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The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict
Why and how America’s defense strategy must change in light of China’s power and ambition—A Wall Street Journal best book of 2021
“This is a realist’s book, laser-focused on China’s bid for mastery in Asia as the 21st century’s most important threat.”—Ross Douthat, New York Times
“Colby’s well-crafted and insightful Strategy of Denial provides a superb and, one suspects, essential departure point for an urgent and much-needed debate over U.S. defense strategy.”—Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Foreign Affairs
Elbridge A. Colby was the lead architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the most significant revision of U.S. defense strategy in a generation. Here he lays out how America’s defense must change to address China’s growing power and ambition. Based firmly on the realist tradition but deeply engaged in current policy, this book offers a clear framework for what America’s goals in confronting China must be, how its military strategy must change, and how it must prioritize these goals over its lesser interests.
The most informed and in-depth reappraisal of America’s defense strategy in decades, this book outlines a rigorous but practical approach, showing how the United States can prepare to win a war with China that we cannot afford to lose—precisely in order to deter that war from happening.
“This is a realist’s book, laser-focused on China’s bid for mastery in Asia as the 21st century’s most important threat.”—Ross Douthat, New York Times
“Colby’s well-crafted and insightful Strategy of Denial provides a superb and, one suspects, essential departure point for an urgent and much-needed debate over U.S. defense strategy.”—Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Foreign Affairs
Elbridge A. Colby was the lead architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the most significant revision of U.S. defense strategy in a generation. Here he lays out how America’s defense must change to address China’s growing power and ambition. Based firmly on the realist tradition but deeply engaged in current policy, this book offers a clear framework for what America’s goals in confronting China must be, how its military strategy must change, and how it must prioritize these goals over its lesser interests.
The most informed and in-depth reappraisal of America’s defense strategy in decades, this book outlines a rigorous but practical approach, showing how the United States can prepare to win a war with China that we cannot afford to lose—precisely in order to deter that war from happening.
384 pages, Hardcover
Published September 14, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 39 reviews
April 4, 2022
It is easier to defend a territory than to conquer one. This truism is at the heart of this book focused on U.S. strategies for preventing from consolidating a hegemonic superstate in Asia. Existing U.S. allies in the region should have their defenses built up as much as possible to deny China the opportunity to coerce them. They should also be linked together in some kind of alliance structure, either a hub-and-spoke model or a full blown Asian NATO if possible, in order to prevent China from picking them off one at a time. The arguments contained here go very deep into different scenarios that could play out. I will not recount all of them but only say that this is clearly going to be a huge task for Americans if they genuinely do commit to preventing Chinese hegemony.
September 20, 2021
I am really upset with this book. We are in the 21st century but here we are beating the drums of war. This book is firmly planted in US’ self interest and western perspective. I find this book isfundamentally flawed.
First, the argument that the reunification of Taiwan as a mythical origin is a very simplistic view to justify war. Let’s switch it a little. If China is ruled by a democratic government and Taiwan on the other hand, is ruled by the communist, would you not think that China will still be threatening to invade Taiwan if it declares independence? The Chinese and in general for all other nations, what is once part of a nation will forever be part of that nation. To declare independence amounts to seceding. If California would like to form a nationhood, why does the US constitution forbids it? And if they did, would US go to war? Why? After all, isn’t it just a mythical dream of a united America?
The second flawed thinking is the view that democracy in Taiwan is China’s problem. Do you think for a second that if Taiwan is another communist state or authoritarian leader, they will cozy up and reunify? Democracy is not the issue here. This issue has a long historical baggage and this book has totally not done any justice to it. It is my believe that the Chinese people view the land and people that live in all of China as part of one nationhood going back millennium and to be together is to be stronger.
Stronger not to bully but stronger so as not to be bullied. Why you may ask. Well, I think the humiliation of World War 2 has not exactly healed especially when your country has been carved up by foreign powers as they see fit. If this were to happen to your country, what would you be feeling? It was many years ago but why is the wound still raw? It is because the aggressors have not been fully taken to justice unlike Germany and the Holocaust. It is a US legacy issue of taking care of their own interest with regards to Japan and this has ultimately left a gaping wound. Since that time, China has viewed the world on the prism of ‘no one will help you and no one has your interest at heart if you do not help yourself’.
