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How China Escaped the Poverty Trap
WINNER OF THE 2017 PETER KATZENSTEIN BOOK PRIZE"BEST OF BOOKS IN 2017" BY FOREIGN AFFAIRSWINNER OF THE 2018 VIVIAN ZELIZER PRIZE BEST BOOK AWARD IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY"How China Escaped the Poverty Trap truly offers game-changing ideas for the analysis and implementation of socio-economic development and should have a major impact across many social sciences."― Zelizer Best Book in Economic Sociology Prize Committee
Acclaimed as "game changing" and "field shifting," How China Escaped the Poverty Trap advances a new paradigm in the political economy of development and sheds new light on China's rise.
How can poor and weak societies escape poverty traps? Political economists have traditionally offered three "stimulate growth first," "build good institutions first," or "some fortunate nations inherited good institutions that led to growth."
Yuen Yuen Ang rejects all three schools of thought and their underlying linear causation, a mechanistic worldview, and historical determinism. Instead, she launches a new paradigm grounded in complex adaptive systems, which embraces the reality of interdependence and humanity's capacity to innovate.
Combining this original lens with more than 400 interviews with Chinese bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, Ang systematically reenacts the complex process that turned China from a communist backwater into a global juggernaut in just 35 years. Contrary to popular misconceptions, she shows that what drove China's great transformation was not centralized authoritarian control, but "directed improvisation"—top-down directions from Beijing paired with bottom-up improvisation among local officials.
Her analysis reveals two broad lessons on development. First, transformative change requires an adaptive governing system that empowers ground-level actors to create new solutions for evolving problems. Second, the first step out of the poverty trap is to "use what you have"—harnessing existing resources to kick-start new markets, even if that means defying first-world norms.
Bold and meticulously researched, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap opens up a whole new avenue of thinking for scholars, practitioners, and anyone seeking to build adaptive systems.
Acclaimed as "game changing" and "field shifting," How China Escaped the Poverty Trap advances a new paradigm in the political economy of development and sheds new light on China's rise.
How can poor and weak societies escape poverty traps? Political economists have traditionally offered three "stimulate growth first," "build good institutions first," or "some fortunate nations inherited good institutions that led to growth."
Yuen Yuen Ang rejects all three schools of thought and their underlying linear causation, a mechanistic worldview, and historical determinism. Instead, she launches a new paradigm grounded in complex adaptive systems, which embraces the reality of interdependence and humanity's capacity to innovate.
Combining this original lens with more than 400 interviews with Chinese bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, Ang systematically reenacts the complex process that turned China from a communist backwater into a global juggernaut in just 35 years. Contrary to popular misconceptions, she shows that what drove China's great transformation was not centralized authoritarian control, but "directed improvisation"—top-down directions from Beijing paired with bottom-up improvisation among local officials.
Her analysis reveals two broad lessons on development. First, transformative change requires an adaptive governing system that empowers ground-level actors to create new solutions for evolving problems. Second, the first step out of the poverty trap is to "use what you have"—harnessing existing resources to kick-start new markets, even if that means defying first-world norms.
Bold and meticulously researched, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap opens up a whole new avenue of thinking for scholars, practitioners, and anyone seeking to build adaptive systems.
503 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 1, 2016
154 people are currently reading
2622 people want to read
About the author
Yuen Yuen Ang
2 books62 followersYuen Yuen Ang is associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, where she is also a faculty associate of the Center for Chinese Studies and the Center for the Study of Complex Systems. Ang’s research aims to advance our understanding of development as a non-linear, adaptive process, using China as a primary case. Part of this agenda involves challenging the assumption that a universally best standard of institutions exists. Her work shows that normatively weak institutions can be functionally strong.
Her book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) won the 2017 Peter Katzenstein Book Prize for “outstanding first book in international relations, comparative politics, or political economy.” It was also named by Foreign Affairs as “Best Books of 2017.”
Ang’s research has been supported by the ACLS/Andrew Mellon Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation, among others. She has served on the United Nations Expert Group on Eradicating Poverty and is a member of the Advisory Board of Cambridge University Press’ Element Series on “The Politics of Development.” A Singapore native, she holds a PhD from Stanford University.
Her book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) won the 2017 Peter Katzenstein Book Prize for “outstanding first book in international relations, comparative politics, or political economy.” It was also named by Foreign Affairs as “Best Books of 2017.”
Ang’s research has been supported by the ACLS/Andrew Mellon Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation, among others. She has served on the United Nations Expert Group on Eradicating Poverty and is a member of the Advisory Board of Cambridge University Press’ Element Series on “The Politics of Development.” A Singapore native, she holds a PhD from Stanford University.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 52 reviews
September 7, 2021
Assuming you: 1) think Western capitalism is the desired end-state for humanity; 2) think China is building capitalism; 3) think nothing of value was built in China between 1949 and 1978; 4) are interested in comparative development studies; 5) can handle relatively academic language; you'll love this book.
I don't share assumptions 1 to 3, on which basis I mainly found myself questioning the whole premise of the book. That said, there are a few valuable insights here as to methodology China has applied in order to shift from low-income to upper-middle income status.
Worth reading for those wanting to develop a detailed understanding of China's economic transformation since 1978. If you're less invested than that, however, life is short and your to-read list is already too long.
I don't share assumptions 1 to 3, on which basis I mainly found myself questioning the whole premise of the book. That said, there are a few valuable insights here as to methodology China has applied in order to shift from low-income to upper-middle income status.
Worth reading for those wanting to develop a detailed understanding of China's economic transformation since 1978. If you're less invested than that, however, life is short and your to-read list is already too long.
January 9, 2018
Does economic growth need good governance? Or does good governance require economic growth as a precondition? Or is governance predetermined by historical experience? Ms. Ang argues that all are true in some ways to understand China since 1978.
Starting with a poor economy and Maoist bureaucracy, the first stage in some CHinese counties was a process of coevolution of markets and administration: a beehive campaign, where every office was given an investment target to meet by courting their family and business contacts. This produced all kinds of investments: some productive, others not. This led to realization by administration that they needed to reorganize the effort to go after quality, not just quantity of investments. Specialization of functions emerged, and these more weberian offices took steps to restructure the economy, and target selected industries for growth. All this goes on with loose direction from the center, like a movie director, and then improvisation from the cast of thousands below. It's better than "good enough governance", its really ideal for the setting, keeps course correcting, makes best use of institutional mix as it evolves over time. It's also not just finding the binding constraints. These were incremental reforms, but not piecemeal; the whole system was being transformed. Starting up growth in poor places is very different from sustaining growth that already exists, and requires a different institutional and capability mix.
Effective adaptation means variation: balancing variety and uniformity, selection: defining and rewarding successful adaptation, and nich creation: turning heterogeneity across units into a system advantage. Adaptation means there is no best practice, but only trial and error to see what works: it doesn't matter whether it is a black or white cat, as long as it catches mice; or seeking truth from facts. Development by franchising: central direction on certain aspects, but otherwise do what works in local context, like MacDonalds. Some direction was a clear no: red lines. Some was ambiguous: grey, and some was positive: black. Grey may lead to black if it is proven to work in practice.
Different localities develop different sectors, at different paces, but the causal sequence is: harness weak institutions to build markets -> emerging markets stimulate strong institutions -> strong institutions preserve markets.
This account could be strengthened by adding historical perspective. One aspect underplayed here is the extensive connections between the USA and China over the last 240 years. Ideas about markets in China were nurtured by American's in China, Chinese educated in America, and extensive trade and financial relations between the countries. Another more subtle aspect is the influence of John Dewey, who gave over 200 talks in China over a two year period in the 1920s, advocating a pragmatic, experimental approach to solving economic, social and political problems: moving on by taking a step forward here, a bit of improvement there. This approach was resisted by leadership from both the right (Chiang Kai Shek) and left (Mao), who thought China needed a big idea "ism". But post Mao, China was back to the Dewey approach, though not calling it that.
