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A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking
In this highly insightful analysis of Western and Chinese concepts of efficacy, Francois Jullien subtly delves into the metaphysical preconceptions of the two civilizations to account for diverging patterns of action in warfare, politics, and diplomacy. He shows how Western and Chinese strategies work in several domains (the battlefield, for example) and analyzes two resulting acts of war. The Chinese strategist manipulates his own troops and the enemy to win a battle without waging war and to bring about victory effortlessly. Efficacity in China is thus conceived of in terms of transformation (as opposed to action) and manipulation, making it closer to what is understood as efficacy in the West.
Jullien's brilliant interpretations of an array of recondite texts are key to understanding our own conceptions of action, time, and reality in this foray into the world of Chinese thought. In its clear and penetrating characterization of two contrasting views of reality from a heretofore unexplored perspective, A Treatise on Efficacy will be of central importance in the intellectual debate between East and West.
Jullien's brilliant interpretations of an array of recondite texts are key to understanding our own conceptions of action, time, and reality in this foray into the world of Chinese thought. In its clear and penetrating characterization of two contrasting views of reality from a heretofore unexplored perspective, A Treatise on Efficacy will be of central importance in the intellectual debate between East and West.
216 pages, Paperback
First published January 8, 1997
About the author
François Jullien
155 books96 followersFrançois Jullien, né en 1951 à Embrun (Hautes-Alpes), est un philosophe, helléniste et sinologue français. Ancien élève de l’École normale supérieure et agrégé de l’université (1974), François Jullien a ensuite étudié la langue et la pensée chinoises à l'université de Pékin et à l'université de Shanghai (1975–1977). Il a été ensuite responsable de l'antenne française de sinologie à Hong-Kong (1978–1981), puis pensionnaire de la Maison franco-japonaise à Tokyo (1985–1987).
Il a été successivement président de l'Association française des études chinoises (de 1988 à 1990), directeur de l'UFR Asie orientale de l'université Paris-Diderot (1990–2000), président du Collège international de philosophie (1995–1998), professeur à l'université Paris-Diderot et directeur de l'Institut de la pensée contemporaine ainsi que du centre Marcel-Granet.
Il a été successivement président de l'Association française des études chinoises (de 1988 à 1990), directeur de l'UFR Asie orientale de l'université Paris-Diderot (1990–2000), président du Collège international de philosophie (1995–1998), professeur à l'université Paris-Diderot et directeur de l'Institut de la pensée contemporaine ainsi que du centre Marcel-Granet.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
May 28, 2018
Книга стала кладом для моего пытливого ума. Не первый раз в жизни приходит важное осознание, а затем я ищу исследователей, которые помогли бы лучше сформулировать в слова и расширить то, что только появилось. Так случилось и с этой книгой. Эмпирическим путем пришли сомнения касательно рационального определения эффективности и целедостижения. Трактат об эффективности - это основательная работа по сравнению европейской и китайских концепций. Древняя восточная мудрость и глубокие метафоры дают серьезную пищу для раздумий и переосмыслений. Хотелось выписывать все мысли из книги, но в этот раз важнее оказалось искать параллели с примерами из жизни и способы интеграции в опыт.
December 29, 2022
How do we achieve change in the world? In the Western approach, we think in terms of subjects. The individual should have clear goals, resolute will, conceptual clarity and a touch of heroism to persevere. The Chinese approach, Jullien argues, focuses on the situation. What is its propensity? What can be exploited? And ideally, how might imperceptible, resistance-less changes have been made far upstream, so as to ensure the situation faced unerringly serves our interests?
This is book is a stunning work of conceptual analysis. Jullien seeks to use ancient Chinese thought as a mirror to reflect back the 'un-thought thoughts' of western mindsets. By exploring and comparing a very different approach, he helps show how western concepts of strategy (political and military) operate within intellectual boundaries that even the most astute observes, such as Machiavelli and Clausewitz, may at best recognise but do not break free of. In order to shine that mirror, he offers a compelling, challenging, thought-provoking analysis of Chinese strategic thought.