There needs to be less of this type of books and rhetoric and more understanding.
First, the argument that the reunification of Taiwan as a mythical origin is a very simplistic view to justify war. Let’s switch it a little. If China is ruled by a democratic government and Taiwan on the other hand, is ruled by the communist, would you not think that China will still be threatening to invade Taiwan if it declares independence? The Chinese and in general for all other nations, what is once part of a nation will forever be part of that nation. To declare independence amounts to seceding. If California would like to form a nationhood, why does the US constitution forbids it? And if they did, would US go to war? Why? After all, isn’t it just a mythical dream of a united America?
The second flawed thinking is the view that democracy in Taiwan is China’s problem. Do you think for a second that if Taiwan is another communist state or authoritarian leader, they will cozy up and reunify? Democracy is not the issue here. This issue has a long historical baggage and this book has totally not done any justice to it. It is my believe that the Chinese people view the land and people that live in all of China as part of one nationhood going back millennium and to be together is to be stronger.
Stronger not to bully but stronger so as not to be bullied. Why you may ask. Well, I think the humiliation of World War 2 has not exactly healed especially when your country has been carved up by foreign powers as they see fit. If this were to happen to your country, what would you be feeling? It was many years ago but why is the wound still raw? It is because the aggressors have not been fully taken to justice unlike Germany and the Holocaust. It is a US legacy issue of taking care of their own interest with regards to Japan and this has ultimately left a gaping wound. Since that time, China has viewed the world on the prism of ‘no one will help you and no one has your interest at heart if you do not help yourself’.
There needs to be less of this type of books and rhetoric and more understanding.
Want to read
December 29, 2022WSJ's take is that China's challenge to the US in Asia is likely to be a full-scale invasion of Taiwan:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-stra...
(Paywalled. As always, I'm happy to email a copy to non-subscribers)
Excerpt:
"Mr. Colby makes a persuasive case that if the U.S. does not rapidly address its military shortfalls, China can successfully invade and occupy the neighboring island. An invasion is Beijing’s “best strategy”—better than a lower-intensity military campaign, which would likely fail. Mr. Colby marshals an impressive command of military history to explain why Beijing will need to occupy the island to achieve its goals and how such an invasion might be conducted. It is particularly significant that Mr. Colby, a former Department of Defense official, details how the U.S. and Taiwan could prevail in such a conflict while avoiding nuclear catastrophe. "
I'm sure the Taiwanese are reading this book, and worried about whether Pres. Biden would really stand up to the PRC if/when they invade.
I'm sure Taiwan's govt is thinking hard about building nuclear arms for themselves. Which would give even the PRC Army pause! If Pakistan and North Korea can become nuclear powers in a very few years (as they both did) -- how long could it take a technically-advanced nation to meet & exceed their armaments? No nuclear-armed state has ever attacked another (yet). Credible deterrence is by far the best way to avoid armed combat!
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-stra...
(Paywalled. As always, I'm happy to email a copy to non-subscribers)
Excerpt:
"Mr. Colby makes a persuasive case that if the U.S. does not rapidly address its military shortfalls, China can successfully invade and occupy the neighboring island. An invasion is Beijing’s “best strategy”—better than a lower-intensity military campaign, which would likely fail. Mr. Colby marshals an impressive command of military history to explain why Beijing will need to occupy the island to achieve its goals and how such an invasion might be conducted. It is particularly significant that Mr. Colby, a former Department of Defense official, details how the U.S. and Taiwan could prevail in such a conflict while avoiding nuclear catastrophe. "
I'm sure the Taiwanese are reading this book, and worried about whether Pres. Biden would really stand up to the PRC if/when they invade.
I'm sure Taiwan's govt is thinking hard about building nuclear arms for themselves. Which would give even the PRC Army pause! If Pakistan and North Korea can become nuclear powers in a very few years (as they both did) -- how long could it take a technically-advanced nation to meet & exceed their armaments? No nuclear-armed state has ever attacked another (yet). Credible deterrence is by far the best way to avoid armed combat!