Starting with a poor economy and Maoist bureaucracy, the first stage in some CHinese counties was a process of coevolution of markets and administration: a beehive campaign, where every office was given an investment target to meet by courting their family and business contacts. This produced all kinds of investments: some productive, others not. This led to realization by administration that they needed to reorganize the effort to go after quality, not just quantity of investments. Specialization of functions emerged, and these more weberian offices took steps to restructure the economy, and target selected industries for growth. All this goes on with loose direction from the center, like a movie director, and then improvisation from the cast of thousands below. It's better than "good enough governance", its really ideal for the setting, keeps course correcting, makes best use of institutional mix as it evolves over time. It's also not just finding the binding constraints. These were incremental reforms, but not piecemeal; the whole system was being transformed. Starting up growth in poor places is very different from sustaining growth that already exists, and requires a different institutional and capability mix.
Effective adaptation means variation: balancing variety and uniformity, selection: defining and rewarding successful adaptation, and nich creation: turning heterogeneity across units into a system advantage. Adaptation means there is no best practice, but only trial and error to see what works: it doesn't matter whether it is a black or white cat, as long as it catches mice; or seeking truth from facts. Development by franchising: central direction on certain aspects, but otherwise do what works in local context, like MacDonalds. Some direction was a clear no: red lines. Some was ambiguous: grey, and some was positive: black. Grey may lead to black if it is proven to work in practice.
Different localities develop different sectors, at different paces, but the causal sequence is: harness weak institutions to build markets -> emerging markets stimulate strong institutions -> strong institutions preserve markets.
This account could be strengthened by adding historical perspective. One aspect underplayed here is the extensive connections between the USA and China over the last 240 years. Ideas about markets in China were nurtured by American's in China, Chinese educated in America, and extensive trade and financial relations between the countries. Another more subtle aspect is the influence of John Dewey, who gave over 200 talks in China over a two year period in the 1920s, advocating a pragmatic, experimental approach to solving economic, social and political problems: moving on by taking a step forward here, a bit of improvement there. This approach was resisted by leadership from both the right (Chiang Kai Shek) and left (Mao), who thought China needed a big idea "ism". But post Mao, China was back to the Dewey approach, though not calling it that.
April 29, 2024
Singaporean political economist, Yuen Yuen Ang, provides an introduction to the complexity theory of development using the evolution of China's market economy post-1978 as an example. Professor Ang argues that instead of simply assuming a linear relationship between variables in an economic system - for example independent institutions and market development - we should consider that variables within the system adapt and evolve as the other variables change. Therefore no variable is ever independent of the other. To put it simply, we cannot assume that Western-style "strong" institutions lead to the development of markets. Instead markets and institutions develop, adapt and evolve to react to each other. A strong market could lead to the requirement for, and therefore the development of, strong institutions.
If you are looking for a narrative history of how China went from one era to the other on the way to lifting millions of its people out of poverty then this is not the book for you. This book is largely an academic work making the case for complexity theory with insights derived from extensive research of Chinese provinces and interviews of Chinese officials about the development of private enterprise after 1978 and especially after 1993.
To stress her point, she traces the development of Nollywood in the 1990s from the production of quickly slapped together movies funded by VCD vendors to the high-end productions released on Youtube and the venture-funded iRokoTV. She argues that it was not strong institutions that led to the development of this industry but innovative entrepreneurs who developed Nollywood. The creation of Nollywood's market is what then developed institutions around it to provide funding and anti-piracy protection.
Although I consider this a development economics book, I consider the focus to be quite narrow i.e. focused on the development of markets. Perhaps it would be unfair to demand of the book something it does not claim to provide, but I would have wanted a broader scope given the title of "escaping the poverty trap". The challenges to escaping poverty are multifaceted and involve much more than developing a capitalist market system. Overall, it's an educative read and a good introduction to another way to look at how nations develop.
If you are looking for a narrative history of how China went from one era to the other on the way to lifting millions of its people out of poverty then this is not the book for you. This book is largely an academic work making the case for complexity theory with insights derived from extensive research of Chinese provinces and interviews of Chinese officials about the development of private enterprise after 1978 and especially after 1993.
To stress her point, she traces the development of Nollywood in the 1990s from the production of quickly slapped together movies funded by VCD vendors to the high-end productions released on Youtube and the venture-funded iRokoTV. She argues that it was not strong institutions that led to the development of this industry but innovative entrepreneurs who developed Nollywood. The creation of Nollywood's market is what then developed institutions around it to provide funding and anti-piracy protection.
Although I consider this a development economics book, I consider the focus to be quite narrow i.e. focused on the development of markets. Perhaps it would be unfair to demand of the book something it does not claim to provide, but I would have wanted a broader scope given the title of "escaping the poverty trap". The challenges to escaping poverty are multifaceted and involve much more than developing a capitalist market system. Overall, it's an educative read and a good introduction to another way to look at how nations develop.
June 1, 2018
How China Escaped the Poverty Trap is not just about China and the economic miracle that lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. It is about how development happens, about the coevolutionary mechanisms of governance and market building and how to create the conditions that make this possible. That is why the book is also of interest for people like me, mainly focussing on Africa.
The book is a very important contribution to the development debate and shows convincingly that modern western-style institutions are not helping poor countries to develop their markets. The good governance agenda as promoted by western donors and multilateral institutions is based on wrong premises. Very insightful.
The book is a very important contribution to the development debate and shows convincingly that modern western-style institutions are not helping poor countries to develop their markets. The good governance agenda as promoted by western donors and multilateral institutions is based on wrong premises. Very insightful.
July 23, 2018
The power of improvisation. Directed improvisation.
There is no shortage of ‘best practices’ or ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions in a development economy. Free trade, democracy, institution building, you name it. The Washington Consensus has reigned in the decades since the 1990s. Now the Beijing consensus is emerging.
Yuen Yuen Ang dismisses such solutions and suggests that there is no universal prescription. Her one-sentence summary is “Poor and weak countries can escape the poverty trap by first building markets with weak institutions and, more fundamentally, by crafting environments that facilitate improvisation among the relevant players.” She explores this idea through studying how China managed to achieve and sustain economic development after Mao. The country employed this approach, which allowed the to achievement of economic growth in complex circumstances. Yuen Yuen Ang call this approach ‘directed improvisation’ where central reformers direct and local state agents improvise. It taps local knowledge and adapts to the local circumstances, while aiming at an overarching goal. The resulting transformative process has displayed three distinct patterns. It is broad, bringing systemic changes despite incremental reforms. It is bold, unusually entrepreneurial but also attracts corruption-prone bureaucrats. Finally, it is uneven, with wide regional disparities coexisting with national prosperity.
The Government nurtured what Yuen Yuen Ang calls ‘directed innovation’ through variation, selection and niche creation. To promote variation, central reformers allowed local agents to flexibly implement central mandates according to local conditions. This has been done through deliberate creation of grey zones, as too much leeway could create chaos. Hence, Central bodies clearly delineated these zones of local improvisation. They imposed red lines around local administration, denoting things which are prohibited and risk very severe punishments; and black lines for things which must be delivered, again at the risk of severe punishment in the case of non-performance. The rest was in a grey zone, open for innovation and adaptation to local conditions. Selection was promoted by clearly defining and rewarding success within bureaucracy, of the type in the black lines discussed above. Central reformers clearly communicated the criteria for success to lower levels and ranked localities, and closely looked for what has worked and what didn’t. Successful models and approaches then became central policy, scaled up and replicated throughout China. For instance, the famous Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) were neither prescribed, nor anticipated by central reformers, as Deng Xiaoping himself admitted. They grew up out of local experimentation at that stage of the reforms, as best fit to local needs and conditions, to produce growth spurts, and centrally imposed restrictions for the of non-acceptability of private property. The diversity of China provided the raw material for innovation, resulting in niche creation for different localities. Regional diversity thus turned from liability into a collective advantage.
The methodology Yuen Yuen Ang used is a mapping of the ‘coevolutionary process’, with whole Chapter (1) and Annex (A) devoted to the description of the methodology. She does not engage into construction of sophisticated regression models, torturing data in the elusive quest for causality out of correlation. Neither does she stick to small N approach, looking through messy and overcomplicated set of variable for a single case (By the way, enquiring reader could find great discussion of cultural differences between small N versus big N approaches in A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences). Hence, no oversimplification and no messy non-reductionist approach to complexity. Rather, a complex approach, which captures a non-linear, co-evolutionary process, in reduced form. She tracks changes in the related systems of economy and institutions, over the time. Throughout the book, she dives into examples of Forest Hill, Blessed County and Humble County in China, which are archetypes of various types of localities in China. In her methodological annex she extends this approach to two additional cases of tax-less finance in United States of America in the 1880s and raise of Nollywood in Nigeria.