What struck me almost immediately in reading this, are the overlaps between Chinese texts such as the Tao Te Ching (which features heavily in Jullien's account), and contemporary western ideas such as Complexity Science. There's echos as well of Iain McGilchrist's brilliant 'Master and his Emissary', with modern western thought dominated by its left hemisphere (emphasizing possessive, abstract, rule-bound action), against the right-hemisphere led mindset of these early Chinese authors, seeing relationships instead of things, transitions and processes instead of actions, and forever emphasizing the bounded situation, the all-encompassing environment, rather than isolating concept and world.
I first learned about this book in an off-hand reference from Andrew Marshall, the great American strategist, who led the Office of Net Assessment for half a century. I can see why Marshall (who had an entire seperate apartment just for his books) thought highly enough to raise this. There is a remarkable degree of overlap between the emphasis on analyzing the situation, getting to grips with the problem, and looking for enduring advantages to exploit. It also helps explain why the Chinese regarded Marshall as a sage, trying to collect everything he wrote. The affinity is remarkable, and both of these avenues, of Chinese thought along lines of Complexity and Net Assessments suggest rich avenues for future research.
As a discipline, Strategy is often classed as an offspring of Military History and of Political Science. I have long thought a third parent should be added: Philosophy. Alfred North Whitehead once described philosophy as concerned with 'The sort of ideas we attend to, and the sort of ideas which we push into the negligible background govern our hopes, our fears, our control of behaviour. As we think, we live'. That to me is what strategy also encompass. How do we understand the world, especially our relationships with others and our attempts to change it.
In 'A Treatise on Efficacy' Francois Jullien offers a profound examination of strategy, Western and Chinese philosophy and their core ideas of how we think about change, and in turn how we engage the world. This book does take some work to chew through, but for anyone interested in strategy, whether military, political, diplomatic, or simply in obtaining a very different way of viewing the world and its nature, this is a brilliant book.
Strongly recommended.
This is book is a stunning work of conceptual analysis. Jullien seeks to use ancient Chinese thought as a mirror to reflect back the 'un-thought thoughts' of western mindsets. By exploring and comparing a very different approach, he helps show how western concepts of strategy (political and military) operate within intellectual boundaries that even the most astute observes, such as Machiavelli and Clausewitz, may at best recognise but do not break free of. In order to shine that mirror, he offers a compelling, challenging, thought-provoking analysis of Chinese strategic thought.
What struck me almost immediately in reading this, are the overlaps between Chinese texts such as the Tao Te Ching (which features heavily in Jullien's account), and contemporary western ideas such as Complexity Science. There's echos as well of Iain McGilchrist's brilliant 'Master and his Emissary', with modern western thought dominated by its left hemisphere (emphasizing possessive, abstract, rule-bound action), against the right-hemisphere led mindset of these early Chinese authors, seeing relationships instead of things, transitions and processes instead of actions, and forever emphasizing the bounded situation, the all-encompassing environment, rather than isolating concept and world.
I first learned about this book in an off-hand reference from Andrew Marshall, the great American strategist, who led the Office of Net Assessment for half a century. I can see why Marshall (who had an entire seperate apartment just for his books) thought highly enough to raise this. There is a remarkable degree of overlap between the emphasis on analyzing the situation, getting to grips with the problem, and looking for enduring advantages to exploit. It also helps explain why the Chinese regarded Marshall as a sage, trying to collect everything he wrote. The affinity is remarkable, and both of these avenues, of Chinese thought along lines of Complexity and Net Assessments suggest rich avenues for future research.
As a discipline, Strategy is often classed as an offspring of Military History and of Political Science. I have long thought a third parent should be added: Philosophy. Alfred North Whitehead once described philosophy as concerned with 'The sort of ideas we attend to, and the sort of ideas which we push into the negligible background govern our hopes, our fears, our control of behaviour. As we think, we live'. That to me is what strategy also encompass. How do we understand the world, especially our relationships with others and our attempts to change it.
In 'A Treatise on Efficacy' Francois Jullien offers a profound examination of strategy, Western and Chinese philosophy and their core ideas of how we think about change, and in turn how we engage the world. This book does take some work to chew through, but for anyone interested in strategy, whether military, political, diplomatic, or simply in obtaining a very different way of viewing the world and its nature, this is a brilliant book.
Strongly recommended.
