapons from getting deployed. This would have been a pity, because this book is important and has gotten me to think about World War II quite differently than I did even a few days ago.
Coming of age in an era when strategic bombing during World War II was seen as a needlessly destructive failure, I was a bit apprehensive when I started that this book might be a rah-rah take on US production capacity and a vindication of "Bomber" Harris and Curtis LeMay's worst excesses. It is not. Early on in book we learn that US industrial capacity was far more limited than is generally understood. We also see that no less than FDR grasped the importance of "air superiority" at a time when that had not become a commonplace idea. O'Brien also highlights the importance of Admiral Leahy, whose name I had never heard before, but is convincingly presented here as the most influential strategist for the allies by emphasizing the importance of reducing the mobility of the Axis powers as the key aim and means to bring about victory.
Along the way, O'Brien carefully explains why early decisions relating to air power and bombing were made that in retrospect were not as useful to winning the war as they might have been, while also showing how and why even as late as 1943 the winning strategy was difficult to implement in both the European and Asian theaters. Along the way, Churchill's vision is criticized, though not in the hit job kind of way he has more than once provoked. O'Brien just shows that like a number of other figures like General George Marshall, Stalin, Hitler, MacArthur, and the Japanese leadership we see Churchill remained wed to what O'Brien calls battle-centric understanding of war focused on territory rather than utility, that belonged to the nineteenth century more than the twentieth. In so doing he demonstrates both the weakness of Churchill's beloved idea of focusing on a Mediterranean front and MacArthur's emphasis on the Philippines. Regarding the latter, O'Brien goes so far as to posit that the battle on Peleliu was utterly unnecessary and actually helped insure that the battle for Iwo Jima was much bloodier than it might have been.
One of the interesting by-products of O'Brien's account is it become clearer how German and Japanese leaders could imagine the war remained winnable even after losing what are now conventionally understood as the "turning-points of the war," the battles of Midway and Stalingrad. In both cases, war production remained quite strong, and in the German case would not actually reach peak production until 1944, and in 1943 both Germans and Japanese military leaders could hold their own so long as the allies did not adapt, which of course they did. Indeed, in the Japanese case Allied actions were already beginning to create conditions that would snowball in 1943, in particular the diminished quality of the training afforded pilots. In the European theater it was the P-51 Mustang modified with the more powerful Merlin engine that was key, and allowed Allied air superiority to take hold as bombers now got much longer escorts. Attacks on aircraft manufacturing became key, along side the effort to cut off German fuel supplies. Nonetheless in the end O'Brien makes the argument that even more important was the shift to destroying German transport systems that came late in the war, suggesting that had this been begun even earlier the German war machine would have been crippled earlier. He is the strategic studies specialist, so he is likely right, but I do wonder if the real point is that by 1944 allied advantages of production and strategic vision simply came together and were further amplified by poor German and Japanese decisions. In the process, O'Brien also highlights the importance of Allied countermeasures taken against the V1 and V2 programs, which he shows was far more extensive than is generally appreciated
As I already noted above, it would have been easy to present an argument emphasizing air and sea power that apologized for massive targeting of civilians associated with "Bomber" Harris in Europe and LeMay in Japan. Both men were convinced that their actions were correct and so could be written off as part of the general destruction of war. O'Brien, however, takes a different tack. He notes what worked -- strategic bombing focused on targets that made war production -- but minces no words regarding the senselessness of targeting civilians as a means to undermine the war effort. He does not trumpet the technology of precision bombing as an alternative, and he recognizes that civilians will be killed in a war, but he is clear that it brought no advantage. Most interestingly he offers a third way in the on-going debate about the value of dropping the A-Bomb on Japan, by lifting up Leahy's own take that control of the Marianas was sufficient to grind Japan down without further invasions. That doesn't resolve the issue, and in my middle age I have come to believe that politics insured that the bomb was dropped, but we are not likely to be in a situation where such a huge technological leap will be made in war time any time soon. Still, in our world Leahy's readiness to checkmate Japan from the Marianas seems easier to sell as an alternative to nuclear war.
In closing a fine book. As a non-specialist I was able to follow it pretty well without necessarily reading every word sentence by sentence. It will definitely get you to think about World War II differently.
Coming of age in an era when strategic bombing during World War II was seen as a needlessly destructive failure, I was a bit apprehensive when I started that this book might be a rah-rah take on US production capacity and a vindication of "Bomber" Harris and Curtis LeMay's worst excesses. It is not. Early on in book we learn that US industrial capacity was far more limited than is generally understood. We also see that no less than FDR grasped the importance of "air superiority" at a time when that had not become a commonplace idea. O'Brien also highlights the importance of Admiral Leahy, whose name I had never heard before, but is convincingly presented here as the most influential strategist for the allies by emphasizing the importance of reducing the mobility of the Axis powers as the key aim and means to bring about victory.
Along the way, O'Brien carefully explains why early decisions relating to air power and bombing were made that in retrospect were not as useful to winning the war as they might have been, while also showing how and why even as late as 1943 the winning strategy was difficult to implement in both the European and Asian theaters. Along the way, Churchill's vision is criticized, though not in the hit job kind of way he has more than once provoked. O'Brien just shows that like a number of other figures like General George Marshall, Stalin, Hitler, MacArthur, and the Japanese leadership we see Churchill remained wed to what O'Brien calls battle-centric understanding of war focused on territory rather than utility, that belonged to the nineteenth century more than the twentieth. In so doing he demonstrates both the weakness of Churchill's beloved idea of focusing on a Mediterranean front and MacArthur's emphasis on the Philippines. Regarding the latter, O'Brien goes so far as to posit that the battle on Peleliu was utterly unnecessary and actually helped insure that the battle for Iwo Jima was much bloodier than it might have been.
One of the interesting by-products of O'Brien's account is it become clearer how German and Japanese leaders could imagine the war remained winnable even after losing what are now conventionally understood as the "turning-points of the war," the battles of Midway and Stalingrad. In both cases, war production remained quite strong, and in the German case would not actually reach peak production until 1944, and in 1943 both Germans and Japanese military leaders could hold their own so long as the allies did not adapt, which of course they did. Indeed, in the Japanese case Allied actions were already beginning to create conditions that would snowball in 1943, in particular the diminished quality of the training afforded pilots. In the European theater it was the P-51 Mustang modified with the more powerful Merlin engine that was key, and allowed Allied air superiority to take hold as bombers now got much longer escorts. Attacks on aircraft manufacturing became key, along side the effort to cut off German fuel supplies. Nonetheless in the end O'Brien makes the argument that even more important was the shift to destroying German transport systems that came late in the war, suggesting that had this been begun even earlier the German war machine would have been crippled earlier. He is the strategic studies specialist, so he is likely right, but I do wonder if the real point is that by 1944 allied advantages of production and strategic vision simply came together and were further amplified by poor German and Japanese decisions. In the process, O'Brien also highlights the importance of Allied countermeasures taken against the V1 and V2 programs, which he shows was far more extensive than is generally appreciated
As I already noted above, it would have been easy to present an argument emphasizing air and sea power that apologized for massive targeting of civilians associated with "Bomber" Harris in Europe and LeMay in Japan. Both men were convinced that their actions were correct and so could be written off as part of the general destruction of war. O'Brien, however, takes a different tack. He notes what worked -- strategic bombing focused on targets that made war production -- but minces no words regarding the senselessness of targeting civilians as a means to undermine the war effort. He does not trumpet the technology of precision bombing as an alternative, and he recognizes that civilians will be killed in a war, but he is clear that it brought no advantage. Most interestingly he offers a third way in the on-going debate about the value of dropping the A-Bomb on Japan, by lifting up Leahy's own take that control of the Marianas was sufficient to grind Japan down without further invasions. That doesn't resolve the issue, and in my middle age I have come to believe that politics insured that the bomb was dropped, but we are not likely to be in a situation where such a huge technological leap will be made in war time any time soon. Still, in our world Leahy's readiness to checkmate Japan from the Marianas seems easier to sell as an alternative to nuclear war.
In closing a fine book. As a non-specialist I was able to follow it pretty well without necessarily reading every word sentence by sentence. It will definitely get you to think about World War II differently.
March 8, 2018
Well researched, meticulously analyzed and entertainingly written, Dr O'Brien has produced a very valuable and much needed evaluation of the importance of air and sea power to the outcome of the Second World War, how victory was actually achieved, and that it was not all on the battlefield. He produces the numbers and examines the implications in a very detailed manner that clearly demonstrates the overwhelming influence air and sea power had on the war effort. Covering the strategic bombing campaign in Europe, the battle against the U-boats in the Atlantic and the air and sea campaign against Japan, Dr O'Brien establishes that the vast majority of the war effort went into the production of the most technologically advanced and expensive weapons systems and the "best-trained warriors" who destroyed the vast majority of the war making ability of the Axis powers.
The most important overall contribution this book makes is to clearly demonstrate that the air and sea effort, of the US and Great Britain, dwarfed the effort of the land battles of all combatants and led directly to the defeat of the Axis powers. Dr O'Brien does not say the land battles were unnecessary but shows how the success of the air and sea war contributed to the success of the Allies on land. He shows how the inability of Germany and Japan to compete in the air and sea war left them vulnerable to the systematic destruction of their ability to wage war.
What was new for me was learning that half as many Luftwaffe planes were available for Barbarossa as were available for the invasion of France. A clear indication of how difficult it was for Germany to replace losses sustained prior to June 1941 and how the added need to defend the conquered territories in the west was already overtaxing Germany's ability to achieve its goals. Dr O'Brien also demonstrates the importance of taking the Marianas abundantly clear, and not just for the strategic bombing of Japan. With the Marianas in hand the fast carrier task force could attack merchant shipping and add to the pressure put on the Japanese war economy by the US submarine offensive. Another surprise is that the aerial mining of Japanese harbors late in the war sank as many or perhaps more merchant shipping than submarines.