The three ‘I’s haunting development economics, according to Esther Duflo, are a conceiving Ideology, often derived out of Ignorance, that is perpetuated as a result of Inertia (see also Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty). More and more we do recognize the complex nature of issues we face with, the inadequacy of opaque models pushing correlation for causality, and the lack of Silver Bullet solutions. However, we are yet to find the instruments for handling complexity in a meaningful way. The book by Yuen Yuen Ang is an excellent starting point for this intellectual inquiry.
Originally at https://wp.me/p54akc-3P
There is no shortage of ‘best practices’ or ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions in a development economy. Free trade, democracy, institution building, you name it. The Washington Consensus has reigned in the decades since the 1990s. Now the Beijing consensus is emerging.
Yuen Yuen Ang dismisses such solutions and suggests that there is no universal prescription. Her one-sentence summary is “Poor and weak countries can escape the poverty trap by first building markets with weak institutions and, more fundamentally, by crafting environments that facilitate improvisation among the relevant players.” She explores this idea through studying how China managed to achieve and sustain economic development after Mao. The country employed this approach, which allowed the to achievement of economic growth in complex circumstances. Yuen Yuen Ang call this approach ‘directed improvisation’ where central reformers direct and local state agents improvise. It taps local knowledge and adapts to the local circumstances, while aiming at an overarching goal. The resulting transformative process has displayed three distinct patterns. It is broad, bringing systemic changes despite incremental reforms. It is bold, unusually entrepreneurial but also attracts corruption-prone bureaucrats. Finally, it is uneven, with wide regional disparities coexisting with national prosperity.
The Government nurtured what Yuen Yuen Ang calls ‘directed innovation’ through variation, selection and niche creation. To promote variation, central reformers allowed local agents to flexibly implement central mandates according to local conditions. This has been done through deliberate creation of grey zones, as too much leeway could create chaos. Hence, Central bodies clearly delineated these zones of local improvisation. They imposed red lines around local administration, denoting things which are prohibited and risk very severe punishments; and black lines for things which must be delivered, again at the risk of severe punishment in the case of non-performance. The rest was in a grey zone, open for innovation and adaptation to local conditions. Selection was promoted by clearly defining and rewarding success within bureaucracy, of the type in the black lines discussed above. Central reformers clearly communicated the criteria for success to lower levels and ranked localities, and closely looked for what has worked and what didn’t. Successful models and approaches then became central policy, scaled up and replicated throughout China. For instance, the famous Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) were neither prescribed, nor anticipated by central reformers, as Deng Xiaoping himself admitted. They grew up out of local experimentation at that stage of the reforms, as best fit to local needs and conditions, to produce growth spurts, and centrally imposed restrictions for the of non-acceptability of private property. The diversity of China provided the raw material for innovation, resulting in niche creation for different localities. Regional diversity thus turned from liability into a collective advantage.
The methodology Yuen Yuen Ang used is a mapping of the ‘coevolutionary process’, with whole Chapter (1) and Annex (A) devoted to the description of the methodology. She does not engage into construction of sophisticated regression models, torturing data in the elusive quest for causality out of correlation. Neither does she stick to small N approach, looking through messy and overcomplicated set of variable for a single case (By the way, enquiring reader could find great discussion of cultural differences between small N versus big N approaches in A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences). Hence, no oversimplification and no messy non-reductionist approach to complexity. Rather, a complex approach, which captures a non-linear, co-evolutionary process, in reduced form. She tracks changes in the related systems of economy and institutions, over the time. Throughout the book, she dives into examples of Forest Hill, Blessed County and Humble County in China, which are archetypes of various types of localities in China. In her methodological annex she extends this approach to two additional cases of tax-less finance in United States of America in the 1880s and raise of Nollywood in Nigeria.
The three ‘I’s haunting development economics, according to Esther Duflo, are a conceiving Ideology, often derived out of Ignorance, that is perpetuated as a result of Inertia (see also Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty). More and more we do recognize the complex nature of issues we face with, the inadequacy of opaque models pushing correlation for causality, and the lack of Silver Bullet solutions. However, we are yet to find the instruments for handling complexity in a meaningful way. The book by Yuen Yuen Ang is an excellent starting point for this intellectual inquiry.
Originally at https://wp.me/p54akc-3P
June 2, 2021
Insightful and thorough.
July 23, 2017
I infer three big contributions (answering three big questions of development economics) of this book to the broader literature of development economics. These questions are seldom asked in development, much less answered. These questions are
1) There's a growth vs. institutions dichotomy in development literature often posed in form of two statements - you first need growth to build institutions OR you need institutions to get growth. But no one asked - should it always be a dichotomy? Can growth and institutions co-evolve? This book raises this unquestioned question and answers that growth and institutions have always co-evolved historically. This may seem obvious statement but it isn't - a brief survey of development debates would tell you that. More than that, it's not just enough to make this statement. One has to prove it with some examples. Most of the hard work goes there. The author has gone into enormous details of China's growth story to make this point.
2) "Countries need adaptability" - This is another famous dictum in development. But no one asks - what conditions enables adaptability? This book raises this question and answers it, drawing lessons from China's story.
3) "Laundry list of reforms vs. All in reforms" - In general, the policy recommendations are made in form of a laundry list of steps that are to be taken. This presumes that there are few constraints, addressing which can lead to growth. This may not be a correct way to frame the question, what the author calls "complicated problem". Addressing few constraints will work if it's a system like a car, where few parts are to be repaired. But it needn't be applicable to what the author calls "complex problem". Complex problems are those where there are many unknown unknowns and where combinations of constraints can lead to new constraints. In such cases, one has to go for an all-in reform, where you have to make "incremental reform across wide range of connected domains simultaneously". If you do fragmented reform across only few domains, those efforts won't translate into outcomes. One has to do reform across wide spectrum of areas. This again may seem obvious but many miss it.
Overall, I highly recommend the book. It's a quick read and written in an engaging manner in simple language, accessible to a non-specialist reader. For those interested, here is a summary and review of the book on my blog http://www.iterativeadaptation.in/201...
1) There's a growth vs. institutions dichotomy in development literature often posed in form of two statements - you first need growth to build institutions OR you need institutions to get growth. But no one asked - should it always be a dichotomy? Can growth and institutions co-evolve? This book raises this unquestioned question and answers that growth and institutions have always co-evolved historically. This may seem obvious statement but it isn't - a brief survey of development debates would tell you that. More than that, it's not just enough to make this statement. One has to prove it with some examples. Most of the hard work goes there. The author has gone into enormous details of China's growth story to make this point.
2) "Countries need adaptability" - This is another famous dictum in development. But no one asks - what conditions enables adaptability? This book raises this question and answers it, drawing lessons from China's story.
3) "Laundry list of reforms vs. All in reforms" - In general, the policy recommendations are made in form of a laundry list of steps that are to be taken. This presumes that there are few constraints, addressing which can lead to growth. This may not be a correct way to frame the question, what the author calls "complicated problem". Addressing few constraints will work if it's a system like a car, where few parts are to be repaired. But it needn't be applicable to what the author calls "complex problem". Complex problems are those where there are many unknown unknowns and where combinations of constraints can lead to new constraints. In such cases, one has to go for an all-in reform, where you have to make "incremental reform across wide range of connected domains simultaneously". If you do fragmented reform across only few domains, those efforts won't translate into outcomes. One has to do reform across wide spectrum of areas. This again may seem obvious but many miss it.
Overall, I highly recommend the book. It's a quick read and written in an engaging manner in simple language, accessible to a non-specialist reader. For those interested, here is a summary and review of the book on my blog http://www.iterativeadaptation.in/201...
April 12, 2023
To put it in simple (and sexy) terms, economic development is, at its core, a path to self-determination, a life well-lived, and the ability to give labor (and existence) meaning –– this is why I love development studies so much. Professor Ang is truly a thought leader in this field. (I’ve been star-struck since I first attended her seminar in January 2020!) This is a masterpiece that illustrates complexity theory in practice. Indisputably, no modern development case gets as complex as that of China in a mere 35 years. As the world benefits from the stability and prosperity of this country that is so deeply embedded into the global network, the world will also suffer from the growing pains and heavy costs of China’s accelerated development in the past decades.