April 10, 2022
François Jullien nous invite à repenser le concept d'efficacité. Comment ? En comparant l'approche philosophique occidentale, s'appuyant beaucoup sur Machiavel, Aristote etc. avec l'approche chinoise de la stratégie, notamment en utilisant l'Art de la Guerre de Sun Zu.
Ouvrage très clair pour mieux comprendre l'oeuvre de Sun Zu qui est souvent lu, mais difficile à restituer. La comparaison avec Machiavel est aussi très pertinente pour mettre en évidence les deux approches très différentes.
Comme point commun entre les deux pensées : le fait de prévoir les occasions est essentiel pour obtenir une stratégie efficace.
Pour résumer les différences en deux exemples :
1) "Comme il est dit dans le Mencius (II,A,2) il ne faut ni tirer sur les plantes pour les faire grandir plus vite, ni se dispenser de sarcler à leur pied pour les aider à pousser"
2) Héracles était célébré en Grèce pour avoir réalisé des travaux périlleux. =/= En Chine l'équivalent pourrait être Yu Le Grand. Le Grand Yu creusa le lit des rivières jusqu'à la mer et rendit la terre habitable. Il est sage car il a accompli un grand travail sans peiner, en s'aidant de la pente.
Ouvrage très clair pour mieux comprendre l'oeuvre de Sun Zu qui est souvent lu, mais difficile à restituer. La comparaison avec Machiavel est aussi très pertinente pour mettre en évidence les deux approches très différentes.
Comme point commun entre les deux pensées : le fait de prévoir les occasions est essentiel pour obtenir une stratégie efficace.
Pour résumer les différences en deux exemples :
1) "Comme il est dit dans le Mencius (II,A,2) il ne faut ni tirer sur les plantes pour les faire grandir plus vite, ni se dispenser de sarcler à leur pied pour les aider à pousser"
2) Héracles était célébré en Grèce pour avoir réalisé des travaux périlleux. =/= En Chine l'équivalent pourrait être Yu Le Grand. Le Grand Yu creusa le lit des rivières jusqu'à la mer et rendit la terre habitable. Il est sage car il a accompli un grand travail sans peiner, en s'aidant de la pente.
March 21, 2019
Different perspectives, the assumptions everyone uses to evaluate the world, have vastly different understandings. The Wests’ perspective is very dichotomic. Starting with the theory of what should be to the practice which always falls short of theory. Chinese perspective considers the continuous process. The interactions between factors generating the order. Dividing the world into good and evil misses the interaction between them and changes the meaning of the opposites. While the West trying to identify the ideal architype of everything, Chinese try to manage the flow of events.
The different perspectives were found most in the military references. One such reference expresses the views of generals. From the West, generals need every individual to act bravery. Actions provides honor and action is what changes the course of events. From the Chinese, generals exploit the potential of the situation. Bravery is the result of how the general utilizes the potential of the army.
For the West, action is necessary to control uncertainty of the future. Chinese try to transform or nudge the potential of events to get their results. An emergent result from diffused responses. An emphasis on waiting to let the evolution of events take course. Without action there is little to distinguish from who has done and what is done causing many to claim to be the source. Imperceptible changes but with drastically different outcomes.
The book is a very difficult read. Being a translation may have made the book slightly more difficult, but much has to do with the way it was written and the topic itself. Most examples and clarifications are from military history. History going back more than a millennium and most of the time, going back more than two millennia. Without going into detail about the history, and without a more recent context, understanding the philosophy becomes a challenge. The other difficulty of the writing is due to the difficulty of explaining vastly different ideas. Trying to explain a different way of thinking. Without prior exposure to the assumptions held by the different philosophies, expressing an understanding to them is a challenge.
The different perspectives were found most in the military references. One such reference expresses the views of generals. From the West, generals need every individual to act bravery. Actions provides honor and action is what changes the course of events. From the Chinese, generals exploit the potential of the situation. Bravery is the result of how the general utilizes the potential of the army.
For the West, action is necessary to control uncertainty of the future. Chinese try to transform or nudge the potential of events to get their results. An emergent result from diffused responses. An emphasis on waiting to let the evolution of events take course. Without action there is little to distinguish from who has done and what is done causing many to claim to be the source. Imperceptible changes but with drastically different outcomes.