December 9, 2021
Was planning on hate-reading this, but mentally I'm just not at the point where I can read a 300-page book about why it's totally necessary for my family to die in yet another senseless American war.
October 12, 2021
The key sentence comes near the end of the book -- "That [best defense policy] standard will be hard and costly to attain, and it will require sustained focus and discipline -- but the alternatives are worse." One could say the same about fixing crime, poverty, the environment, racial injustice, economic inequality, and a host of other problems, but this book focuses on defense. The author states that ideas like having Asian Georgia in NATO or defending Mongolia are hopeless -- they are too far away and too hard to defend. Afghanistan he classes as a country we can abandon without harming other alliances -- if we abandon Taiwan or The Philippines other allies are not going to rely on us. He believes that Laos is indefensible, and with its fall Thailand and Vietnam would be likely to fall as well.
Iran and Russia he finds less dangerous, and he comes out squarely in favor of defending the small Baltic NATO members if they are attacked. Most frightening, his strategy assumes that a defense of Taiwan may fail, and worries about the US sustaining focus and discipline, or even enthusiasm. He calls for not defending Taiwan's civilian sites -- if China attacks those, it will rouse the world against China, which a simple conquest might not accomplish.
The book is a tough minded attempt to grapple with our current defense needs and capabilities, fascinating and turbulent. Well worth reading.
Iran and Russia he finds less dangerous, and he comes out squarely in favor of defending the small Baltic NATO members if they are attacked. Most frightening, his strategy assumes that a defense of Taiwan may fail, and worries about the US sustaining focus and discipline, or even enthusiasm. He calls for not defending Taiwan's civilian sites -- if China attacks those, it will rouse the world against China, which a simple conquest might not accomplish.
The book is a tough minded attempt to grapple with our current defense needs and capabilities, fascinating and turbulent. Well worth reading.
September 20, 2021
This book outlines the critical need to shore up the democracy in Taiwan and thwart the attempts by the CCP on the mainland to subjugate Taiwan. Once upon a time the CCP could accurately claim that Taiwan was merely a breakaway pod of nationalists still fighting the Chinese civil war. No longer. Taiwan has a robust democracy in place and acts as a reminder of the importance of a free and open Asian order just as the CCP insists upon regional hegemony. The US needs to do the work of deterring the ambitions of the CCP to turn Taiwan into another Tibet, Hong Kong, or Xinjiang. Deterrence and denial now prevents defeat and decline later. Well written and timely.
February 7, 2022
Bridge Colby has delivered a long overdue and analytical realist approach to current defense strategy in the era of great power competition. Focused primarily at counterbalancing China’s regional hegemony ambitions (because who else out there is really a US competitor in all IOPs?), this in depth approach covers the necessary elements of competition and (potential) conflict with China militarily, over Taiwan, economically, etc. Each strategy and argument is carefully crafted along the lines of plausibility, feasibility and reality—and he makes a no nonsense case that the pain/risk threshold is too high (currently) for China to enter into hostilities directly with the US now, and perhaps for the foreseeable future, as the risk at present is much too high. This fresh and realistic appraisal reflects Colby’s time as the chief defense strategist for DoD, as well as his hand in crafting the existing Defense strategy pending publication of the current Administration’s. This should be required reading for all defense and military strategists, regardless of whether you agree or not, as Colby’s credibility to pen it is undeniable.
January 16, 2022
The surest path to an uncontrolled confrontation between the United States and China is willful ignorance or haphazard disengagement on the part of the U.S. Insofar as that basic premise is the core idea of this book it’s worthwhile. That bumped my review up from a 1 or 2 star to 3. But on the whole the book is just a hawkish ramble that struggles from the start to make sense of how to get to a broadly meritorious conclusion - that strategic clear sightedness on the part of America and her allies is the best way to approach the more challenging aspects of China’s aim of at least an
Asian hegemony.