For me the most enjoyable parts of the book were the discussions of Allied Grand Strategy; the relationship between Roosevelt, Churchill and the members of their military staffs; Admiral Leahy's importance to Roosevelt, the operation of the JCS and grand strategy. The author analyzes the Lend Lease commitments to the Soviets, Great Britain and China and how they were vitally necessary for victory. I also enjoyed his examination of several controversial issues that persist to this day, especially the massive effort to establish and maintain B-29s in China, whether it was really necessary to invade the Philippines prior to Iwo Jima and the targeting of cities in the strategic bombing campaign of both Germany and Japan.
I am very enthusiastic about Dr O'Brien's book and that is why I gave it 5 stars. I think it should be read by every student of World War II. Just an outstanding piece of work.
I do have a quibble, a troubling disagreement with a very small part of the story Dr O'Brien is telling. Dr O'Brien writes, "When Roosevelt began pushing for money for the USN to construct new vessels, the navy continued to opt for a battleship-centric fleet until Pearl Harbor...Once the war in Europe started and before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the USN was given authorization to build a further eleven battleships, six of the Iowa Class and five of the mammoth Montana Class [the note he lists here does not give a source for this and only describes the Montana class] As it was, only four of the Iowa Class were ever completed and the rest cancelled when it became clear during the war that the aircraft carrier was now the decisive weapon. If only the USN had known this before it would have started more than the two aircraft carriers it laid down between 1937 and November 1941, the Hornet in 1939 and the Essex in April 1941. It was still thinking in terms of a capital ship duel in the Pacific." (p 111)
In the summer of 1940 the chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, Carl Vinson, gave a press conference. The House had just passed a massive spending bill to expand the Navy and he had been asked why so much of the bill was devoted to carriers and naval aircraft. Carl Vinson said, "The modern development of aircraft has demonstrated conclusively that the backbone of the Navy today is the aircraft carrier. The carrier, with destroyers, cruisers and submarines grouped around it[,] is the spearhead of all modern naval task forces."
Carl Vinson was the force behind the construction of the North Carolina class and the South Dakota class battleships that Dr O'Brien mentions just prior to the above quote, as Vinson tried to modernize the navy, but in 1940 he got a bill through Congress that called for 18 Essex class aircraft carriers along with the 6 or 7 Iowa and Montana class battleships. This happened in 1940. It was not something that happened after Pearl Harbor. It happened a year earlier and Congress called for not just one carrier but 18. Actually 5 Essex class hulls were laid down in 1941, all before Pearl Harbor. I don't think that House Representative Carl Vinson, Democrat from Georgia, came up with the notion that the fast carrier task force would be the "backbone of the Navy" all by himself. The bill came about from a request from Admiral Stark, CNO, and his staff. It would have been nice if Dr O'Brien could have researched that development. I am a little disappointed that he took the standard line of many historians that it was after Pearl Harbor that the navy came to the conclusion that carriers would be the primary combat ship in a modern navy. Seven of those carriers would be commissioned by the end of 1943 with the commissioning of USS Essex on 31 December 1942. Only 4 Iowa class battleships would be completed and none of the massive Montana class ships ordered in the bill, passed by the House on 18 June 1940 and signed into law in July 1940, would be built. Those developments and the eventual construction of 14 Essex class aircraft carriers, that would see action in the war, I do think are the result of the navy's experience in the first year of the war but the notion that the aircraft carrier would "spearhead" modern naval warfare had to have been envisioned by top navy brass sometime earlier than the summer of 1940, way before the dynamic operations of the Kido Butai.
Stark asked for 4 billion dollars to increase the existing fleet by 70%. The House Naval Affairs Committee increased it to more than 8 billion dollars emphasizing aircraft and called for 15,000 aircraft for the navy. The bill also called for 27 cruisers and an additional 6 Alaska class cruisers that mounted 12" guns. The Alaska class was the US Navy's answer to the battlecruiser. The Navy did still want big guns. Only 2 Alaska class cruisers would see service in WW II. It seems clear that the navy wanted a powerful surface force that included battleships, battlecruisers and cruisers as well as a very powerful fleet of carriers. It is clear that Dr O'Brien's statement of the preference for battleships and the laying down of a single Essex class carrier prior to November 1941 is not accurate. Actually three Essex class carriers were laid down before November 1941 and two more before 7 December 1941. I'm not sure if Admiral Stark would have agreed exactly with Vinson's statement but Vinson and Stark made it possible for 4 fleet carriers to join operations by the end of 1943.
It is clear that the US Navy did not have a detailed doctrine of carrier operations developed before the US entered the war and they surely did still envision battleship duels but the 1940 bill shows they wanted a preponderance of carriers. Is this misrepresentation a fatal flaw in Dr O'Brien's narrative? No, I don't think so. It is a wide miss of the actual history of the US Navy, the development of the US war effort and how it was possible for 7 new Essex class carriers to be commissioned by the end of 1943. It makes me wonder what happened in his research to make such an error and why November 1941 is his cut off for carrier construction and not 7 December, but it is not a fatal flaw and does not influence the rest of his narrative. Actually 1940 was the important year for the Essex class. Only 2 that were ordered after 1940 saw action in the war. Vinson's bill made it possible for 4 replacement carriers to be ready for operations by the end of 1943 and another 3 before the middle of 1944. What did happen after Pearl Harbor was the acceleration of the construction of the Essex class ships and the conversion of 9 Cleveland class cruisers to Independence class light carriers. I just think that overlooking the importance of the Vinson-Walsh Act is a very curious mistake but does not take away from what is obviously Dr O'Brien's main line of research and the narrative he wanted to present.
In most histories Carl Vinson is never mentioned, unless they are examining why Admiral Spruance did not get promoted to Fleet Admiral. I think it is a great shame to ignore Vinson's important work to modernize the US Navy prior to Pearl Harbor and how it was possible for the Navy to lead the way to victory in the Pacific. Vinson served in Congress from 1914 until 1965 and is known as the Father of the Two Ocean Navy. The Nimitz class carrier Carl Vinson, CVN-70, was named in his honor while he was still alive.
The most important overall contribution this book makes is to clearly demonstrate that the air and sea effort, of the US and Great Britain, dwarfed the effort of the land battles of all combatants and led directly to the defeat of the Axis powers. Dr O'Brien does not say the land battles were unnecessary but shows how the success of the air and sea war contributed to the success of the Allies on land. He shows how the inability of Germany and Japan to compete in the air and sea war left them vulnerable to the systematic destruction of their ability to wage war.
What was new for me was learning that half as many Luftwaffe planes were available for Barbarossa as were available for the invasion of France. A clear indication of how difficult it was for Germany to replace losses sustained prior to June 1941 and how the added need to defend the conquered territories in the west was already overtaxing Germany's ability to achieve its goals. Dr O'Brien also demonstrates the importance of taking the Marianas abundantly clear, and not just for the strategic bombing of Japan. With the Marianas in hand the fast carrier task force could attack merchant shipping and add to the pressure put on the Japanese war economy by the US submarine offensive. Another surprise is that the aerial mining of Japanese harbors late in the war sank as many or perhaps more merchant shipping than submarines.
For me the most enjoyable parts of the book were the discussions of Allied Grand Strategy; the relationship between Roosevelt, Churchill and the members of their military staffs; Admiral Leahy's importance to Roosevelt, the operation of the JCS and grand strategy. The author analyzes the Lend Lease commitments to the Soviets, Great Britain and China and how they were vitally necessary for victory. I also enjoyed his examination of several controversial issues that persist to this day, especially the massive effort to establish and maintain B-29s in China, whether it was really necessary to invade the Philippines prior to Iwo Jima and the targeting of cities in the strategic bombing campaign of both Germany and Japan.
I am very enthusiastic about Dr O'Brien's book and that is why I gave it 5 stars. I think it should be read by every student of World War II. Just an outstanding piece of work.
I do have a quibble, a troubling disagreement with a very small part of the story Dr O'Brien is telling. Dr O'Brien writes, "When Roosevelt began pushing for money for the USN to construct new vessels, the navy continued to opt for a battleship-centric fleet until Pearl Harbor...Once the war in Europe started and before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the USN was given authorization to build a further eleven battleships, six of the Iowa Class and five of the mammoth Montana Class [the note he lists here does not give a source for this and only describes the Montana class] As it was, only four of the Iowa Class were ever completed and the rest cancelled when it became clear during the war that the aircraft carrier was now the decisive weapon. If only the USN had known this before it would have started more than the two aircraft carriers it laid down between 1937 and November 1941, the Hornet in 1939 and the Essex in April 1941. It was still thinking in terms of a capital ship duel in the Pacific." (p 111)
In the summer of 1940 the chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, Carl Vinson, gave a press conference. The House had just passed a massive spending bill to expand the Navy and he had been asked why so much of the bill was devoted to carriers and naval aircraft. Carl Vinson said, "The modern development of aircraft has demonstrated conclusively that the backbone of the Navy today is the aircraft carrier. The carrier, with destroyers, cruisers and submarines grouped around it[,] is the spearhead of all modern naval task forces."
Carl Vinson was the force behind the construction of the North Carolina class and the South Dakota class battleships that Dr O'Brien mentions just prior to the above quote, as Vinson tried to modernize the navy, but in 1940 he got a bill through Congress that called for 18 Essex class aircraft carriers along with the 6 or 7 Iowa and Montana class battleships. This happened in 1940. It was not something that happened after Pearl Harbor. It happened a year earlier and Congress called for not just one carrier but 18. Actually 5 Essex class hulls were laid down in 1941, all before Pearl Harbor. I don't think that House Representative Carl Vinson, Democrat from Georgia, came up with the notion that the fast carrier task force would be the "backbone of the Navy" all by himself. The bill came about from a request from Admiral Stark, CNO, and his staff. It would have been nice if Dr O'Brien could have researched that development. I am a little disappointed that he took the standard line of many historians that it was after Pearl Harbor that the navy came to the conclusion that carriers would be the primary combat ship in a modern navy. Seven of those carriers would be commissioned by the end of 1943 with the commissioning of USS Essex on 31 December 1942. Only 4 Iowa class battleships would be completed and none of the massive Montana class ships ordered in the bill, passed by the House on 18 June 1940 and signed into law in July 1940, would be built. Those developments and the eventual construction of 14 Essex class aircraft carriers, that would see action in the war, I do think are the result of the navy's experience in the first year of the war but the notion that the aircraft carrier would "spearhead" modern naval warfare had to have been envisioned by top navy brass sometime earlier than the summer of 1940, way before the dynamic operations of the Kido Butai.