The book is a very difficult read. Being a translation may have made the book slightly more difficult, but much has to do with the way it was written and the topic itself. Most examples and clarifications are from military history. History going back more than a millennium and most of the time, going back more than two millennia. Without going into detail about the history, and without a more recent context, understanding the philosophy becomes a challenge. The other difficulty of the writing is due to the difficulty of explaining vastly different ideas. Trying to explain a different way of thinking. Without prior exposure to the assumptions held by the different philosophies, expressing an understanding to them is a challenge.
January 15, 2024
This author has little to nothing substantive to tell us. He provides poor readings of Greek epics and Aristotelian ethics as a foundation for his thinking on Western thought, and then repetitively rambles on about Chinese thought for pages in text that could be summarized and laid out more effectively in mere sentences. The argument stalls in the first four chapters and doesn’t advance. Here is an example of poorly written thought that loses its own sense of itself. Note the irony of saying there is nothing to say and then continuing for another 40 words in the same sentence. Then, ironically, making a statement about avoiding excess …
“On the subject of behavior that is efficacious, there is perhaps no more to say than what has always been said and is endlessly repeated on all sides, expressing an age old prudence that underlies wisdoms, a “popular” or “universal” prescription that antedates all theorizing and simply states the obvious: namely, that excess should be avoided.”
Find another work. This is a waste of time.
“On the subject of behavior that is efficacious, there is perhaps no more to say than what has always been said and is endlessly repeated on all sides, expressing an age old prudence that underlies wisdoms, a “popular” or “universal” prescription that antedates all theorizing and simply states the obvious: namely, that excess should be avoided.”
Find another work. This is a waste of time.
October 3, 2019
Although the text was dense, even turgid at times, the book offers nuggets of thought for the diligent reader. The alphabetical system employed for finding the Chinese expressions in the glossary was unnecessarily opaque- not allowing the reader to jump from the glossary to the place in the text where the term was used.
June 13, 2019
Jullien shows different perspectives on the matter. But it is really difficult to read for the general reader.
You meed to go over almost all of the sentences so that you would understand what the hell he even wants to say. Written in a bit of a snobbish manner.
You meed to go over almost all of the sentences so that you would understand what the hell he even wants to say. Written in a bit of a snobbish manner.
March 5, 2021
All action is folly without the knowledge of how to distinguish and design with pre-existing patterns and their natural potentialities.
January 26, 2014
Propensity in circumstances supersedes action to try to control and manipulate a situation through overt means. The means-end framework falls short in practice due to the inefficacy of means to deliver an end when situational factors are ever changing and dynamic.
Rather than structuring our strategy to defeat our enemy with action, we should be concerned with events that are further upstream. The opportunity is created, not just by chance meeting our skill at the correct time in space, but created by a tremor that occurred farther up the path and set a condition that made a future consequence more likely. Once the sage/general/politician recognizes the value of recognizing or triggering inception, this leader will then be able to "monitor" the development of the environment toward a more and more likely consequence. Developing tools to manage the process of strategy in conflict rather than a focus on the means to conduct such conflict represents a deeper, less direct method for conducting the practice of strategy and tactics.
Tools of Western Strategy:
1) Case Study of the end with an aim to identify causality along the path of the analyzed event.
-flaws in this approach may include mistaking correlation for causality.
-if conditions are sufficiently complex, it will be difficult to identify crucial developments.
2) Action - trying to strike the enemy at a point of weakness, managing the activity as the goal is pursued.
Tools of Eastern Strategy:
1) Inception - identifying or creating an initial thought or condition from which a more likely outcome will develop from which the leader may profit.
2) studying the potential energy of a situation and feeding the environment to build the maximum amount of potential energy. Thus, opportunity is created by a process of manipulation of conditions.
3) Evaluate the current unfolding to be able to identify the precursor to the current environment so that the factors may be controlled.
Both strategic lines of thought try to identify opportunity and exploit it, but Western thought may be more concerned with identifying danger before it happens rather than trying to set up future opportunity as Eastern thought might develop.
The Western general relies upon rational foresight to develop a probabilistic framework for what is likely to occur given the characteristics of the situation, the motivating factors for each party and the likely reactions to any given action that the general might deploy.
The Eastern general, by contrast, is focused on identifying inception of conditions that will lead to a likely result. Thus, he is concerned with tendencies that, though subtle at first, will allow him to respond to the developing conditions rather than hypothesize on those that are most likely in theory to develop.