Colby falls short in almost countless ways. His argument is riven by internal inconsistencies and intellectual shortcuts. His narrative is light on facts and specifics and he hand waves huge strategic assumptions (apparently China won’t escalate a conflict vertically “because it won’t”). Some of these shortcomings or gaps either underwrite his own or promote for the reader dangerously broad but poorly supported conclusions. And when that fails he just warms up some functionally unproven defense and foreign policy thought from the Cold War. And when he’s not doing that he uses a World History 201 level of knowledge to namecheck a grab-bag of well known examples to (one guesses) try to make his reader feel sharp - despite the fact that the examples are almost uniformly either not germane or flat silly. Roll all of that into a wrapper of what feels like reflexive hawkishness without a very precise sense of its own goal and you have Mr. Colby’s book.
But the real value (and danger) in this book is that it gets some big things right and has bits sprinkled throughout a mass of bad arguments and 2AM dorm room level analysis that will “sound right” to a variety of view points - even if they collectively don’t all fit together. In a sense it’s a perfect and mildly frightening core sample of just how hapless the US foreign policy and defense establishment is at the moment. Not that we needed any particular refreshers in the wake of America’s tragically executed Afghan withdrawal.
It is a good thing that books about how the US should consider and cope with an aggressive PRC are being written. It’s a better thing that those books are being published and read. This just isn’t where I’d suggest that anyone start reading.
Asian hegemony.
Colby falls short in almost countless ways. His argument is riven by internal inconsistencies and intellectual shortcuts. His narrative is light on facts and specifics and he hand waves huge strategic assumptions (apparently China won’t escalate a conflict vertically “because it won’t”). Some of these shortcomings or gaps either underwrite his own or promote for the reader dangerously broad but poorly supported conclusions. And when that fails he just warms up some functionally unproven defense and foreign policy thought from the Cold War. And when he’s not doing that he uses a World History 201 level of knowledge to namecheck a grab-bag of well known examples to (one guesses) try to make his reader feel sharp - despite the fact that the examples are almost uniformly either not germane or flat silly. Roll all of that into a wrapper of what feels like reflexive hawkishness without a very precise sense of its own goal and you have Mr. Colby’s book.
But the real value (and danger) in this book is that it gets some big things right and has bits sprinkled throughout a mass of bad arguments and 2AM dorm room level analysis that will “sound right” to a variety of view points - even if they collectively don’t all fit together. In a sense it’s a perfect and mildly frightening core sample of just how hapless the US foreign policy and defense establishment is at the moment. Not that we needed any particular refreshers in the wake of America’s tragically executed Afghan withdrawal.
It is a good thing that books about how the US should consider and cope with an aggressive PRC are being written. It’s a better thing that those books are being published and read. This just isn’t where I’d suggest that anyone start reading.
November 25, 2022
In testimony before Congress in 2021, the soon-to-retire commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral John Davidson, surprised many in the commentariat when he noted of China, “I worry that [China is] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they’ve long said that they want to do that by 2050. I’m worried about them moving that target closer…Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years.”
Davidson was not the first person to note a timeline for Chinese regional and global ambitions, nor was he the first to describe Taiwan as being under threat. But it was the proximity that shocked many, as it has required a very real conversation of why China would possess these ambitions, how they would seek to first secure global influence through true regional hegemony in Asia, and how the United States’ leadership not only can or should, but *must* seek to stop this from happening if that leadership cares at all for the security, freedom, and prosperity of all Americans. In short, such a timeline requires us to now, not in 2025 or 2030, consider how and why the United States should commit itself and its people and economy to a conflict in Asia to stop China from achieving regional hegemony.
This what Elbridge Colby attempts to do this in book. It is first and foremost a defense strategy grounded in international relations theory and practice. It is extremely logical: Asia, especially maritime Asia, is the most important global region; China, being not only the most powerful state in the region but a global leader, will seek to dominate it, to achieve regional hegemony; this will lead it to capture neighboring states in its hegemonic coalition as pawns, vassals, or useful idiots; it will seek to achieve this through coercion or capture; because these will be its best tools, military power will undergird its regional ambitions; eventually, this military capacity will be brought to bear on a recalcitrant, valuable regional state; and finally, because of the aforementioned
importance of Asia, the United States should seek to stop this hegemony, serve as a military counterweight *within the region*, put its credibility on the line, and, if necessary, provides material, military support to a state experiencing military coercion or capture by China.