Built upon the works of countless renowned modern economists, sociologists, and political scientists, this book further revolutionizes how we understand the adaptivity of complex systems that are capable of delivering developmental outcomes. Seeing through the fog of often over-simplified notions such as “good governance —> growth,” Dr. Ang invites us to examine economic development as a coevolutionary process that looks more like an improvised dance to bridge highly localized conditions (often shortcomings) and ambitions. It all goes back to our attempt to answer a simple yet perplexing conundrum: indeed, human flourishing is our shared dream, yet without good institutions, how can one go about preserving conditions for growth that one currently does not have and cannot afford?
Six key takeaways Dr. Ang highlights:
1. Delimit boundaries of experimentation and flexibility
2. Activate incremental changes across connected domains simultaneously
3. In the beginning, define success narrowly (to account for geographical and endowment differences)
4. Give everyone a personal stake in the development process (decentralize the system!)
5. Let some get rich first but pair up the poor and the rich (“the flying geese,” regional variations are as salient as their connections)
6. Harness weak institutions to build markets, or more simply, “use what you have”
This book is simply too breathtaking!! Lots to soak in… lots of notes to organize.
A super insightful book for anyone who's interested in poverty alleviation, human development, economics fieldwork, how to do good social science research, etc. etc.
Built upon the works of countless renowned modern economists, sociologists, and political scientists, this book further revolutionizes how we understand the adaptivity of complex systems that are capable of delivering developmental outcomes. Seeing through the fog of often over-simplified notions such as “good governance —> growth,” Dr. Ang invites us to examine economic development as a coevolutionary process that looks more like an improvised dance to bridge highly localized conditions (often shortcomings) and ambitions. It all goes back to our attempt to answer a simple yet perplexing conundrum: indeed, human flourishing is our shared dream, yet without good institutions, how can one go about preserving conditions for growth that one currently does not have and cannot afford?
Six key takeaways Dr. Ang highlights:
1. Delimit boundaries of experimentation and flexibility
2. Activate incremental changes across connected domains simultaneously
3. In the beginning, define success narrowly (to account for geographical and endowment differences)
4. Give everyone a personal stake in the development process (decentralize the system!)
5. Let some get rich first but pair up the poor and the rich (“the flying geese,” regional variations are as salient as their connections)
6. Harness weak institutions to build markets, or more simply, “use what you have”
This book is simply too breathtaking!! Lots to soak in… lots of notes to organize.
A super insightful book for anyone who's interested in poverty alleviation, human development, economics fieldwork, how to do good social science research, etc. etc.
May 25, 2021
Development economics, meet political science.
Economic models can accomplish little, when one has no idea (or the wrong ideas) about what to put into the models — garbage in, garbage out. This is why fieldwork, like Prof.Ang has done masterfully in this book, can be important for understanding economic development. It helps economists understand what the initial conditions of their models should be, and it helps other scholars to trace the process of development much more clearly.
Although, I wonder if Prof. Ang is too quick to dismiss North-Weingast-De Soto story of the importance of property rights. The fact still remains: China only developed after the establishment of secure property rights (if not by law, then by government acquiescence). No nation, past or present has been able to develop economically without first securing such property rights. These rights may be important for both building and preserving markets.
Nevertheless, this book isn’t focused on the “why” of China’s rapid economic development, but on the “how”. Therefore, to an extent, Prof.Ang sidesteps many controversies in economics about the causes of economic development. Instead, she focus on the actual process of how economic development occured in China. Three key take aways (among many others) are:
(1) Institutions needed to preserve markets are different from institutions needed to build markets. Economists focus too much on the former, but developing countries urgently need the latter.
(2) Politics and economics coevolve in China (and probably everywhere else). As some areas in China grew richer, the local governments changed their policies and organizations, which in turn further changed the economics... which then affected politics... So single-cause explanations are not very useful. Property rights alone or a developmental state alone did not cause all of China’s growth.
(3) A McDonald-like franchised model of government in China promoted growth. Local governments are given flexibility to pursue economic growth as they see fit. Local governments can tailor their policies to best fit local conditions, but Beijing (and provincial capitals) still set guidelines for local governments and prohibit some policy outcomes, such as growth strategies that cause social protests.
All in all, highly recommend to anyone interested in the topic.
Economic models can accomplish little, when one has no idea (or the wrong ideas) about what to put into the models — garbage in, garbage out. This is why fieldwork, like Prof.Ang has done masterfully in this book, can be important for understanding economic development. It helps economists understand what the initial conditions of their models should be, and it helps other scholars to trace the process of development much more clearly.
Although, I wonder if Prof. Ang is too quick to dismiss North-Weingast-De Soto story of the importance of property rights. The fact still remains: China only developed after the establishment of secure property rights (if not by law, then by government acquiescence). No nation, past or present has been able to develop economically without first securing such property rights. These rights may be important for both building and preserving markets.
Nevertheless, this book isn’t focused on the “why” of China’s rapid economic development, but on the “how”. Therefore, to an extent, Prof.Ang sidesteps many controversies in economics about the causes of economic development. Instead, she focus on the actual process of how economic development occured in China. Three key take aways (among many others) are:
(1) Institutions needed to preserve markets are different from institutions needed to build markets. Economists focus too much on the former, but developing countries urgently need the latter.
(2) Politics and economics coevolve in China (and probably everywhere else). As some areas in China grew richer, the local governments changed their policies and organizations, which in turn further changed the economics... which then affected politics... So single-cause explanations are not very useful. Property rights alone or a developmental state alone did not cause all of China’s growth.
(3) A McDonald-like franchised model of government in China promoted growth. Local governments are given flexibility to pursue economic growth as they see fit. Local governments can tailor their policies to best fit local conditions, but Beijing (and provincial capitals) still set guidelines for local governments and prohibit some policy outcomes, such as growth strategies that cause social protests.
All in all, highly recommend to anyone interested in the topic.
October 4, 2024
This is a well-structured intervention into a body of scholarly output that seems woefully unable to understand China’s economic rise. Yuen Yuen Ang insists on understanding development as an interconnected, co-evolutionary process, in which governance and economic growth are mutually interdependent, against the prevailing schools of “good governance → growth” (how does one develop ‘good’ institutions without resources?), “growth → good governance” (where does the growth come from?) or “history → good governance → growth” (deterministic, fatalistic, sometimes chauvinistic).
In one line, Ang’s argument is: Poor and weak countries can escape the poverty trap by first building markets with weak institutions and, more fundamentally, by crafting environments that facilitate improvisation among the relevant players.
“Weak” institutions are those that correspond to Max Weber’s framework for pre-modern institutions as opposed to legal-rational, professional bureaucracies; that is, those that fuse personal and private interests, are regulated partially rather than impartially, implement policies without coordination, and involve fee extractions as opposed to disinterested oversight. As Ang notes, there is a chauvinism in the way this classification is applied:
She highlights the ways that “weak” institutions are well-suited to the tasks of initial development, including being able to leverage strong communities ties in order to mobilize resources, move quickly and improvise, and adapt to local conditions and needs. Combating a persistent myth that all that is needed for development to explode is for government to protect private property and otherwise get out of the way (as in England’s 1688 Glorious Revolution), Ang looks at how examples of “weak” institutions supported development in 14th-15th century Europe. I particularly liked her insight into the rationality of prebendalism (widespread throughout Europe at this time): central governments unable to pay or administer salaries to a dispersed bureaucracy instead bestow the right to take portions of the taxes in exchange for collecting the taxes.
In treating development as co-evolutionary, Ang leans on the biological metaphor. In evolution, random variation leads to advantages that are selected for, either leading to survival of the fittest, or divergence into specialization to fill a niche. These themes of variation, selection and niche creation are as crucial for studying economic development, but where the origin of species is determined by unambiguous markers of success (survival and reproduction), in sociological systems, what should be considered “success” is determined via public debate and political decision-making (and, though Ang doesn’t say so, the survival of the State).