Rather than structuring our strategy to defeat our enemy with action, we should be concerned with events that are further upstream. The opportunity is created, not just by chance meeting our skill at the correct time in space, but created by a tremor that occurred farther up the path and set a condition that made a future consequence more likely. Once the sage/general/politician recognizes the value of recognizing or triggering inception, this leader will then be able to "monitor" the development of the environment toward a more and more likely consequence. Developing tools to manage the process of strategy in conflict rather than a focus on the means to conduct such conflict represents a deeper, less direct method for conducting the practice of strategy and tactics.
Tools of Western Strategy:
1) Case Study of the end with an aim to identify causality along the path of the analyzed event.
-flaws in this approach may include mistaking correlation for causality.
-if conditions are sufficiently complex, it will be difficult to identify crucial developments.
2) Action - trying to strike the enemy at a point of weakness, managing the activity as the goal is pursued.
Tools of Eastern Strategy:
1) Inception - identifying or creating an initial thought or condition from which a more likely outcome will develop from which the leader may profit.
2) studying the potential energy of a situation and feeding the environment to build the maximum amount of potential energy. Thus, opportunity is created by a process of manipulation of conditions.
3) Evaluate the current unfolding to be able to identify the precursor to the current environment so that the factors may be controlled.
Both strategic lines of thought try to identify opportunity and exploit it, but Western thought may be more concerned with identifying danger before it happens rather than trying to set up future opportunity as Eastern thought might develop.
The Western general relies upon rational foresight to develop a probabilistic framework for what is likely to occur given the characteristics of the situation, the motivating factors for each party and the likely reactions to any given action that the general might deploy.
The Eastern general, by contrast, is focused on identifying inception of conditions that will lead to a likely result. Thus, he is concerned with tendencies that, though subtle at first, will allow him to respond to the developing conditions rather than hypothesize on those that are most likely in theory to develop.
September 30, 2015
J'ai toujours du mal avec l'écriture de Jullien, qui me semble souvent inutilement compliquée, sinon amphigourique.
Dans le même temps, je dois à Jullien une de mes grandes émotions intellectuelles, avec son "Éloge de la fadeur" qui a transformé ma façon de réfléchir.
Ce texte consacré à l'efficacité est passionnant. Il permet de réfléchir autrement, non seulement sur la politique internationale - je pense à l'Irak et la Syrie- mais sur l'action publique en général.
Il donne des clefs pour tout leader ou dirigeant, et plus largement sur toute personne souhaitant atteindre un but. Agir ou non agir ?
Dans le même temps, je dois à Jullien une de mes grandes émotions intellectuelles, avec son "Éloge de la fadeur" qui a transformé ma façon de réfléchir.
Ce texte consacré à l'efficacité est passionnant. Il permet de réfléchir autrement, non seulement sur la politique internationale - je pense à l'Irak et la Syrie- mais sur l'action publique en général.
Il donne des clefs pour tout leader ou dirigeant, et plus largement sur toute personne souhaitant atteindre un but. Agir ou non agir ?
September 16, 2019
3.5 stars. Interesting comparative philosophy, but good grief, the writer badly needs an editor to make this accessible to the general reader. Sample of what I am referring to:
"For just as a nontaste ("blandness") constitutes the latent basis of the most diverse of savors (and contains them all in a virtual state), a sage acts upon the very root of becoming, positioning himself upstream from its full deployment. Acting, like tasting, can then extend of its own accord, excluding nothing; it is inexhaustible."
"For just as a nontaste ("blandness") constitutes the latent basis of the most diverse of savors (and contains them all in a virtual state), a sage acts upon the very root of becoming, positioning himself upstream from its full deployment. Acting, like tasting, can then extend of its own accord, excluding nothing; it is inexhaustible."
October 24, 2015
This is one of the greatest books I ever read. It is a thorough erudition of the subject of "Efficacy," as the title implies. I won't spoil it for you, but if you want to see HOW things unfold, this is the book for you.
March 31, 2016
Pas son meilleur; assez répétitif. Mais toujours de très beaux passages et des moments de grâce.
December 1, 2016
An excellent study of eastern and western thinking regarding power and efficiency, and winning.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews