Well researched, slightly less well argued. Builds on important work by Victor critiquing naive Econ 101 arguments for carbon pricing and identifies a lot of interesting failed policy attempts that the authors successfully tie together conceptually: they were all built with a lack of flexibility and insufficient acknowledgement of uncertainties, complexity, and interconnectedness of different tech areas.
Experimentalism, a new governance paradigm the authors lay out here, calls for climate governance by sector rather than global or economy-wide measures, better incorporation of uncertainty and regular joint reviews, updates, and gradual tightening or loosening of hard targets depending on whether evidence suggests solutions are either ready or not yet available for a given sector. Slow moving firms, households, or countries must be given technical assistance before applying penalties.
All fine until here. For hardliner resistance, compliance is incentivized by “penalty defaults” such as limited access to markets, closer scrutiny by regulators, or financial penalties. But how different are these from financial incentives like a price? And how willing are political leaders/constituencies to impose these penalties in the absence of political consensus in favor of action? What are the pathways to building these experimentalist governance structures in the US with a weak/hamstrung regulatory state (and where supporters of stronger regs are generally against flexibility/reform as envisioned here)?
In the more positive case studies the authors are also way too optimistic about the outcomes and their ability to scale. Giving every farmer in the world an extension agent might work if you could do it but would be prohibitively expensive and labor intensive. CA’s electricity grid might be good at deploying batteries but is not an overall success story with slow permitting times, blackouts every summer, and high costs.
Overall a very informative and well put together book, and if I agreed with it more I probably would have gotten less out of reading it.