Ang’s specific advice for developing countries based on her analysis of China’s remarkable development, is (like me, Ang’s a big fan of numbered lists):
1. Delimit boundaries of experimentation and flexibility. China’s central government developed a system of red policies (clear uncrossable lines enforced consistently by the state), black policies (clear positive instructions from the state that must be fulfilled), and grey policies (deliberately ambiguous guidelines). The “grey” area permitted variation and improvisation, and the central government would then transform successful interventions into “black” universal policies. As Deng Xiaoping says, “Cross the river by feeling for the stones.”
2. Activate incremental changes across connected domains simultaneously. Because all aspects of an economy are interconnected, it is not pragmatic to change only a few policies at once. While China’s reform period is marked by incremental change, incremental does not always mean small, and China’s reforms were often bold and typically multi-pronged.
3. In the beginning, define success narrowly. At the start of Reform and Opening Up, the central state defined success as economic success. With additional resources at its disposal, additional success metrics have been incorporated, such as environmental policy. (Here, I wish Ang had spent considerably more time, including on interplay between social markers like poverty alleviation or education and economic factors, alas!)
4. Give everyone a personal stake in the development process. Even the on-the-ground representatives of the state, like regulatory officers and school teachers, were given personal incentives in the form of income or professional advancement to work towards the collective goals. (I appreciated Ang’s examination of all levels of the bureaucracy, versus party leaders.)
5. Let some get rich first but pair up the poor and the rich. Coastal regions in China had significant trade advantages, and so developed first. As these regions took off, financed largely by foreign direct investment, domestic investment (both state and private) then shifted to the center of the country.
6. Harness weak institutions to build markets. Like parenting a newborn is different from parenting a teen, developing new markets is different from maintaining existing markets. It is not a matter of developing “good enough” institutions, but of using the institutions you have in the best way possible to achieve development
In one line, Ang’s argument is: Poor and weak countries can escape the poverty trap by first building markets with weak institutions and, more fundamentally, by crafting environments that facilitate improvisation among the relevant players.
“Weak” institutions are those that correspond to Max Weber’s framework for pre-modern institutions as opposed to legal-rational, professional bureaucracies; that is, those that fuse personal and private interests, are regulated partially rather than impartially, implement policies without coordination, and involve fee extractions as opposed to disinterested oversight. As Ang notes, there is a chauvinism in the way this classification is applied:
We miss the obvious because standard binary labels of “weak/strong” and “good/bad” blinds us to the potential of nonmodern, nonformal, non-rule-of-law, and nondemocratic institutions. Our conventional and strongly rooted bias that the norms of the developed West are universally best leads us to regard any deviation from these norms only as weaknesses. Consequently, institutions in developing societies are routinely identified by what they are not rather than by what they are.
She highlights the ways that “weak” institutions are well-suited to the tasks of initial development, including being able to leverage strong communities ties in order to mobilize resources, move quickly and improvise, and adapt to local conditions and needs. Combating a persistent myth that all that is needed for development to explode is for government to protect private property and otherwise get out of the way (as in England’s 1688 Glorious Revolution), Ang looks at how examples of “weak” institutions supported development in 14th-15th century Europe. I particularly liked her insight into the rationality of prebendalism (widespread throughout Europe at this time): central governments unable to pay or administer salaries to a dispersed bureaucracy instead bestow the right to take portions of the taxes in exchange for collecting the taxes.
In treating development as co-evolutionary, Ang leans on the biological metaphor. In evolution, random variation leads to advantages that are selected for, either leading to survival of the fittest, or divergence into specialization to fill a niche. These themes of variation, selection and niche creation are as crucial for studying economic development, but where the origin of species is determined by unambiguous markers of success (survival and reproduction), in sociological systems, what should be considered “success” is determined via public debate and political decision-making (and, though Ang doesn’t say so, the survival of the State).
Ang’s specific advice for developing countries based on her analysis of China’s remarkable development, is (like me, Ang’s a big fan of numbered lists):
1. Delimit boundaries of experimentation and flexibility. China’s central government developed a system of red policies (clear uncrossable lines enforced consistently by the state), black policies (clear positive instructions from the state that must be fulfilled), and grey policies (deliberately ambiguous guidelines). The “grey” area permitted variation and improvisation, and the central government would then transform successful interventions into “black” universal policies. As Deng Xiaoping says, “Cross the river by feeling for the stones.”
2. Activate incremental changes across connected domains simultaneously. Because all aspects of an economy are interconnected, it is not pragmatic to change only a few policies at once. While China’s reform period is marked by incremental change, incremental does not always mean small, and China’s reforms were often bold and typically multi-pronged.
3. In the beginning, define success narrowly. At the start of Reform and Opening Up, the central state defined success as economic success. With additional resources at its disposal, additional success metrics have been incorporated, such as environmental policy. (Here, I wish Ang had spent considerably more time, including on interplay between social markers like poverty alleviation or education and economic factors, alas!)
4. Give everyone a personal stake in the development process. Even the on-the-ground representatives of the state, like regulatory officers and school teachers, were given personal incentives in the form of income or professional advancement to work towards the collective goals. (I appreciated Ang’s examination of all levels of the bureaucracy, versus party leaders.)
5. Let some get rich first but pair up the poor and the rich. Coastal regions in China had significant trade advantages, and so developed first. As these regions took off, financed largely by foreign direct investment, domestic investment (both state and private) then shifted to the center of the country.
6. Harness weak institutions to build markets. Like parenting a newborn is different from parenting a teen, developing new markets is different from maintaining existing markets. It is not a matter of developing “good enough” institutions, but of using the institutions you have in the best way possible to achieve development
Ang’s examination is very market focused — even more so than I have laid out here. In her exposition, the goal of development is to have strong markets and institutions that support them. My own value system differs somewhat: the goal is to have a thriving, happy, liberated populace and markets are a tool to enable that. Correspondingly, discussion of the human happiness side of China’s meteoric rise was nearly absent from the narrative, and when it was presented, the negative was emphasized: slums, emptied out villages, etc (to her credit, Ang notes that the same patterns emerged during Europe’s early development) rather than poverty alleviation and a continuation of the rise in life expectancy that started with the 1949 revolution.
There was very little examination at the philosophical factors that led to China’s uniquely being able to solve the poverty trap. In this way, it was the near opposite of When China Rules The World, which I read earlier this year and which explains China’s rise as a result of its Neo-Confucianism more than any material factors. Ang hits the mark a little better, and I think it is not a coincidence that she emphasizes the interconnectedness of systems, the relationship between economic structure and superstructure, and how one stage of development lays the foundations for the stage of development supersedes it. Or, in other words, her analysis is (unintentionally, I think) dialectical and material, the same philosophical foundations of the Communist Party of China. Ang dismisses — or, to the extent they are discussed, regards as one-sidedly tragic — the policies of the Mao era. I think the relationship between pre-Reform and post-Reform China is more continuous than that presented here, and the impact of policies of that era transmitted well beyond the 1970s.
Ang defends her theses by exploring three cities within China that took different paths to development. She used placeholder names (“Forest Hill”) and I would have preferred she use the real names so that I came away from the book with a firm grasp of a real location rather than a firm grasp of somewhere in The Shire. Ang also compares antebellum United States and Nigeria’s Nollywood as examples of development outside China that fulfilled these steps. Showing wwo positive controls gives the reader confidence in her thesis. As a scientist, I did note the lack of negative controls that would have lent further support to the parsimoniousness of her recommendations: were there locations that implemented five of her six recommendations but saw only tepid growth?
Though I read it critically, I found this to be informative and thought-provoking. The structure of institutions must match the tasks at hand. This is a lesson worth bearing in mind whether the tasks at hand are those of a small local community organization, a venture capital-backed start-up, or the governing body of the world’s most populous country.
December 19, 2024
When AJR won the Nobel, I saw a lot of hubbub about Ang's work being a more nuanced and less teleological approach to the same subject matter, so felt it would be an appropriate follow up after being more or less disappointed by the Why Nations Fail boys. Overall, Ang's more anthropological take on economic development adds a sorely needed human based dimension to the topic at hand, with her thick descriptions of the differing experiences of different Chinese counties contributing a lot of ethos to her ideas. I found myself wanting her to branch outside of the Chinese experience a bit more and apply what feels like a compelling package of ideas to other scenarios to both add credibility to her analysis of China's development and explain other similar feeling cases (which does happen, just briefly at the end with 3 short dives). Almost choked when she mentioned the looming Chinese real estate bubble though.
November 4, 2023
A marvelous academic comparative analysis of China’s economic evolution. It’s amazing to realize how much could be changed if ground level market operators have the freedom to adapt to ever-changing market and policies.
February 22, 2025
Wonderful book on industrial policy. Instead of sitting at home and thinking about how to do it, she decides to go and ask the people who managed to industrialize a country what they think people should do.
April 10, 2025
Espouses nuanced understanding that holds multiple co-evolutionary conceptions of growth and governance factors in its head at once as an alternative to others that tend toward blame games, reductionism and/or silver bullets. Spends quite a bit of time academically stating the obvious but I appreciate its pointing out the incompleteness of single-minded perspectives.
November 17, 2020
Si hoy les dijera que quizá los consejos genéricos de las organizaciones internacionales, de consultores y demás expertos en desarrollo económico no son tan útiles, probablemente muchos no lo creerían o dirían que es una locura. Pero en este libro Yuen Yuen Ang toma la experiencia China durante los últimos 30 años para producir una explicación sobre como el desarrollo económico realmente ocurre, el resultado muestra que tiene poco en común con lo que los consultores, el Banco Mundial o la mayoría de los expertos consideraría “la receta para el desarrollo”.
La autora propone un entendimiento más sofisticado del proceso, uno de coevolución donde salimos de la falsa dicotomía entre “mejores instituciones producen crecimiento” o “mayor crecimiento nos permite tener mejores instituciones”. En la realidad las dos cosas se necesitan, no hay causalidad en una sola dirección, todo lo contrario, la causalidad corre todo el tiempo en ambas direcciones.
De esta manera son los países que logren mantenerse en un proceso constante de adaptación de su realidad política, regulatoria y económica los que tienen mayor probabilidad de obtener buenos resultados. Su idea de el desarrollo económico como un proceso coevolutivo va en contra de las Interpretaciones deterministas que apuntan a que si tienes malas instituciones no hay nada que hacer.
En mi opinión es un entendimiento similar al de Justin Yifu Lin “industrial upgrading” pero aplicado a la economía política del desarrollo. Donde las instituciones y el crecimiento van de la mano y se retroalimentan entre si y el trabajo del estado es fijar la dirección de esa coevolución, pero no necesariamente controlarla.
Es un libro extraordinario, con una gran claridad y lucidez de análisis. Además en el se ven los inicios del tipo de pensamiento que llevaría a la autora a producir luego China’s Gilded Age, este par de libros realmente se leen muy bien juntos. Lo recomiendo mucho.
La autora propone un entendimiento más sofisticado del proceso, uno de coevolución donde salimos de la falsa dicotomía entre “mejores instituciones producen crecimiento” o “mayor crecimiento nos permite tener mejores instituciones”. En la realidad las dos cosas se necesitan, no hay causalidad en una sola dirección, todo lo contrario, la causalidad corre todo el tiempo en ambas direcciones.
De esta manera son los países que logren mantenerse en un proceso constante de adaptación de su realidad política, regulatoria y económica los que tienen mayor probabilidad de obtener buenos resultados. Su idea de el desarrollo económico como un proceso coevolutivo va en contra de las Interpretaciones deterministas que apuntan a que si tienes malas instituciones no hay nada que hacer.
En mi opinión es un entendimiento similar al de Justin Yifu Lin “industrial upgrading” pero aplicado a la economía política del desarrollo. Donde las instituciones y el crecimiento van de la mano y se retroalimentan entre si y el trabajo del estado es fijar la dirección de esa coevolución, pero no necesariamente controlarla.
Es un libro extraordinario, con una gran claridad y lucidez de análisis. Además en el se ven los inicios del tipo de pensamiento que llevaría a la autora a producir luego China’s Gilded Age, este par de libros realmente se leen muy bien juntos. Lo recomiendo mucho.
July 21, 2021
This was a really solid piece of Political Economy that I highly recommend!
I want to start out by saying that I can credit works I don’t necessarily agree with. I myself am a Marxist, so reading about China’s capitalist revolution is a bit daunting. With that being said, the author’s methodology is consistent, and she absolutely proves the thesis with clear evidence and context.
This book is definitely worth the read for any academics studying Political Economy who have seen the failures of neoliberal institutions and thought to themselves, “But what are the alternatives?” The terminology that the author uses is clearly-defined, and she pulls from several regional examples to prove her thesis.
This book teaches about China’s political system of decentralized authoritarianism as well as its convoluted mixed economy. It isn’t exactly a page turner, but it delivers exactly what it promises to deliver, and it does so honestly and consistently.
I want to start out by saying that I can credit works I don’t necessarily agree with. I myself am a Marxist, so reading about China’s capitalist revolution is a bit daunting. With that being said, the author’s methodology is consistent, and she absolutely proves the thesis with clear evidence and context.
This book is definitely worth the read for any academics studying Political Economy who have seen the failures of neoliberal institutions and thought to themselves, “But what are the alternatives?” The terminology that the author uses is clearly-defined, and she pulls from several regional examples to prove her thesis.
This book teaches about China’s political system of decentralized authoritarianism as well as its convoluted mixed economy. It isn’t exactly a page turner, but it delivers exactly what it promises to deliver, and it does so honestly and consistently.
August 21, 2018
This is a fairly dry book. I get the impression that it's directed more at other academics than interested non-specialists, but the information contained within it is fascinating. The essential argument is that weak states need to bootstrap their way to modern free-market economies by making markets and institutions that function well relative to their current level of growth and that can be refined or replaced as the country and its economy develop. After finishing this book I felt better able to understand why many well intentioned development plans failed to have their desired effects in other countries.
January 3, 2017
One could only hope to produce such a magisterial doctoral dissertation. The author borrows from evolutionary biology and complexity theory to analyze the development of markets in China. It is a co-evolutionary process of ground up and top down institutional reform that has produced the PRC's incredible growth since Deng Xiaoping's reforms.
The book is well written and accessible to a middle-brow popular audience with a grasp of basic economics and politics--your average reader of the WSJ or Economist.
The book is well written and accessible to a middle-brow popular audience with a grasp of basic economics and politics--your average reader of the WSJ or Economist.
July 24, 2019
I just love it when a book totally opens up a whole new way of thinking about things. I don't read much political economy, so to be fair this contains a whole lot of new thinking for me - but I really enjoyed it, and reckon others would too.
(No it isn't perfect - but I look forward to seeing what Yuen Yuen Ang has to say next!)
(No it isn't perfect - but I look forward to seeing what Yuen Yuen Ang has to say next!)
October 28, 2019
Absolutely the best book I have read on political economics. Yuen Yuen Ang detailed ground-level analysis of the process of economic change in China is superb. This is not lens through any particular life, but an analysis of how policy affects many live. Must-read.
November 17, 2024
China development literature is fascinating and ever-evolving. While conventional development economics usually dedicates case studies for Argentina and Japan, this was my first time reading an entire book on China's development alone. I cannot attest to the *accuracy* (or even the methodology) Ang uses, but she writes convincingly with various example counties that highlight the dynamics at play - natural resources, foreign investment, geography, local bureaucracies, etc.
I enjoyed how she examines the *interactions* between well-endowed and not-so-well-endowed cities, recognizing the cruel reality that sometimes, inequality is a facilitator for economic development.
I enjoyed how she examines the *interactions* between well-endowed and not-so-well-endowed cities, recognizing the cruel reality that sometimes, inequality is a facilitator for economic development.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 12, 2023
This is a valuable but frustrating book for scholars of China, growth, and international development, in part because it is essentially 2 books yoked together.
One book, providing a narrative account of how local bureaucrats in China adapted their strategies for promoting development over time and to local circumstances, based on extensive structured interviews in 4 Chinese counties, is clear and informative, at least regarding the arc of policy as perceived by insiders in earlier and later-developing parts of China. To sum this up, early in the development process regions used unorthodox tactics including leveraging informal relationships and high-powered incentives to promote growth, and the resulting growth subsequently created pressure for bureaucracies to become more organized and to target a wider range of goals. The initiation and speed of this process varied based on economic opportunities across regions, beginning in the coasts and proceeding inland based on access to markets.