Now, there are obviously innumerable assumptions baked into this logic, but the structure is probably sound. What Colby describes are the conditions under which a conflict in the Western Pacific against China will begin. Said less passively, Colby describes why China will serve as a regional aggressor and seek war, even with the United States if it believes the ends will justify the pain. Questions of state capacity, will, power, and alliances do and will influence how China moves and how the U.S. seeks to respond.
However, this is not a book describing how the United States should fight a war with China. Colby, even if he never explicitly says this, rightfully leaves that to the individuals tasked with waging war on America’s behalf. Colby instead seeks to make such a serious possibility real for the reader and to convince the reader that Chinese regional hegemony over Asia will have dire consequences for America and is thus worth committing valuable blood and treasure to stop. Colby is not fatalist though, nor does he desire a conflict with China. The title of the book alludes to denial, that is to make the likely first and most important target of Chinese aggression, Taiwan, strong enough that it can withstand Chinese military aggression, including a possible fait accompli. Alongside that, Colby envisions an anti-hegemonic coalition that will assist Taiwan in some material way, to include becoming an active party to the conflict. Together, Taiwan’s defensive capability and regional commitments hopefully serve as a sufficient deterrent to Chinese ambitions and she instead pursues a non-violent, non-coercive future of security, freedom, and prosperity for her own people. The desire, as Colby titles his last chapter, is a decent peace.
As the saying goes, however, hope is not a strategy. Colby provides some reflections on what such a framework entails, but he purposefully does not delve into the minutiae of defense planning that will ensure such a stable outcome. Given his past (two decades of experience at the Pentagon, think tanks, and the Intelligence Community, including serving as lead author of the 2018 National Defense Strategy under Secretary Mattis), these insights would have been valuable. At the same time, he was written extensively outside of this book on similar topics. In short, the United States is nowhere close to actually deterring China in the Western Pacific. Our forces are overstretched, under-protected, and ill-placed to rapidly respond to a regional contingency. Worse, these theater challenges are backed up by a global posture that is imbalanced and a domestic acquisition policy that is sclerotic and out of sync with the proximity of the challenge. For years now, defense officials have admitted that China is the pacing threat and the Indo-Pacific the critical theater, but the commitment of men, materiel, and construction to actually deter and win continues to be sorely lacking. Not a dime of support in billions of (rightful) emergency military support for Ukraine has been sent to the region in the past year. Likewise, the department continues to seek to build a capable military for 2035-2040, failing to see the roaring lion right in front of their face. The difference between words and actions is becoming an unbridgeable gulf.
Similar to not providing real takeaways, Colby could also have opened up the Chinese literature on strategy and planning. He has been critiqued for that elsewhere, but it is a salient complaint. Colby essentially uses the tenets of realist thought in place of actual Chinese documents to explain why China will have regional ambitions and how she will act upon them. There is also the issue of the logic described above. It is so straight-forward that one could accuse Colby of starting from his desired outcome and working backward, reverse engineering the process he then describes in forward motion. I do not believe that is fair, but it is worth reflection.
In some circles, this book has captured the zeitgeist, and the conversation surrounding it, while being popularly lauded, has shown how insular security thinkers can be. In general, for the layman, I would seek out Colby’s writings in the popular press, including the Wall Street Journal, where AEI’s Dan Blumenthal has a good review of this book. As someone who carries immense sway with many natsec thinkers and practitioners on the right, especially in the national conservative movement, and who could be a secretary of defense or national security advisor one day, Colby’s thinking is worth reading.
Davidson was not the first person to note a timeline for Chinese regional and global ambitions, nor was he the first to describe Taiwan as being under threat. But it was the proximity that shocked many, as it has required a very real conversation of why China would possess these ambitions, how they would seek to first secure global influence through true regional hegemony in Asia, and how the United States’ leadership not only can or should, but *must* seek to stop this from happening if that leadership cares at all for the security, freedom, and prosperity of all Americans. In short, such a timeline requires us to now, not in 2025 or 2030, consider how and why the United States should commit itself and its people and economy to a conflict in Asia to stop China from achieving regional hegemony.