Stark asked for 4 billion dollars to increase the existing fleet by 70%. The House Naval Affairs Committee increased it to more than 8 billion dollars emphasizing aircraft and called for 15,000 aircraft for the navy. The bill also called for 27 cruisers and an additional 6 Alaska class cruisers that mounted 12" guns. The Alaska class was the US Navy's answer to the battlecruiser. The Navy did still want big guns. Only 2 Alaska class cruisers would see service in WW II. It seems clear that the navy wanted a powerful surface force that included battleships, battlecruisers and cruisers as well as a very powerful fleet of carriers. It is clear that Dr O'Brien's statement of the preference for battleships and the laying down of a single Essex class carrier prior to November 1941 is not accurate. Actually three Essex class carriers were laid down before November 1941 and two more before 7 December 1941. I'm not sure if Admiral Stark would have agreed exactly with Vinson's statement but Vinson and Stark made it possible for 4 fleet carriers to join operations by the end of 1943.
It is clear that the US Navy did not have a detailed doctrine of carrier operations developed before the US entered the war and they surely did still envision battleship duels but the 1940 bill shows they wanted a preponderance of carriers. Is this misrepresentation a fatal flaw in Dr O'Brien's narrative? No, I don't think so. It is a wide miss of the actual history of the US Navy, the development of the US war effort and how it was possible for 7 new Essex class carriers to be commissioned by the end of 1943. It makes me wonder what happened in his research to make such an error and why November 1941 is his cut off for carrier construction and not 7 December, but it is not a fatal flaw and does not influence the rest of his narrative. Actually 1940 was the important year for the Essex class. Only 2 that were ordered after 1940 saw action in the war. Vinson's bill made it possible for 4 replacement carriers to be ready for operations by the end of 1943 and another 3 before the middle of 1944. What did happen after Pearl Harbor was the acceleration of the construction of the Essex class ships and the conversion of 9 Cleveland class cruisers to Independence class light carriers. I just think that overlooking the importance of the Vinson-Walsh Act is a very curious mistake but does not take away from what is obviously Dr O'Brien's main line of research and the narrative he wanted to present.
In most histories Carl Vinson is never mentioned, unless they are examining why Admiral Spruance did not get promoted to Fleet Admiral. I think it is a great shame to ignore Vinson's important work to modernize the US Navy prior to Pearl Harbor and how it was possible for the Navy to lead the way to victory in the Pacific. Vinson served in Congress from 1914 until 1965 and is known as the Father of the Two Ocean Navy. The Nimitz class carrier Carl Vinson, CVN-70, was named in his honor while he was still alive.
May 12, 2022
Recently there was another fight on Talk:World War II over the order of the leaders of the Big Four. (They've been getting ornery lately. Let's hope that things return to normal now that their political season is over.) In the course of this, someone recommended this book. I hadn't read it, but it sounded interesting, so I picked up a copy.
The thesis of this book is that the air and sea power of the Western Allies played the decisive role in World War II because they "kept the Germans and Japanese from moving". From the Wikipedia point of view, one need read no further than page 13 to find that the author concedes that this is not the consensus among historians by any means, and that the author is an unabashed revisionist and a WP:FRINGE dweller.
The notion that the war was won by superior technology and industrial capacity is not a new one. In fact, it was the orthodox position for a quarter of a century after the war. It fell into disfavour in the 1970s. The reason for this is simple: if wars are inevitably won by the side with greater resources, more advanced technology, and superiority at sea and in the air, then what the Hell happened in Vietnam? This led to a reappraisal of the role of the Soviet Union, and with the opening of archives in Russia, historians have been paying increasing attention to that aspect of the war.
There's a lot of interesting material on German production, and the relative amounts devoted to different weapons. The author notes how even during the most intense battles of 1943, the Germans and Japanese were able to replace material losses from new production. The book notes the debates at the time and since over the effectiveness of strategic bombing, and the correct means of employing it. What I'd find more interesting to read about is just where the concept of wars being won by equipment and technology came from, and how it propagated through the English-speaking world. It pre-dated the war, and in many ways became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This book tries to cover too much ground, and despite its size, there is nowhere new enough space to cover the issues adequately. The issue of industrial mobilisation was one that confronted every country, and the problem of determining what was best allocation of manpower and resources was an intractable one. In the end, most generals had to fight with what was on hand, adapting strategy to the available resources because the lead time for production was so much longer than the timespan of global strategy. Rarely was the best allocation arrived at; what was the best is still debated to this day.
A great deal of space is wasted on matters that are not germane to the author's argument. Moreover, when he moves into the realm of strategy, much of it is wrong. This is especially true of the discussion of the Pacific War. The reasons for the advance into the Mariana and Caroline islands are jumbled. I'm also getting really tired of the allegation that General MacArthur pushed for the invasion of Palau, which he did not. The claim that the 1st Marine Division was too badly damaged to participate in operations for months is incorrect: it returned to Guadalcanal to stage for the Battle of Okinawa, but this was delayed for a couple of months; the reasons why there was a delay between each campaign in the Pacific is not explained (probably because it was not understood). The assertion that the campaign in New Guinea only appeared less expensive than the ones in the Central Pacific because the Australians were taking most of the casualties so they were not counted is absurd, and does not add up. The idea that basing the B-29s in the Mariana islands obviated the capture of the Philippines and cutting off the sea lanes to Japan makes no sense. And there's a whole lot more but you get the idea.
In the end, that is the problem with writing about the Second World War: the technology and the issues are so complex. This book has a case to make, but the one to buy it is weak.
The thesis of this book is that the air and sea power of the Western Allies played the decisive role in World War II because they "kept the Germans and Japanese from moving". From the Wikipedia point of view, one need read no further than page 13 to find that the author concedes that this is not the consensus among historians by any means, and that the author is an unabashed revisionist and a WP:FRINGE dweller.
The notion that the war was won by superior technology and industrial capacity is not a new one. In fact, it was the orthodox position for a quarter of a century after the war. It fell into disfavour in the 1970s. The reason for this is simple: if wars are inevitably won by the side with greater resources, more advanced technology, and superiority at sea and in the air, then what the Hell happened in Vietnam? This led to a reappraisal of the role of the Soviet Union, and with the opening of archives in Russia, historians have been paying increasing attention to that aspect of the war.
There's a lot of interesting material on German production, and the relative amounts devoted to different weapons. The author notes how even during the most intense battles of 1943, the Germans and Japanese were able to replace material losses from new production. The book notes the debates at the time and since over the effectiveness of strategic bombing, and the correct means of employing it. What I'd find more interesting to read about is just where the concept of wars being won by equipment and technology came from, and how it propagated through the English-speaking world. It pre-dated the war, and in many ways became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This book tries to cover too much ground, and despite its size, there is nowhere new enough space to cover the issues adequately. The issue of industrial mobilisation was one that confronted every country, and the problem of determining what was best allocation of manpower and resources was an intractable one. In the end, most generals had to fight with what was on hand, adapting strategy to the available resources because the lead time for production was so much longer than the timespan of global strategy. Rarely was the best allocation arrived at; what was the best is still debated to this day.
A great deal of space is wasted on matters that are not germane to the author's argument. Moreover, when he moves into the realm of strategy, much of it is wrong. This is especially true of the discussion of the Pacific War. The reasons for the advance into the Mariana and Caroline islands are jumbled. I'm also getting really tired of the allegation that General MacArthur pushed for the invasion of Palau, which he did not. The claim that the 1st Marine Division was too badly damaged to participate in operations for months is incorrect: it returned to Guadalcanal to stage for the Battle of Okinawa, but this was delayed for a couple of months; the reasons why there was a delay between each campaign in the Pacific is not explained (probably because it was not understood). The assertion that the campaign in New Guinea only appeared less expensive than the ones in the Central Pacific because the Australians were taking most of the casualties so they were not counted is absurd, and does not add up. The idea that basing the B-29s in the Mariana islands obviated the capture of the Philippines and cutting off the sea lanes to Japan makes no sense. And there's a whole lot more but you get the idea.
In the end, that is the problem with writing about the Second World War: the technology and the issues are so complex. This book has a case to make, but the one to buy it is weak.
December 13, 2020
This book takes a very different, and enlightening, view on WW2.
I read once an interview with a Luftwaffe officer from WW2 where he pointed out that it was a lot of effort and risk to destroy a tank on the battlefield, but taking out a rail line transporting tanks to the front was a more efficient means of keeping tanks from a battlefield (i.e., you could stop an entire train load of tanks). It's that sort of thinking that is driving this book - there are dramatic moments in WW2, but if you analyze it from a broader perspective, how did one side destroy/engage the most material from another. One of them is O'Brien's look at spending on weapons systems. His analysis shows that the proportion of defense spending by the US, UK, Germany, and Japan is shockingly light for tanks and AFVs - showing that aircraft and naval units are very expensive, and that the US, UK, Germany, and Japan emphasized air power in particular. O'Brien then looks to how some of the dramatic battles of WW2 compared from a destruction of material standpoint. The Battle of Kursk, regarded by many as the largest tank battle in history, resulted in a relatively small amount of destruction if one is looking at the number of the tanks and AFVs destroyed and their relative cost.
O'Brien turns to a view of the different theaters, looking at the different strategies that resulted in large destruction of war material. His analysis takes a cost benefit analysis view on a number of strategies - how much material is expended, and how much material of the enemy is destroyed. Naval combat has a significant impact, but the real central arena for determining WW2 in O'Brien's view is air power. His analysis shows the powers using an inordinate amount of their resources on air power, and in the narrative section, he points to air power's ability to eliminate productive capacity as well as reduce the effectiveness of opponent's air power and naval and land power through aspects such as constrained mobility. There are also discussions on which were the most effective aspects of the use of strategic air power, moral questions, and the use of the atomic bomb.
This is one of the more original, thought provoking books I've read on WW2. You may find minor errors and areas for disagreement, but O'Brien provides a nice overarching analysis that leads one to look at WW2 differently and possibly rethink assumptions.
A very worthy read.
I read once an interview with a Luftwaffe officer from WW2 where he pointed out that it was a lot of effort and risk to destroy a tank on the battlefield, but taking out a rail line transporting tanks to the front was a more efficient means of keeping tanks from a battlefield (i.e., you could stop an entire train load of tanks). It's that sort of thinking that is driving this book - there are dramatic moments in WW2, but if you analyze it from a broader perspective, how did one side destroy/engage the most material from another. One of them is O'Brien's look at spending on weapons systems. His analysis shows that the proportion of defense spending by the US, UK, Germany, and Japan is shockingly light for tanks and AFVs - showing that aircraft and naval units are very expensive, and that the US, UK, Germany, and Japan emphasized air power in particular. O'Brien then looks to how some of the dramatic battles of WW2 compared from a destruction of material standpoint. The Battle of Kursk, regarded by many as the largest tank battle in history, resulted in a relatively small amount of destruction if one is looking at the number of the tanks and AFVs destroyed and their relative cost.
O'Brien turns to a view of the different theaters, looking at the different strategies that resulted in large destruction of war material. His analysis takes a cost benefit analysis view on a number of strategies - how much material is expended, and how much material of the enemy is destroyed. Naval combat has a significant impact, but the real central arena for determining WW2 in O'Brien's view is air power. His analysis shows the powers using an inordinate amount of their resources on air power, and in the narrative section, he points to air power's ability to eliminate productive capacity as well as reduce the effectiveness of opponent's air power and naval and land power through aspects such as constrained mobility. There are also discussions on which were the most effective aspects of the use of strategic air power, moral questions, and the use of the atomic bomb.
This is one of the more original, thought provoking books I've read on WW2. You may find minor errors and areas for disagreement, but O'Brien provides a nice overarching analysis that leads one to look at WW2 differently and possibly rethink assumptions.
A very worthy read.
January 19, 2016
An intriguing approach to the subject. He makes some rather provocative observations that I’m not sure are well-founded. Still, it was not without its merits. I enjoyed the book, don’t get me wrong. I just question comments he made that dismiss individual soldiers’ bravery or most of the German-Russian War on the Eastern Front as of relatively minor importance. Call me old-fashioned but unlike Professor O'Brien, I still think the Battles of Stalingrad, Midway, and El Alamein were kind of important. Had they gone the other way what would have happened? I suppose the Allies still probably would have won the war but it would’ve taken longer – perhaps significantly longer. Also certain little things in the book - like his suggestion that Admiral Leahy was possibly more important and insightful than General George Marshall -- seem a little far-fetched. His Leahy conclusion seems based mostly on the observation that Leahy spent more time with FDR than the others. But FDR was a peculiar person himself in terms of his personal relationships and may have enjoyed Leahy’s company simply because they enjoyed the same cocktails and jokes rather than spending their time together plotting global strategy.
Then too: I wonder about the author’s methodology. This may be excessively simplistic for me to say, but could it be that planes and ships just COST more on a per unit basis than tanks or M-1 carbines or ammo? The fact that nations spent more money on planes and ships than on infantry resources does not necessarily to my mind mean that there was some unspoken agreement among all parties that WW2 was going to be primarily an air-sea war and that is where the decisive outcome would be determined. For example, my own organization has a Marketing Budget. We pursue marketing through print ads in industry magazines, sponsorship or exhibits at trade shows, phone sales calls, and social media such as LinkedIn, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. If you looked at how much we spend on these things in the manner of Professor O’Brien, you might conclude that our strategic focus is on magazine ads and trade show exhibits since that’s where most of marketing budget is going. But that is not true. Those things are simply more expensive. We feel we have to do them, but less expensive things like phone calls and social media are just as important if not more so.
Then too: I wonder about the author’s methodology. This may be excessively simplistic for me to say, but could it be that planes and ships just COST more on a per unit basis than tanks or M-1 carbines or ammo? The fact that nations spent more money on planes and ships than on infantry resources does not necessarily to my mind mean that there was some unspoken agreement among all parties that WW2 was going to be primarily an air-sea war and that is where the decisive outcome would be determined. For example, my own organization has a Marketing Budget. We pursue marketing through print ads in industry magazines, sponsorship or exhibits at trade shows, phone sales calls, and social media such as LinkedIn, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. If you looked at how much we spend on these things in the manner of Professor O’Brien, you might conclude that our strategic focus is on magazine ads and trade show exhibits since that’s where most of marketing budget is going. But that is not true. Those things are simply more expensive. We feel we have to do them, but less expensive things like phone calls and social media are just as important if not more so.
May 2, 2022
Came across the author de-mystifying logistics in the Ukarianian war on Twitter.
He did recommend not reading his WW2 history, and I may have done better to follow his advice. It is one of the worse written books I have completed reading - infuriatingly repetitive, jumpy in tone, overlong - in need of a good editor.
That said, it is an interesting and convincing argument: without diminishing the great loss of life on the Eastern Front, the mass of Axis resources were committed to fighting the Western Allies.
The great mass of industrial production, Allied and Axis, was dedicated to air power and sea power, much less to land power.
Only a fraction of resources were destroyed on the battlefield: much more by forestalling production or preventing deployment.
Germany's last chance to win was the Battle of the Atlantic.
The bombing campaigns over Germany were decisive.
Despite the US "Germany first" policy, Admiral King ensured that a great weight of US resources went to the Pacific.
Japan succeeded as an industrial power, similar in capacity to USSR.
The V1 and V2 campaigns and the Allies' Operation Crossbow bombing against them, consumed resources on an enormous scale, comparable to land campaigns of the time.
When the Axis lost mobility, to move resources to and around their factories and the battlefront, they lost the war.
He did recommend not reading his WW2 history, and I may have done better to follow his advice. It is one of the worse written books I have completed reading - infuriatingly repetitive, jumpy in tone, overlong - in need of a good editor.
That said, it is an interesting and convincing argument: without diminishing the great loss of life on the Eastern Front, the mass of Axis resources were committed to fighting the Western Allies.
The great mass of industrial production, Allied and Axis, was dedicated to air power and sea power, much less to land power.
Only a fraction of resources were destroyed on the battlefield: much more by forestalling production or preventing deployment.
Germany's last chance to win was the Battle of the Atlantic.
The bombing campaigns over Germany were decisive.
Despite the US "Germany first" policy, Admiral King ensured that a great weight of US resources went to the Pacific.
Japan succeeded as an industrial power, similar in capacity to USSR.
The V1 and V2 campaigns and the Allies' Operation Crossbow bombing against them, consumed resources on an enormous scale, comparable to land campaigns of the time.
When the Axis lost mobility, to move resources to and around their factories and the battlefront, they lost the war.
December 20, 2023
I’m not an expert in WW2 (or anything really) so please take this review with a grain of salt. This study is an excellent revisionist account of the war, but I believe it indulges in the sorts of exaggerations excellent revisionist accounts tend to partake in.
The thrust of the argument is that while most accounts identify the land battles (especially on the Eastern Front) as playing the decisive role in winning the war, air-sea power had a much more important part in eliminating Axis ability to resist. In service of this argument the author provides a great variety of evidence including quality statistics, declassified documents from both sides of the war, and post-war memoirs and interrogation transcripts.
All in all, I believe the author convincingly shows that air sea-power played *a* crucial role in winning the war. If the author had contented himself at stopping here, I believe the study would have been an unqualified success. However, the author unfortunately takes the extra step of marginalizing, even trivializing the major land engagements.
Take his account of the Battle of Stalingrad. He rightly points out the issues with fetishizing this battle as “the decisive” turning point of the war. But if the cardinal sin of mainstream accounts is to take infantry strength to be the sole metric of importance, the author slips into the same error by placing an overriding influence on the rate of production, at times to the exclusion of other relevant favorites. Here are some key quotes from the author’s account of Stalingrad:
- “Both quantitatively and, maybe more importantly, qualitatively, the German army would have had a considerably more powerful armored force on February 1 1943 than on July 1 1942.”
- “When it came to overall German munitions production, the value of the AFV losses on the entire Eastern Front during July and August 1943 was less than 1 percent.”
The implication behind these quotes, as well as the author’s accounts of large WW2 land battles in general, is that because these battles didn’t impact the rate of Axis production, they ultimately did not matter all that much, or at least played a merely secondary or tertiary role in Allied success.
But hold on a minute: don’t large land battles have much more at stake than merely equipment destroyed? What about the loss of quality human capital, the seizure of territory, the effect on morale that a crushing battlefield defeat could result in, and more?
The author repeatedly underscores the key importance that imperial possessions played in supplying raw materials to power the Axis war machine. Is it not the case that land power played a critical role in the acquisition of these territories to begin with? And is it not also the case that had battles like Stalingrad, Kursk, and others gone the other way, the Axis powers would have been in possession of more raw materials with which to power their war machines?
My last nitpick is minor. In the beginning of his study the author bemoans the fact that it’s “commonplace for many European historians to reduce the war against Japan to a sideshow when compared with the great war against Germany,” pointing out that some studies only devote 15-20% to the war in the East.
But this study basically maintains the same ratio. The study does include an extended account of top level Allied debates about how forces should be balanced between Western and Eastern theaters. However, sustained discussion of the Eastern Front is really only confined to one long (and quite good chapter) and half of the final chapter and conclusion.
My issues with the study lies not in its core argument but in its emphasis. I am glad to have read this study and would heartily recommend it to anyone who has any interest in the fascinating question of how the war was won.
The thrust of the argument is that while most accounts identify the land battles (especially on the Eastern Front) as playing the decisive role in winning the war, air-sea power had a much more important part in eliminating Axis ability to resist. In service of this argument the author provides a great variety of evidence including quality statistics, declassified documents from both sides of the war, and post-war memoirs and interrogation transcripts.
All in all, I believe the author convincingly shows that air sea-power played *a* crucial role in winning the war. If the author had contented himself at stopping here, I believe the study would have been an unqualified success. However, the author unfortunately takes the extra step of marginalizing, even trivializing the major land engagements.
Take his account of the Battle of Stalingrad. He rightly points out the issues with fetishizing this battle as “the decisive” turning point of the war. But if the cardinal sin of mainstream accounts is to take infantry strength to be the sole metric of importance, the author slips into the same error by placing an overriding influence on the rate of production, at times to the exclusion of other relevant favorites. Here are some key quotes from the author’s account of Stalingrad:
- “Both quantitatively and, maybe more importantly, qualitatively, the German army would have had a considerably more powerful armored force on February 1 1943 than on July 1 1942.”
- “When it came to overall German munitions production, the value of the AFV losses on the entire Eastern Front during July and August 1943 was less than 1 percent.”
The implication behind these quotes, as well as the author’s accounts of large WW2 land battles in general, is that because these battles didn’t impact the rate of Axis production, they ultimately did not matter all that much, or at least played a merely secondary or tertiary role in Allied success.
But hold on a minute: don’t large land battles have much more at stake than merely equipment destroyed? What about the loss of quality human capital, the seizure of territory, the effect on morale that a crushing battlefield defeat could result in, and more?
The author repeatedly underscores the key importance that imperial possessions played in supplying raw materials to power the Axis war machine. Is it not the case that land power played a critical role in the acquisition of these territories to begin with? And is it not also the case that had battles like Stalingrad, Kursk, and others gone the other way, the Axis powers would have been in possession of more raw materials with which to power their war machines?
My last nitpick is minor. In the beginning of his study the author bemoans the fact that it’s “commonplace for many European historians to reduce the war against Japan to a sideshow when compared with the great war against Germany,” pointing out that some studies only devote 15-20% to the war in the East.
But this study basically maintains the same ratio. The study does include an extended account of top level Allied debates about how forces should be balanced between Western and Eastern theaters. However, sustained discussion of the Eastern Front is really only confined to one long (and quite good chapter) and half of the final chapter and conclusion.
My issues with the study lies not in its core argument but in its emphasis. I am glad to have read this study and would heartily recommend it to anyone who has any interest in the fascinating question of how the war was won.
July 17, 2023
Thorough Analysis of the Factors of Victory with Some Shortcomings
Author Phillips O’Brien argues that the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II was much more a result of U.S. and British achievement of air and sea supremacy than of victory in land battles including those on the Russian front. A subtext of this argument is that in western histories of the war written in the immediate postwar period, the Soviet contribution to victory against Nazi Germany was downplayed. But this may have then led to overcompensation exaggerating the importance of land battles generally and the Soviet role specifically.
This book is a volume in the “Cambridge [University] Military Histories.” O’Brien is a Director of the Scottish Centre for War Studies and a Reader in History at the University of Glasgow.
There is no question that O’Brien has assembled a reference source that will be useful to future historians writing about the war. With a text that runs 488 pages supplemented by footnotes and bibliography that add another 112 pages, the author has assembled many tables showing war production by each of the belligerents as the war progressed.
Each country spent far more on aircraft, ships, and submarines than on on tanks and other land weapons. The exception was the Soviet Union, which never had a navy or air force that was comparable in size to America, Britain, Germany or Japan. But ships and aircraft are far more expensive than infantry equipment or armored fighting vehicles. Thus higher spending on these items seems a common sense observation, not a myth-shattering revelation.
In an analysis that emphasizes relative production capability, O’Brien points out that the largest tank battle in history, Kurkst on the Russian steppes in the summer of 1943, was “not a great German defeat in production terms.” Both the Germans and the Soviets were able easily to replace the tanks that were lost, and indeed by more modern armor that was then coming off production lines.
As the war proceeded, the U.S. and Britain were able to slowly strangle supply lines for oil and other raw materials necessary for the German and Japanese war effort. Japan’s supplies, which had to be shipped great distances by sea, were particularly vulnerable to interdiction. War production could be cut without the destruction of factory capacity.
O’Brien offers assessments of strategy, especially from the perspective of the sea and air war.
Perhaps best known is the argument over bombing strategy. Area bombing of the enemy’s large cities was promoted by Arthur “Bomber” Harris, head of Britain’s Bomber Command. By contrast, “strategic” bombing, to take out factories producing critical war materials, was advocated by U.S. Army Air Force General Carl Spaatz. In both cases, bombing forced the Germans and later the Japanese to disperse factories that came under air attack, thereby adversely affecting productivity. As the invasion of Europe approached, O’Brien argues, an even more effective use of air power was the destruction of railways and bridges, making it hard to supply factories with raw materials and difficult to supply troops at the front.
O’Brien provides detailed analysis of the extent to which Germany had to divert resources to protect its cities. The bulk of the Luftwaffe was devoted to efforts to shoot down British and U.S. bombers. Anti-aircraft artillery and the munitions for air defense received high priority. These air and artillery resources might otherwise have gone to support the land forces defending Germany.
Hitler miscalculated by investing so much in V-1 and V-2 rocket production rather than producing conventional aircraft or armored fighting vehicles, the author notes. In the late stages of the war, the allies did devote enormous effort to identifying and destroying from the air the sites from which the V weapons were launched. By then, however, they had the air resources to do this while continuing ground support and bombing German cities and supply lines.
Deteriorating pilot training due to scarcity of fuel led to soaring German and Japanese combat losses, observes O’Brien. When German and Japanese pilots met American pilots in combat, they were outclassed by their better-trained adversaries. Additionally, the Japanese suffered grave “deployment losses” as inexperienced pilots were asked to fly vast distances over open ocean to get to a place where they could engage U.S. forces. Many never arrived.
O’Brien is at his best when he discusses Admiral Ernest King. As operational head of the U.S. Navy, King wanted to ensure early engagement of the Japanese, even though President Roosevelt and General George Marshall insisted upon prioritizing “Germany First.” King engaged in subterfuge to ensure that the Pacific theater got most of the Navy’s resources — one result being severe loss of unescorted merchant shipping along the U.S. Gulf and Eastern seaboard in the early months of the war.
But O’Brien praises King and is highly critical of General Douglas MacArthur as the two argued about how to conduct the war in the Pacific. King’s strategy of taking the war to Japan through the capture of key islands in the Central Pacific was what ultimately led to Japan’s defeat less than four years after Pearl Harbor. The capture of Saipan allowed bases from which the newly-developed B-29 could bomb Japan, supplementing the submarine war that was interdicting the supply of raw materials to the Japanese war industry.
By contrast, the author argues that it was unnecessary to wrest the Philippines from the Japanese and delayed victory. O’Brien speculates that President Roosevelt may have acceded to MacArthur’s Philippines demand to prevent the general from becoming a candidate for president in 1944.
There are many insights in this book, but in arguing for a reassessment of the Soviet role in the defeat of Germany O’Brien seems to discount too fully the land battles of World War II. As important as winning the air and sea battles were in Europe, it still took occupying troops to force Nazi surrender. Even without the dropping of the atomic bomb, the author argues that Japan would never have had to be invaded by land forces due to its strangulation by sea and the effect of conventional bombing on the civilian population. This of course is speculative.
There is much to be said for the fresh analysis and perspective that this book brings regarding the factors contributing to victory in World War II. If there is a criticism, O’Brien overemphasizes the importance of air and sea productivity alone.
Author Phillips O’Brien argues that the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II was much more a result of U.S. and British achievement of air and sea supremacy than of victory in land battles including those on the Russian front. A subtext of this argument is that in western histories of the war written in the immediate postwar period, the Soviet contribution to victory against Nazi Germany was downplayed. But this may have then led to overcompensation exaggerating the importance of land battles generally and the Soviet role specifically.
This book is a volume in the “Cambridge [University] Military Histories.” O’Brien is a Director of the Scottish Centre for War Studies and a Reader in History at the University of Glasgow.
There is no question that O’Brien has assembled a reference source that will be useful to future historians writing about the war. With a text that runs 488 pages supplemented by footnotes and bibliography that add another 112 pages, the author has assembled many tables showing war production by each of the belligerents as the war progressed.
Each country spent far more on aircraft, ships, and submarines than on on tanks and other land weapons. The exception was the Soviet Union, which never had a navy or air force that was comparable in size to America, Britain, Germany or Japan. But ships and aircraft are far more expensive than infantry equipment or armored fighting vehicles. Thus higher spending on these items seems a common sense observation, not a myth-shattering revelation.
In an analysis that emphasizes relative production capability, O’Brien points out that the largest tank battle in history, Kurkst on the Russian steppes in the summer of 1943, was “not a great German defeat in production terms.” Both the Germans and the Soviets were able easily to replace the tanks that were lost, and indeed by more modern armor that was then coming off production lines.
As the war proceeded, the U.S. and Britain were able to slowly strangle supply lines for oil and other raw materials necessary for the German and Japanese war effort. Japan’s supplies, which had to be shipped great distances by sea, were particularly vulnerable to interdiction. War production could be cut without the destruction of factory capacity.