The second book, attempting to ground and defend this work in terms of an articulated methodology based on "complex adaptive systems" and "coevolutionary" processes, is a godawful travesty of misappropriated jargon which shrouds banal trivialities like "different policies work well in different places at different times" in mountains of superfluous prose, obscuring the main arguments. If these large sections of the book were tossed out and every use of "complex adaptive system" replaced by "crossing the river by feeling the stones," it would be a substantial improvement.
To be charitable to the author, as best I can tell, this methodological nonsense is some kind of defensive tactic used to justify fairly standard, even careful, comparative narrative ethnographic work against hostile reception from quantitatively-inclined political scientists by shielding it in intimidating-sounding phrases from more quantitative disciplines. If this is right, it paints an even more damning picture of the state of quantitative political science (or at least the perception thereof, but if so a widely shared one given that this book won awards), as in those cases where the jargon means anything at all, it is distinguishing narrative work about change over time from mindless cross-sectional regressions. This is particularly dispiriting, as dynamics of economic growth and political economy, even particularly in the setting of Chinese regional growth patterns, have been routinely addressed by economists in formal mathematical frameworks that go beyond static linear regression modeling, with little need for defensive bombast. This is not to say that Ang should have abandoned her approach in favor of even more complicated mathematical models (though as someone who has supervised a PhD thesis modeling tax competition and local industrial policies across Chinese cities complete with requisite PDEs, I certainly do see value there), but that in a more self-assured field the ethnographic work could stand on its own, insulated from sophomoric critiques from scholars whose conception of quantitative work is so narrow as to rule out even quite simple stories of difference and change over time. As is, the insecurity which drives the arms race towards ever more tenuously-relevant quantitative research is met with further insecurity, leaving the field worse off.
One book, providing a narrative account of how local bureaucrats in China adapted their strategies for promoting development over time and to local circumstances, based on extensive structured interviews in 4 Chinese counties, is clear and informative, at least regarding the arc of policy as perceived by insiders in earlier and later-developing parts of China. To sum this up, early in the development process regions used unorthodox tactics including leveraging informal relationships and high-powered incentives to promote growth, and the resulting growth subsequently created pressure for bureaucracies to become more organized and to target a wider range of goals. The initiation and speed of this process varied based on economic opportunities across regions, beginning in the coasts and proceeding inland based on access to markets.
The second book, attempting to ground and defend this work in terms of an articulated methodology based on "complex adaptive systems" and "coevolutionary" processes, is a godawful travesty of misappropriated jargon which shrouds banal trivialities like "different policies work well in different places at different times" in mountains of superfluous prose, obscuring the main arguments. If these large sections of the book were tossed out and every use of "complex adaptive system" replaced by "crossing the river by feeling the stones," it would be a substantial improvement.
To be charitable to the author, as best I can tell, this methodological nonsense is some kind of defensive tactic used to justify fairly standard, even careful, comparative narrative ethnographic work against hostile reception from quantitatively-inclined political scientists by shielding it in intimidating-sounding phrases from more quantitative disciplines. If this is right, it paints an even more damning picture of the state of quantitative political science (or at least the perception thereof, but if so a widely shared one given that this book won awards), as in those cases where the jargon means anything at all, it is distinguishing narrative work about change over time from mindless cross-sectional regressions. This is particularly dispiriting, as dynamics of economic growth and political economy, even particularly in the setting of Chinese regional growth patterns, have been routinely addressed by economists in formal mathematical frameworks that go beyond static linear regression modeling, with little need for defensive bombast. This is not to say that Ang should have abandoned her approach in favor of even more complicated mathematical models (though as someone who has supervised a PhD thesis modeling tax competition and local industrial policies across Chinese cities complete with requisite PDEs, I certainly do see value there), but that in a more self-assured field the ethnographic work could stand on its own, insulated from sophomoric critiques from scholars whose conception of quantitative work is so narrow as to rule out even quite simple stories of difference and change over time. As is, the insecurity which drives the arms race towards ever more tenuously-relevant quantitative research is met with further insecurity, leaving the field worse off.
July 12, 2022
One of the strengths of Yuen Yuen Ang’s analysis of China’s phoenix-like rise is to distinguish what is and what is not uniquely “Chinese” about the economic miracle of the past fifty years.
And for the record, a lot of it has nothing to do with being Chinese or being an authoritarian regime.
Coastal provinces succeeded because of their proximity to other eastern powerhouse economies which themselves had become cost uncompetitive through their success.
Coastal provinces also succeeded because of their huge draw on really cheap labour from inland provinces.
In turn, as the coastal provinces lost their competitive advantages because of rising wages and rising land costs the inland provinces made their gains.
Indeed, Deng Xiaoping opened the door to experimentation, to price relaxation, and to privatization of commercial surpluses. Early on, the CCP’s predilection for somewhat vague policies also worked to their advantage. People could begin innovating on a local level with much less fear it would land them in prison.
But the leadership was also pretty clear on what success was supposed to look like.
Capital did not immediately begin to flow into China without a few tried and true methods used in other jurisdictions in earlier times, says Yuen.
Like early America before it, China used taxless financing to spur investment, issuing monopolies, charter rights, and land financing. And like America before it, there were big incentives for corruption at the highest and lowest levels of society.
Some things have changed, some have not. Even as stronger institutions have grown up in China to help accommodate growth, corruption while evolved is still prevalent. The definitions of success have become way more complicated and much harder to achieve, much like in other advanced economies.
The final chapter in this story has yet to be written. China, like America, is a huge polluter. Also, like America, a lot of its wealth is contingent on pushing off the real costs of environmental degradation to the hinterlands, somebody else’s backyard. Many of the elements for its success have moved offshore and real estate speculation has become a national catastrophe on so many levels.
And for the record, a lot of it has nothing to do with being Chinese or being an authoritarian regime.
Coastal provinces succeeded because of their proximity to other eastern powerhouse economies which themselves had become cost uncompetitive through their success.
Coastal provinces also succeeded because of their huge draw on really cheap labour from inland provinces.
In turn, as the coastal provinces lost their competitive advantages because of rising wages and rising land costs the inland provinces made their gains.
Indeed, Deng Xiaoping opened the door to experimentation, to price relaxation, and to privatization of commercial surpluses. Early on, the CCP’s predilection for somewhat vague policies also worked to their advantage. People could begin innovating on a local level with much less fear it would land them in prison.
But the leadership was also pretty clear on what success was supposed to look like.
Capital did not immediately begin to flow into China without a few tried and true methods used in other jurisdictions in earlier times, says Yuen.
Like early America before it, China used taxless financing to spur investment, issuing monopolies, charter rights, and land financing. And like America before it, there were big incentives for corruption at the highest and lowest levels of society.
Some things have changed, some have not. Even as stronger institutions have grown up in China to help accommodate growth, corruption while evolved is still prevalent. The definitions of success have become way more complicated and much harder to achieve, much like in other advanced economies.
The final chapter in this story has yet to be written. China, like America, is a huge polluter. Also, like America, a lot of its wealth is contingent on pushing off the real costs of environmental degradation to the hinterlands, somebody else’s backyard. Many of the elements for its success have moved offshore and real estate speculation has become a national catastrophe on so many levels.
June 8, 2025
I'll be honest, I picked this book up expecting a dense, academic analysis of China's economy. What I got instead was one of the most insightful and practical books on strategy and systemic change I've read in years. This isn't really a book about China; it's a book about how complex systems—be they nations or companies—actually grow, and it demolishes a lot of the tidy, linear "best-practice" models we're often fed.
The author's core argument is that China didn't succeed by importing a perfect system first. It succeeded by using the messy, imperfect, and "weak" institutions it already had. The process wasn't a straight line but a "coevolution," where the state and the market constantly adapted to each other.
What I found most compelling was the framework of "directed improvisation." It’s a brilliant concept that feels immediately applicable to business. The idea is that leadership provides a broad direction and clear incentives, but then empowers local teams to experiment and find solutions that work on the ground. For China, this meant:
- Local officials were incentivized like entrepreneurs, with their careers tied to concrete economic results.