This what Elbridge Colby attempts to do this in book. It is first and foremost a defense strategy grounded in international relations theory and practice. It is extremely logical: Asia, especially maritime Asia, is the most important global region; China, being not only the most powerful state in the region but a global leader, will seek to dominate it, to achieve regional hegemony; this will lead it to capture neighboring states in its hegemonic coalition as pawns, vassals, or useful idiots; it will seek to achieve this through coercion or capture; because these will be its best tools, military power will undergird its regional ambitions; eventually, this military capacity will be brought to bear on a recalcitrant, valuable regional state; and finally, because of the aforementioned
importance of Asia, the United States should seek to stop this hegemony, serve as a military counterweight *within the region*, put its credibility on the line, and, if necessary, provides material, military support to a state experiencing military coercion or capture by China.
Now, there are obviously innumerable assumptions baked into this logic, but the structure is probably sound. What Colby describes are the conditions under which a conflict in the Western Pacific against China will begin. Said less passively, Colby describes why China will serve as a regional aggressor and seek war, even with the United States if it believes the ends will justify the pain. Questions of state capacity, will, power, and alliances do and will influence how China moves and how the U.S. seeks to respond.
However, this is not a book describing how the United States should fight a war with China. Colby, even if he never explicitly says this, rightfully leaves that to the individuals tasked with waging war on America’s behalf. Colby instead seeks to make such a serious possibility real for the reader and to convince the reader that Chinese regional hegemony over Asia will have dire consequences for America and is thus worth committing valuable blood and treasure to stop. Colby is not fatalist though, nor does he desire a conflict with China. The title of the book alludes to denial, that is to make the likely first and most important target of Chinese aggression, Taiwan, strong enough that it can withstand Chinese military aggression, including a possible fait accompli. Alongside that, Colby envisions an anti-hegemonic coalition that will assist Taiwan in some material way, to include becoming an active party to the conflict. Together, Taiwan’s defensive capability and regional commitments hopefully serve as a sufficient deterrent to Chinese ambitions and she instead pursues a non-violent, non-coercive future of security, freedom, and prosperity for her own people. The desire, as Colby titles his last chapter, is a decent peace.
As the saying goes, however, hope is not a strategy. Colby provides some reflections on what such a framework entails, but he purposefully does not delve into the minutiae of defense planning that will ensure such a stable outcome. Given his past (two decades of experience at the Pentagon, think tanks, and the Intelligence Community, including serving as lead author of the 2018 National Defense Strategy under Secretary Mattis), these insights would have been valuable. At the same time, he was written extensively outside of this book on similar topics. In short, the United States is nowhere close to actually deterring China in the Western Pacific. Our forces are overstretched, under-protected, and ill-placed to rapidly respond to a regional contingency. Worse, these theater challenges are backed up by a global posture that is imbalanced and a domestic acquisition policy that is sclerotic and out of sync with the proximity of the challenge. For years now, defense officials have admitted that China is the pacing threat and the Indo-Pacific the critical theater, but the commitment of men, materiel, and construction to actually deter and win continues to be sorely lacking. Not a dime of support in billions of (rightful) emergency military support for Ukraine has been sent to the region in the past year. Likewise, the department continues to seek to build a capable military for 2035-2040, failing to see the roaring lion right in front of their face. The difference between words and actions is becoming an unbridgeable gulf.
Similar to not providing real takeaways, Colby could also have opened up the Chinese literature on strategy and planning. He has been critiqued for that elsewhere, but it is a salient complaint. Colby essentially uses the tenets of realist thought in place of actual Chinese documents to explain why China will have regional ambitions and how she will act upon them. There is also the issue of the logic described above. It is so straight-forward that one could accuse Colby of starting from his desired outcome and working backward, reverse engineering the process he then describes in forward motion. I do not believe that is fair, but it is worth reflection.
In some circles, this book has captured the zeitgeist, and the conversation surrounding it, while being popularly lauded, has shown how insular security thinkers can be. In general, for the layman, I would seek out Colby’s writings in the popular press, including the Wall Street Journal, where AEI’s Dan Blumenthal has a good review of this book. As someone who carries immense sway with many natsec thinkers and practitioners on the right, especially in the national conservative movement, and who could be a secretary of defense or national security advisor one day, Colby’s thinking is worth reading.