O’Brien offers assessments of strategy, especially from the perspective of the sea and air war.
Perhaps best known is the argument over bombing strategy. Area bombing of the enemy’s large cities was promoted by Arthur “Bomber” Harris, head of Britain’s Bomber Command. By contrast, “strategic” bombing, to take out factories producing critical war materials, was advocated by U.S. Army Air Force General Carl Spaatz. In both cases, bombing forced the Germans and later the Japanese to disperse factories that came under air attack, thereby adversely affecting productivity. As the invasion of Europe approached, O’Brien argues, an even more effective use of air power was the destruction of railways and bridges, making it hard to supply factories with raw materials and difficult to supply troops at the front.
O’Brien provides detailed analysis of the extent to which Germany had to divert resources to protect its cities. The bulk of the Luftwaffe was devoted to efforts to shoot down British and U.S. bombers. Anti-aircraft artillery and the munitions for air defense received high priority. These air and artillery resources might otherwise have gone to support the land forces defending Germany.
Hitler miscalculated by investing so much in V-1 and V-2 rocket production rather than producing conventional aircraft or armored fighting vehicles, the author notes. In the late stages of the war, the allies did devote enormous effort to identifying and destroying from the air the sites from which the V weapons were launched. By then, however, they had the air resources to do this while continuing ground support and bombing German cities and supply lines.
Deteriorating pilot training due to scarcity of fuel led to soaring German and Japanese combat losses, observes O’Brien. When German and Japanese pilots met American pilots in combat, they were outclassed by their better-trained adversaries. Additionally, the Japanese suffered grave “deployment losses” as inexperienced pilots were asked to fly vast distances over open ocean to get to a place where they could engage U.S. forces. Many never arrived.
O’Brien is at his best when he discusses Admiral Ernest King. As operational head of the U.S. Navy, King wanted to ensure early engagement of the Japanese, even though President Roosevelt and General George Marshall insisted upon prioritizing “Germany First.” King engaged in subterfuge to ensure that the Pacific theater got most of the Navy’s resources — one result being severe loss of unescorted merchant shipping along the U.S. Gulf and Eastern seaboard in the early months of the war.
But O’Brien praises King and is highly critical of General Douglas MacArthur as the two argued about how to conduct the war in the Pacific. King’s strategy of taking the war to Japan through the capture of key islands in the Central Pacific was what ultimately led to Japan’s defeat less than four years after Pearl Harbor. The capture of Saipan allowed bases from which the newly-developed B-29 could bomb Japan, supplementing the submarine war that was interdicting the supply of raw materials to the Japanese war industry.
By contrast, the author argues that it was unnecessary to wrest the Philippines from the Japanese and delayed victory. O’Brien speculates that President Roosevelt may have acceded to MacArthur’s Philippines demand to prevent the general from becoming a candidate for president in 1944.
There are many insights in this book, but in arguing for a reassessment of the Soviet role in the defeat of Germany O’Brien seems to discount too fully the land battles of World War II. As important as winning the air and sea battles were in Europe, it still took occupying troops to force Nazi surrender. Even without the dropping of the atomic bomb, the author argues that Japan would never have had to be invaded by land forces due to its strangulation by sea and the effect of conventional bombing on the civilian population. This of course is speculative.
There is much to be said for the fresh analysis and perspective that this book brings regarding the factors contributing to victory in World War II. If there is a criticism, O’Brien overemphasizes the importance of air and sea productivity alone.
November 13, 2021
A great book, providing a detailed analysis of the allied path to victory in World War II. The author, historian Phillips Payson O’Brian, dives deep into a study of the participants’ strategy, the resulting resourcing decisions, and the effect of material attrition on the war’s course. O’Brian proposes Strategic Mobility as the deciding factor of WWII, rather than Operational/Tactical Maneuver. He sees the Allied ability to “out-build” the Axis, especially in airplane and ship production, as essential to their controlling the pace of attrition and thus the course of the conflict. O’Brian downplays the affect of individual battles (Midway, Kursk, The Bulge, etc.), instead concentrating on the cumulative material destruction over the course of months and years. I appreciate the insights the author has on the way individual leaders approached this material-centric conflict. The book portrays Churchill and Marshall in a negative light, unable to adapt like Leahy, Arnold, and FDR to the changed nature of modern warfare. A great book for anyone wanting to understand WWII as a resource-centric conflict. Highly recommended for those interested in the ways Seapower and AirPower combine to win wars.
August 29, 2015
The author poses that the conventional view of the reason why the Allies were able to win WOII, namely that the was was decided in the traditional land battles such as El Alamein, Stalingrad and Kursk did not win World War II, but that the Allied path to victory was far more a contest of air and see supremacy.
January 4, 2022
This book is an astonishing piece of scholarship. It is a heavy read with an enormous store of data and analysis. I have found it more approachable by skipping around to different topics followed up by a final straight through read. If you are serious about trying to grasp the nearly ungraspable story of WWII, you must engage with this book.
July 7, 2022
“There were no decisive battles in World War II.” It is with this revisionist and even iconoclastic statement that Phillips Payson O'Brien opens his well-researched and closely argued “How the War Was Won” (2015). As to the broad outlines of O'Brien's argument, it is difficult to better the dust-cover copy: “World War II is usually seen as a titantic land battle, decided by mass armies, most importantly those on the Eastern Front. … O'Brien argues that in terms of production, technology and economic power, the war was far more a contest of air and sea than land supremacy. … Air and sea power dramatically expanded the area of battle and allowed the Allies to destroy over half of the Axis' equipment before it had even reached the traditional 'battlefield.' Battles such as El Alamein, Stalingard and Kursk did not win World War II; air and sea power did.”
Briefly, and at the risk of over-simplifying, O'Brien posits that it was the relative ability of the major combatants to deliver functioning weapons to the battlefield that won battles. Consequently, he views three – and only three – campaigns as being decisive. First is the U-Boat campaign against Allied merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, which failed after first the Royal Navy in 1940 realized that ships not in convoy were at far higher risk than those in convoy, even with inadequate escorts, and began to fail utterly after mid-1942, when US Navy head Admiral King finally agreed to convoy American shipping off the East Coast (and Caribbean). As such, O'Brien places the critical decisions earlier than most historians, who point to the withdrawal of U-Boats from the Atlantic after the massive battles in April and May 1943. The second key campaign was the Combined Bomber Offensive, most notably the USAAF 8th Air Force's attacks on German production and especially transportation, which O'Brien concludes began to constrain German production as early as 1943 – again, a year earlier than most analysts. The third was the US submarine and, after mid-1944, airplane attacks on Japanese merchant shipping, which cut Japan off from its consquests of oil and bauxite (aluminum) in the Dutch East Indies [Indonesia]. O'Brien credits Admiral King with identifying the Marianas as the final cork needed to stop shipments, while providing a far more useful base for B-29 heavy bomber strikes against Japanese industry.
At the risk of confirmation bias, I note my appreciation for O'Brien's criticisms of RAF Bomber Command Arthur “Butch(er)” Harris and US General Douglas MacArthur. He sees both leaders as persisting in unproductive and counterproductive strategies that led to thousands of unneccessary deaths among their own personnel and even more among civilians. (Harris and area bombing; MacArthur and pursuing a fruitless expedition to “return” to the Phillipines.)
How the War is Won is extensively documented (Chapter 9 on the war in Europe in 1944 has 269 footnotes over 58 pages of text, for example). While the argument is persuasive in the context of World War II, O'Brien does undervalue the need for strong armed forces, especially land forces, to halt Axis ground (and naval) offensives and give time for sea and air forces to choke off production.
Two asides: O'Brien almosts throws a fit in criticizing the 1965 Henry Fonda film “Battle of the Bulge:” “Another terrible movie … riddled with errors … Robert Shaw's astonishingly bleached-blond Colonel Hessler … after a few days of running around in circles ...” O'Brien laments “Almost all the books on the Battle of the Bulge concentrate overwhelmingly on the period from December 16 to 24, when the weather was overcast and air power could not be effectively used on the battlefield. It is as though once the reality of what the war had become reasserted itself, it becomes less interesting.” I note that is a lament that applies equally to not a few wargames on the subject, and the players themselves.
And the author's conclusion and accusation: “Thus, German and Japanese capitulation in May and August of 1945 occurred long after each had “lost” World War II. That their leaders, trying to prolong their political authority, would not take the honorable step that the leaders of imperial Germany took in 1918 speaks volumes about both the horrible and yet grotesquely petty nature of both regimes.” Not that that reminds me of any other, more recent, situations.
Briefly, and at the risk of over-simplifying, O'Brien posits that it was the relative ability of the major combatants to deliver functioning weapons to the battlefield that won battles. Consequently, he views three – and only three – campaigns as being decisive. First is the U-Boat campaign against Allied merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, which failed after first the Royal Navy in 1940 realized that ships not in convoy were at far higher risk than those in convoy, even with inadequate escorts, and began to fail utterly after mid-1942, when US Navy head Admiral King finally agreed to convoy American shipping off the East Coast (and Caribbean). As such, O'Brien places the critical decisions earlier than most historians, who point to the withdrawal of U-Boats from the Atlantic after the massive battles in April and May 1943. The second key campaign was the Combined Bomber Offensive, most notably the USAAF 8th Air Force's attacks on German production and especially transportation, which O'Brien concludes began to constrain German production as early as 1943 – again, a year earlier than most analysts. The third was the US submarine and, after mid-1944, airplane attacks on Japanese merchant shipping, which cut Japan off from its consquests of oil and bauxite (aluminum) in the Dutch East Indies [Indonesia]. O'Brien credits Admiral King with identifying the Marianas as the final cork needed to stop shipments, while providing a far more useful base for B-29 heavy bomber strikes against Japanese industry.