- Initial growth was sparked by "weak" institutions like personal networks and campaign-style mobilization, which were effective for building markets from scratch.
- "Strong" institutions, like formal rule of law, came later to *preserve* the markets that had already been built.
This book reframes development not as a checklist to be completed, but as an adaptive process to be managed. It’s a must-read for anyone in a leadership position who is grappling with large-scale transformation or trying to foster innovation within a large organization. It’s rare to find a book that offers a genuinely new mental model, but this is one of them. It will stick with me for a long time.
The author's core argument is that China didn't succeed by importing a perfect system first. It succeeded by using the messy, imperfect, and "weak" institutions it already had. The process wasn't a straight line but a "coevolution," where the state and the market constantly adapted to each other.
What I found most compelling was the framework of "directed improvisation." It’s a brilliant concept that feels immediately applicable to business. The idea is that leadership provides a broad direction and clear incentives, but then empowers local teams to experiment and find solutions that work on the ground. For China, this meant:
- Local officials were incentivized like entrepreneurs, with their careers tied to concrete economic results.
- Initial growth was sparked by "weak" institutions like personal networks and campaign-style mobilization, which were effective for building markets from scratch.
- "Strong" institutions, like formal rule of law, came later to *preserve* the markets that had already been built.
This book reframes development not as a checklist to be completed, but as an adaptive process to be managed. It’s a must-read for anyone in a leadership position who is grappling with large-scale transformation or trying to foster innovation within a large organization. It’s rare to find a book that offers a genuinely new mental model, but this is one of them. It will stick with me for a long time.
March 10, 2024
the downside fragment of a review
Nonetheless, the book falls short of adequately addressing some important problems.
First, China’s impressive growth model masks an equally impressive excess of debt.
The true enormity of its debt problem remains under-explored in the book.
Second, the crucial bureaucratic innovation carried out in the particular mix of the Chinese political context may have worked but it remains a question whether such necessary innovation can be triggered in other weak institutional contexts.
Finally, Ang admirably plunges into the complex issue of economic development, but she underappreciates the myriad human connections entangled in the socio-economic processes of development. The improvement of collective welfare surely came with many individual and social costs in China, as it did in the West during the centuries of slow, zigzag, and often brutal market-building.
However, higher individual socio-political awareness since the late twentieth century, combined with easier connectivity to near and distant worlds, can create undue political pressures, which perhaps in an authoritarian regime can only be tackled with brute force.
How can we overlook and tolerate weak institutions that promote economic development but at the expense of popular demands for political rights and equity in everyday socio-economic transactions?
Admittedly, one book cannot address every possible relevant question. In sum, Ang has done an excellent job despite the constraints. This book is an invaluable addition to the scholarship on the political economy of development.
February 11, 2023
Very impressive academic work on studying China. Usually the study of escaping poverty is framed as a 'chicken or egg' question, with one factor or another being more important. Ang rejects this approach, noting the 'co-evolutionary' relationship between reformed laws and emphasizing economic growth - there is a fun anecdote where a local official who had no more than a limited formal education but still understood the relationship between the two was able to explain this in an interview question.
Ang also outlines the process of 'directed improvisation', where specific policy goals - that is, economic growth, were neither mandated nor explicitly forbidden, but also allowed for local government to adapt to specific circumstances without direction from the central government.
Additionally, Ang notes the tendency among social scientists to search for a single explanatory variable in their narratives, which tends to oversimplify a historical narrative - instead it is important to note that political processes are complex, with multiple variables interacting with each other. Descriptions about policy methods, such as a "Beijing Consensus" may only be valid for specific settings.
Lots to learn from this book, not just the conclusions but also from her methodology.
Ang also outlines the process of 'directed improvisation', where specific policy goals - that is, economic growth, were neither mandated nor explicitly forbidden, but also allowed for local government to adapt to specific circumstances without direction from the central government.
Additionally, Ang notes the tendency among social scientists to search for a single explanatory variable in their narratives, which tends to oversimplify a historical narrative - instead it is important to note that political processes are complex, with multiple variables interacting with each other. Descriptions about policy methods, such as a "Beijing Consensus" may only be valid for specific settings.
Lots to learn from this book, not just the conclusions but also from her methodology.
May 27, 2025
洪老师真的很会写作，其实这本书的核心观点就是state and market coevolve, weak institutions build market，strong preserves. 在旁征博引之下就成为了一本很不错的书。她用微妙词义差距展开论述的方式特别值得学习（eg complex and complicated)。她很在意读者的感受，很少自说自话，问题意识鲜明，文献综述简洁漂亮，甚至有点过分优雅了（good governance-growth，growth- good governance，history-good governance-growth）gap展现的很清晰。很多发人深省的问题说得也特别漂亮（中国初期对市场是deliberately not impersonal vs weber）无论是写作还是研究方法都是值得参考的一本好书。个人认为的不足之处是，方法论还是薄弱了些，panel quanlitative data如何与真正的理论联系起来缺乏展示（很多coevolve的图个人认为不够）。这就导致后面几章案例部分的写作有点平庸了，很多东西都在老生常谈。还有一个最大的方法论上对问题，就是作者引以为傲的这种研究方法，或者说当她画这幅图的时候，其实一定会得出coevolution这一结论，因为两边肯定都会随着时间有所变化。虽然这种方法很有前景，但是仅仅停留在说他们coevolve还是有点循环论证的嫌疑。
文章有三个signature mechanism用来研究coevolution：variation（generation of alternatives 多大程度自由合适？） 红线 黑线selection （怎么定义成功？） franchised公司，niche creation（ crafting of distinct and valuable roles among heterogeneous units within a system 区域差异怎么变成国家的成功) 作者认为先发地区在国内为后发地区提供了政策引领，产业转移的部分挺有新意。
文章有三个signature mechanism用来研究coevolution：variation（generation of alternatives 多大程度自由合适？） 红线 黑线selection （怎么定义成功？） franchised公司，niche creation（ crafting of distinct and valuable roles among heterogeneous units within a system 区域差异怎么变成国家的成功) 作者认为先发地区在国内为后发地区提供了政策引领，产业转移的部分挺有新意。
February 11, 2025
A simple and compelling masterpiece in political economy, an effort to study economic development in developing countries as they are, rather than what they are not. I think this should be included in a lot of undergraduate reading syllabuses.
To sum up, development is a coevolutionary process between markets and institutions, with best-fit solutions in each of the development stages. While the stages themselves are not strictly defined, particular attention is given to market-building vs. market-sustaining institutions.
Of particular interest to me is how these dynamics operate on the sub-national level with a high degree of decentralization (which is not a universal form of country design), highlighting big countries with internal variety.
To sum up, development is a coevolutionary process between markets and institutions, with best-fit solutions in each of the development stages. While the stages themselves are not strictly defined, particular attention is given to market-building vs. market-sustaining institutions.
Of particular interest to me is how these dynamics operate on the sub-national level with a high degree of decentralization (which is not a universal form of country design), highlighting big countries with internal variety.
July 21, 2025
Me gusta mucho ver una perspectiva diferente a un tema tan específico. También es muy importante destacar el rigor investigativo y lo bien narrado que está. Esto es crucial porque toca temas densos de manera muy aterrizada. Pensaba que iba a ser un poco propagandístico, sin embargo, es un recuento sobre el desarrolo muy imparcial (en mi opinión), mostrando los aspectos tanto positivos como negativos de las decisiones tomadas. Sin eliminar las consecuencias negativas y sin exagerar las consecuencias positivas. Creo que algunas partes del libro se sienten un poco redundantes pero entiendo que son para afianzar y solidificar el análisis de la autora. Tiene una reflexión interesante y me deja con ganas de más información sobre el desarollo y la tomas de decisiones politico-económicas en Asia
January 14, 2025
3.5/5. Compelling, academic, painfully repetitive. Well-researched and educational. This book makes many interesting points that, as noted, are plain in hindsight. However, the authors repeats the same central points so often that it seems they either fear that the average reader has forgotten the prior page or is unable to grasp the key message of the book after having been peppered with it for several hundred pages. Reading the introduction is sufficient for understanding the central points of this book, though some of the latter anecdotes (e.g., the rise of Nollywood) are particularly interesting and insightful.
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