January 9, 2022
Very academic, wonky but critically important for students of the contested (or not) hegemony in front of us.
August 26, 2023
An interest-driven (vice values-driven) argument for why Taiwan is fundamental to US policy.
January 22, 2023
Written by US war planner Eldridge Colby, this book contemplates how the US maintains the global balance of power in a world where the fast rise of China threatens US dominance. With China's military spending growing at 10% annually, much faster than that of the US, the power gap can only continue to close. Yet, as of 2021, US defense spending still amounted to as much as the next seven countries combined, several of which are US allies.
So, what should the US do, short of simply trying to grow military spending as fast as the Chinese? Says the author: Build a coalition against China involving the key Asian countries with the combined power to defeat China's best expansionist strategies.
That best strategy for China is to invade Taiwan: it's close (80 miles across the strait), it's small, there is widespread foreign acceptance in some countries of China having some sort of "right" to it, and the two countries are culturally similar even if their systems are wildly different. That's the strategy for the US to"deny".
The strategy for the US, then, faced with this reality, is to line up a coalition with Taiwan, along with key allies Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Indonesia, plus use its own forces, to make a Chinese invasion very expensive militarily to the attacker. Sink the invasion fleet, shoot down the aircraft and missiles, and repel any landing force. Piece of cake? The failed Russian invasion of Ukraine has probably given pause to the autocrats in Beijing about undertaking this adventure, which even in the best case for them would leave China isolated, without much foreign trade, and facing the task of holding a hostile piece of conquered territory whose economy might well have collapsed. This is pretty much where Russia finds itself today.
The above is what Colby says is the "strategy of denial", the title of his book.
All this seems pretty self-evident, but it is not so long ago that the US squandered its blood and weaponry and wealth and a good piece of its international standing to go to war in strategically inconsequential countries like Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia and the like. So, not so self-evident to the occupants of the White House, nor maybe to the Pentagon either.
Hope they read the book, especially if there's an abridged version. But really, you can get 80% of the benefit of reading the book just by reading its very good 8-page preface!
So, what should the US do, short of simply trying to grow military spending as fast as the Chinese? Says the author: Build a coalition against China involving the key Asian countries with the combined power to defeat China's best expansionist strategies.
That best strategy for China is to invade Taiwan: it's close (80 miles across the strait), it's small, there is widespread foreign acceptance in some countries of China having some sort of "right" to it, and the two countries are culturally similar even if their systems are wildly different. That's the strategy for the US to"deny".
The strategy for the US, then, faced with this reality, is to line up a coalition with Taiwan, along with key allies Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Indonesia, plus use its own forces, to make a Chinese invasion very expensive militarily to the attacker. Sink the invasion fleet, shoot down the aircraft and missiles, and repel any landing force. Piece of cake? The failed Russian invasion of Ukraine has probably given pause to the autocrats in Beijing about undertaking this adventure, which even in the best case for them would leave China isolated, without much foreign trade, and facing the task of holding a hostile piece of conquered territory whose economy might well have collapsed. This is pretty much where Russia finds itself today.
The above is what Colby says is the "strategy of denial", the title of his book.
All this seems pretty self-evident, but it is not so long ago that the US squandered its blood and weaponry and wealth and a good piece of its international standing to go to war in strategically inconsequential countries like Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia and the like. So, not so self-evident to the occupants of the White House, nor maybe to the Pentagon either.
Hope they read the book, especially if there's an abridged version. But really, you can get 80% of the benefit of reading the book just by reading its very good 8-page preface!
September 29, 2023
A thoughtful, if aggressive and slightly outdated, defense proposal for American national security. Author Elbridge Colby, primarily known for his contribution to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, argues for a U.S. defense that prioritizes countering China. The book is structured in a bottom-up manner, beginning with first principles of defense policy and culminating in the specific recommendations befitting present circumstances. This keeps the writing accessible and its ideas streamlined, making this book a solid entry point into the morass of U.S. defense strategy.