At the risk of confirmation bias, I note my appreciation for O'Brien's criticisms of RAF Bomber Command Arthur “Butch(er)” Harris and US General Douglas MacArthur. He sees both leaders as persisting in unproductive and counterproductive strategies that led to thousands of unneccessary deaths among their own personnel and even more among civilians. (Harris and area bombing; MacArthur and pursuing a fruitless expedition to “return” to the Phillipines.)
How the War is Won is extensively documented (Chapter 9 on the war in Europe in 1944 has 269 footnotes over 58 pages of text, for example). While the argument is persuasive in the context of World War II, O'Brien does undervalue the need for strong armed forces, especially land forces, to halt Axis ground (and naval) offensives and give time for sea and air forces to choke off production.
Two asides: O'Brien almosts throws a fit in criticizing the 1965 Henry Fonda film “Battle of the Bulge:” “Another terrible movie … riddled with errors … Robert Shaw's astonishingly bleached-blond Colonel Hessler … after a few days of running around in circles ...” O'Brien laments “Almost all the books on the Battle of the Bulge concentrate overwhelmingly on the period from December 16 to 24, when the weather was overcast and air power could not be effectively used on the battlefield. It is as though once the reality of what the war had become reasserted itself, it becomes less interesting.” I note that is a lament that applies equally to not a few wargames on the subject, and the players themselves.
And the author's conclusion and accusation: “Thus, German and Japanese capitulation in May and August of 1945 occurred long after each had “lost” World War II. That their leaders, trying to prolong their political authority, would not take the honorable step that the leaders of imperial Germany took in 1918 speaks volumes about both the horrible and yet grotesquely petty nature of both regimes.” Not that that reminds me of any other, more recent, situations.
July 3, 2022
Best WWII book I've read
This is an excellent book which lays out major mistakes of all combatants and makes clear that the US and UK won by massively damagingthe economies of their enemies. No, the European war was not won on the Eastern front. It was mainly won by defeating the Luftwaffe and demobilizing and destroying the German economy from the air.
Churchill, Bomber Harris, Douglas MacArthur, and Curtis LeMay are among those who suffer reputation damage in these pages. Admiral Ernest King is rightfully criticized for failing to allocate destroyers to the Atlantic in 1942. But that is a small mistake compared to his correctly choosing the Mariana islands as key for cutting off Japan from bauxite and oil while also putting B29 bombers on excellent barse for attacking Japan. He did this against opposition.
Douglas MacArthur didn't just needlessly throw away hundreds of thousands of Filipino, Japanese, and American lives invading the Philippines (bad enough). By doing this he also delayed the invasion of Iwo Jima, giving the Japanese time to fortify the island and making it far more costly to invade.
RAF Bomber commander Arthur Harris' city area bombing was a wrong use of resources in 1944. The evidence was clear. Germany had more AA protection for synthetic oil facilities than for cities. Harris didn't want to acknowledge that he was wrong. Fortunately the USAAF was better led. Harris should have been fired by his superior who strongly disagreed with him. Was Harris protected by political popularity? Certainly MacArthur was and he used this to his advantage and against the US national interest.
Movies give you the wrong idea that land battles mattered the most. Wrong. The war was won in sea and air. Cutting off supplies, demobilizing the enemy, destroying production won the war. The P51 fighter was far more important than superior German tanks. The P51 let the bombers destroy German war output while also doing their own damage.
The arguments are made with lots of numbers. I find the book's arguments highly persuasive.
This is an excellent book which lays out major mistakes of all combatants and makes clear that the US and UK won by massively damagingthe economies of their enemies. No, the European war was not won on the Eastern front. It was mainly won by defeating the Luftwaffe and demobilizing and destroying the German economy from the air.
Churchill, Bomber Harris, Douglas MacArthur, and Curtis LeMay are among those who suffer reputation damage in these pages. Admiral Ernest King is rightfully criticized for failing to allocate destroyers to the Atlantic in 1942. But that is a small mistake compared to his correctly choosing the Mariana islands as key for cutting off Japan from bauxite and oil while also putting B29 bombers on excellent barse for attacking Japan. He did this against opposition.
Douglas MacArthur didn't just needlessly throw away hundreds of thousands of Filipino, Japanese, and American lives invading the Philippines (bad enough). By doing this he also delayed the invasion of Iwo Jima, giving the Japanese time to fortify the island and making it far more costly to invade.
RAF Bomber commander Arthur Harris' city area bombing was a wrong use of resources in 1944. The evidence was clear. Germany had more AA protection for synthetic oil facilities than for cities. Harris didn't want to acknowledge that he was wrong. Fortunately the USAAF was better led. Harris should have been fired by his superior who strongly disagreed with him. Was Harris protected by political popularity? Certainly MacArthur was and he used this to his advantage and against the US national interest.
Movies give you the wrong idea that land battles mattered the most. Wrong. The war was won in sea and air. Cutting off supplies, demobilizing the enemy, destroying production won the war. The P51 fighter was far more important than superior German tanks. The P51 let the bombers destroy German war output while also doing their own damage.
The arguments are made with lots of numbers. I find the book's arguments highly persuasive.
April 7, 2023
After enjoying Overy's Why the allies won, this book was something that I was definitely looking forward to.
PPO makes the point that the UK and the USA were fighting a more efficient form of war than the axis powers (and USSR), with air (in particular) and sea power allied to technological innovation taking the place of mass land armies. An especially important point is made concerning the disparity between equipment losses on the battlefield and before they got there. Even at Kursk, the largest ever tank battle, the numbers lost on both sides were but a small percentage of production. This isn't something I've seen articulated elsewhere. PPO show that by deploying air and naval power, enemy material losses were greatly exacerbated. Losses in the pre-production, production and prior to delivery phases were much more severe than battlefield losses. There was an escalator effect, with bombing:
forcing factories to be dispersed, which lowered production, led to inferior build quality,
destroying fuel production, which made the training of pilots perfunctory and so lowered skill and ability,
destroying transport, which stopped factories from producing weapons.
This all had a cumulative effect and by the midst of 1944 the war was lost for the axis. They could defend tenaciously, but any form of mobile warfare was beyond them. Air and sea power won the war. Land battles still needed to be fought, but the opponents were denuded of equipment and support. This made victory so much easier.
There were a couple of things I took slight issue with. When disparaging the KGV class battleships in comparison to those being produced by the Axis or the later American models, I feel that PPO somewhat overlooks the fact that the KGVs were bound by the Washington Treaty, which the Axis ignored and the American ships were wartime builds, when no one cared about treaty limitations. Also, the tables are all pretty tiny and not easy to make out.
This is a fascinating book and well worth reading.
PPO makes the point that the UK and the USA were fighting a more efficient form of war than the axis powers (and USSR), with air (in particular) and sea power allied to technological innovation taking the place of mass land armies. An especially important point is made concerning the disparity between equipment losses on the battlefield and before they got there. Even at Kursk, the largest ever tank battle, the numbers lost on both sides were but a small percentage of production. This isn't something I've seen articulated elsewhere. PPO show that by deploying air and naval power, enemy material losses were greatly exacerbated. Losses in the pre-production, production and prior to delivery phases were much more severe than battlefield losses. There was an escalator effect, with bombing:
forcing factories to be dispersed, which lowered production, led to inferior build quality,
destroying fuel production, which made the training of pilots perfunctory and so lowered skill and ability,
destroying transport, which stopped factories from producing weapons.
This all had a cumulative effect and by the midst of 1944 the war was lost for the axis. They could defend tenaciously, but any form of mobile warfare was beyond them. Air and sea power won the war. Land battles still needed to be fought, but the opponents were denuded of equipment and support. This made victory so much easier.
There were a couple of things I took slight issue with. When disparaging the KGV class battleships in comparison to those being produced by the Axis or the later American models, I feel that PPO somewhat overlooks the fact that the KGVs were bound by the Washington Treaty, which the Axis ignored and the American ships were wartime builds, when no one cared about treaty limitations. Also, the tables are all pretty tiny and not easy to make out.
This is a fascinating book and well worth reading.
October 4, 2023
I thought this was a great book that changed my mind on a few things. The research he did is extensive, and he builds a very persuasive case. In his view, World War II was about air and sea supremacy, and that the achievement of this supremacy by the Allies made the outcome inevitable. One area where he changed my mind was on the subject of strategic bombing. I have always considered it a waste of time and resources. After all, German output kept rising even as the bombs fell, or in the case of Britain, the Battle of Britain, and then the Vengeance weapons, never affected morale on the home front. And of course in Vietnam the US dropped more bombs than they dropped in both theaters of WWII combined without stopping the Vietnamese. But O'Brien makes a persuasive case that what matters is the strategy behind the bombing. I think he has a very low view of Arthur Harris for pursuing a bad strategy of bombing German cities, but I think he finds that bombing aimed at really strategic targets like aircraft and fuel production was quite helpful. and in the Pacific he seems to find MacArthur lacking in strategic insight, but is very admiring of Ernest King for seeing the main point of using air power to cut the lifeline of Japan to the colonies in the Dutch East Indies.
Another area where I think I got a slightly different view after reading this book was the significance of the Western Front. We all know that the largest armies were in the East, and with that the largest numbers of casualties. But virtually all of the Luftwaffe was deployed towards the West, which says something about the way Germany saw the war going. And of course that gave the Soviets air superiority on their front, which made their drive to Berlin a whole lot easier. If you are a WWII buff, this should be essential reading in my view.
Another area where I think I got a slightly different view after reading this book was the significance of the Western Front. We all know that the largest armies were in the East, and with that the largest numbers of casualties. But virtually all of the Luftwaffe was deployed towards the West, which says something about the way Germany saw the war going. And of course that gave the Soviets air superiority on their front, which made their drive to Berlin a whole lot easier. If you are a WWII buff, this should be essential reading in my view.
December 30, 2022
Given just the vast the literature on the Second World War, O'Brien has made a remarkable achievement in presenting both a new insight into the course of the war, and in doing so in a way that combines meticulous research and a readable text, despite the massive weight of the book.
I won't attempt to summarise the book - other reviewers, and the blurb on the book itself do this better than I could. What is remarkable about O'Brien's thesis is that, given the data he presents, it seems self-evident that airpower and seapower were where all of the major combatant nations placed their main effort, notwithstanding the massive land battles that tend to dominate our perception, yet this has remained hidden in plain sight. Not only did most of the senior leaders at the time not realise how the war had shifted in its focus, but they have been followed in this by most subsequent historians. O'Brien's central insight is that an enemy who cannot move their equipment to the front, and who cannot move their forces at the front, cannot fight, no matter the quality of their troops or equipment. In the Second World War, Germany attempted to stop the Allies from moving raw materials, equipment and men from around the world to Europe, and failed. The Allies sought to use airpower to destroy German manufacturing, transport, and fuel, and largely succeeded. They did much the same in the Pacific, and again succeeded in undermining Japanese military power. Yet most commanders focused on land battles or area bombing.
The book is long and detailed, but completely worth the effort. In some respects, O'Brien brings out the critical difference between generalship and statemanship - generals can win battles, but the statesman needs to work out how to win the war. Unfortunately, both tend to focus on the battles rather than the war.
I won't attempt to summarise the book - other reviewers, and the blurb on the book itself do this better than I could. What is remarkable about O'Brien's thesis is that, given the data he presents, it seems self-evident that airpower and seapower were where all of the major combatant nations placed their main effort, notwithstanding the massive land battles that tend to dominate our perception, yet this has remained hidden in plain sight. Not only did most of the senior leaders at the time not realise how the war had shifted in its focus, but they have been followed in this by most subsequent historians. O'Brien's central insight is that an enemy who cannot move their equipment to the front, and who cannot move their forces at the front, cannot fight, no matter the quality of their troops or equipment. In the Second World War, Germany attempted to stop the Allies from moving raw materials, equipment and men from around the world to Europe, and failed. The Allies sought to use airpower to destroy German manufacturing, transport, and fuel, and largely succeeded. They did much the same in the Pacific, and again succeeded in undermining Japanese military power. Yet most commanders focused on land battles or area bombing.
The book is long and detailed, but completely worth the effort. In some respects, O'Brien brings out the critical difference between generalship and statemanship - generals can win battles, but the statesman needs to work out how to win the war. Unfortunately, both tend to focus on the battles rather than the war.
February 29, 2024
I love very accessible war books and this one is great. The main theses are
- the right way to measure what part of the war was most important is by total effort and expenditures rather than by number of deployed humans.
- the air and to a lesser extent sea war were thus much more important than the land battles.
- the allies (especially US/UK) not only won because they had better air and sea power but also because they were extremely effective at destroying Axis air and sea forces before those forces reached the battlefield
- controlling and/or impacting the enemy’s access to materials, production and mobility were the crucial aspects of destroying their capabilities before they reached the battlefield.
Lots of other interesting stuff in here including a bunch on Lehey (the author has a whole biography that I intend on reading too) and King and Hopkins.
Overall pretty interesting
- the right way to measure what part of the war was most important is by total effort and expenditures rather than by number of deployed humans.
- the air and to a lesser extent sea war were thus much more important than the land battles.
- the allies (especially US/UK) not only won because they had better air and sea power but also because they were extremely effective at destroying Axis air and sea forces before those forces reached the battlefield
- controlling and/or impacting the enemy’s access to materials, production and mobility were the crucial aspects of destroying their capabilities before they reached the battlefield.
Lots of other interesting stuff in here including a bunch on Lehey (the author has a whole biography that I intend on reading too) and King and Hopkins.
Overall pretty interesting
November 20, 2023
A powerful revisionist take on WWII that argues the war was not really won in the great land battles of the Eastern Front by Russia but instead in the air and sea battle fought by the US and UK against Germany. O'Brien bases this thesis off the argument that while 80-85% of the Nazis losses in terms of men, tanks and land gear was on the Eastern Front, that is not where Germany spent the majority of its economic output. Instead it was in the construction of air and sea resources that Germany spent the vast majority of its economic resources and those resources. Those much more important resources were defeated by the US & UK air force and navies. That German and Japanese economic and military output only started decreasing and being terminally degraded once the US and UK had won the air and sea wars and could systematically destroy Germany and Japan's economic infrastructures
March 30, 2023
O'brien makes an argument that Anglo-American sea and, espiecially, air power were decisive in bringing about the allied Victory, moreso than the conventionally understood decisive battles of the Eastern Front.
I found the argument convincing, particularly by looking at German allocation of war resources - as it was Germany who was at the receiving end of both the Western allies' air campaigns and the Soviet Union's large ground offensives, and nonetheless chose to spend a majority of its resources on the former.
The book is easy to read and presents its argument in a clear manner. Even if you disagree - and I myself am open to counter-arguments - it's clear how the author constructs his simple, but persuasive and well documented, thesis.
I found the argument convincing, particularly by looking at German allocation of war resources - as it was Germany who was at the receiving end of both the Western allies' air campaigns and the Soviet Union's large ground offensives, and nonetheless chose to spend a majority of its resources on the former.
The book is easy to read and presents its argument in a clear manner. Even if you disagree - and I myself am open to counter-arguments - it's clear how the author constructs his simple, but persuasive and well documented, thesis.
April 6, 2019
Terrific book that examines the air and maritime conflicts of World War II. the author proposes that it was the conflict in the air and on the sea that was paramount to the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Once the U.S. won the Battle of the Atlantic and took the Marianas Islands, the outcome of the the war was certain. Moreover, the author proposes that the air and sea aspects of the war was the main effort of the United States, well above any land battles. Indeed, the U.S. destroyed more enemy land forces in the production and transportation phase than in battle when they were employed.
January 14, 2023
The main thesis of the book is that the decisive factor for the Allies' win in WWII was their air and naval power, and not the iconic land battles.
The books is well researched, argumentation is backed up by a ton of numbers and graphs. Actually, some details could have been ommitted without harming the overall content, and would probably have resulted in a better reading experience.
Not being well versed in WWII history, I don't really know how this thesis was met or challenged by other historians. But it definitely added some new nuances to my somewhat superficial understanding of the war.
I would say it was worth the read.
The books is well researched, argumentation is backed up by a ton of numbers and graphs. Actually, some details could have been ommitted without harming the overall content, and would probably have resulted in a better reading experience.
Not being well versed in WWII history, I don't really know how this thesis was met or challenged by other historians. But it definitely added some new nuances to my somewhat superficial understanding of the war.
I would say it was worth the read.
April 23, 2023
Excellent if longer than needed. The author gets tangled up in a few places and can be repetitive at times, but generally makes a really good case that the battlefield view of how WWII was won misses the bigger story of how combined air and seapower destroyed far more equipment and consumed far more of the axis war making capabilities than the famous battles ever did. And therefore the air and sea wars were the dominant contributor to their defeat - before, behind, and after any battles being fought.
October 3, 2023
An interesting perspective. Logistics and economics is all that matters. Production vs destruction. Whoever makes more, wins. I'm not necessarily on board with this vision. It is not that the provision of weapons isn't important, but the application of those weapons applies as well. Ask the Romans after Cannae.
With that said, there was a lot of information here that I'd not seen before about the application of the US war production to the different theaters - all the folks and personnel involved. That was new to me.
So a different approach to wwii analysis.
With that said, there was a lot of information here that I'd not seen before about the application of the US war production to the different theaters - all the folks and personnel involved. That was new to me.
So a different approach to wwii analysis.
January 3, 2024
Interesting thesis, that British and American sea/air power was far more destructive of Axis resources than we usually realise. Battles like Kursk and El-Alamein get the headlines but actually destroy relatively little of Axis production.
Perhaps links to David Edgerton's ideas on the USA/UK fighting a WW2 as a war of machines not masses.
Is the thesis over-egged ? I'm not sure. But stimulating.
Perhaps links to David Edgerton's ideas on the USA/UK fighting a WW2 as a war of machines not masses.
Is the thesis over-egged ? I'm not sure. But stimulating.
September 23, 2018
I really enjoyed this work. I first read this book first when my dad lended it to me. It was such an interesting read that I bought a copy for myself during my Masters Degree so that I could reference it and the ideas that Phillips O'Brien puts forth. I think he exagurates what can be evaluated on a monetary scale (as the value of human capital is never explored) but well worth a read.
June 12, 2022
Great book; history without all of the sensationalism that we see way too much of in WWII history books. This could be used as a textbook for both a military history class as well as it could for a army logistics course. This book successfully instructs about the “drier” side of conflict without making the reading dry itself.
August 12, 2022
Excellent overview of the allied vs axis rate of equipment loss. Light on information on the USSR. Revisionist and convincing case that the allied Air and Naval war consumed far more Axis resources than the land war. Whilst not agreeing with everything stated it was extremely well put and well sourced.
November 22, 2023
An enjoyable revisionist challenge to the conventional wisdom that World War 2 was won on the battlefields. O'Brien makes a strong case that the air-sea war effort to disrupt the enemy's ability to build, train, and deploy forces played a much bigger role than the traditional choices like 'Stalingrad' or 'Midway'.
July 23, 2019
Brilliant analysis
A terrific examination of the SWW, articulating the impact of cumulative pressure on German and Japanese fighting power pressure brought about by Anglo-American dominance in the air and at sea.
A terrific examination of the SWW, articulating the impact of cumulative pressure on German and Japanese fighting power pressure brought about by Anglo-American dominance in the air and at sea.
August 15, 2020
Truly excellent book. The bean counters guide to world war 2. Once air superiority was achieved the war was unwinnable for the axis. This was achieved through manufacturing and strangulation of Germany's rail and Japan's sealanes.. I've read 20+ books on the war and I finally know what happened
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