The author is clearly both a China hawk and a realist, leaving no doubt with the primacy he places on U.S. interests contra those of allies and the clear centrality of China’s looming threat to his argument. The book’s weak link is the lack of justification for the imminence of the Chinese threat, especially given developments in recent years of stunted economic growth and botched “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy that’s driven key regional states further into the U.S. orbit. The prominence of China herein contrasts with the underestimation of Russia, which is only afforded a single chapter of focus despite actually coming to embody the China depicted in the book (ground invasion of U.S. ally aimed at territorial expansion, albeit not producing a hegemony). While this book’s publication in September 2021 precedes Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Colby cannot be faulted for failing to predict the future, it does call to question the gravity of the situation as told in the book.
Otherwise, this strategy guide is not particularly innovative. Colby promotes leveraging mutual interest among states to counter China’s ambitions to form an anti-hegemonic coalition consisting of formal or de facto U.S. defense agreements. He prioritizes the defense of Taiwan from a Chinese first strike above all, advises moderating defense spending to not hamper the U.S. economy, and offers some suggestions for how to frame political maneuvering with China to generate the most buy-in from the American public. None of these particularly diverge from The Blob’s consensus or the U.S. policy status quo. If they do, in some unrecognizable way, then that’s an issue of Colby failing to explain it. But this book does offer a firm ideological justification for defensive strength in the face of Chinese military maneuvering, and serves as a worthwhile entry point to the U.S. foreign policy strategy dialogue.
The author is clearly both a China hawk and a realist, leaving no doubt with the primacy he places on U.S. interests contra those of allies and the clear centrality of China’s looming threat to his argument. The book’s weak link is the lack of justification for the imminence of the Chinese threat, especially given developments in recent years of stunted economic growth and botched “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy that’s driven key regional states further into the U.S. orbit. The prominence of China herein contrasts with the underestimation of Russia, which is only afforded a single chapter of focus despite actually coming to embody the China depicted in the book (ground invasion of U.S. ally aimed at territorial expansion, albeit not producing a hegemony). While this book’s publication in September 2021 precedes Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Colby cannot be faulted for failing to predict the future, it does call to question the gravity of the situation as told in the book.
Otherwise, this strategy guide is not particularly innovative. Colby promotes leveraging mutual interest among states to counter China’s ambitions to form an anti-hegemonic coalition consisting of formal or de facto U.S. defense agreements. He prioritizes the defense of Taiwan from a Chinese first strike above all, advises moderating defense spending to not hamper the U.S. economy, and offers some suggestions for how to frame political maneuvering with China to generate the most buy-in from the American public. None of these particularly diverge from The Blob’s consensus or the U.S. policy status quo. If they do, in some unrecognizable way, then that’s an issue of Colby failing to explain it. But this book does offer a firm ideological justification for defensive strength in the face of Chinese military maneuvering, and serves as a worthwhile entry point to the U.S. foreign policy strategy dialogue.
August 25, 2023
Elbridge Colby has written an outstanding book. For anyone interested in understanding what a possible war between China and the United States might look like, The Strategy of Denial is the place to start. It is analytically rigorous, well-informed, and filled with interesting and smart insights.
John Mearsheimer
........
Colby gives us an original and provocative approach to containing adversaries, especially China. . . . [D]istinguished by its moving seamlessly from international relations theory to detailed questions of diplomacy and force deployment.
Robert Jervis, author of How Statesmen Think
There are many ways to lose wars or win them, but only one way to avoid them: to envision closely enough the dangers to be averted by deterrence or defense. This book brings together pure intellect, wide knowledge, and practical experience to show how U.S. defense strategy must change—and fast.
Edward Luttwak, author of The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy
This is an incredibly important book. . . . The definitive work on U.S. defense strategy that should guide our strategic competition with China for the years to come.
Christian Brose, author of The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare
Succeeds brilliantly in the task of building a broad strategic framework—one that is actually new—for how to think about America’s defense in the face of a rising China. . . . The Chinese military are going to translate and classify this book—if they haven’t already.
Michael Pillsbury, senior fellow and director for Chinese Strategy, Hudson Institute
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The Strategy of Denial is an excellent book and a very important one. Fundamentally, it’s not an argument about ‘global stability’ . . . but rather that we need to think about defense strategy in terms of regions in order to achieve political objectives.
Nadia Schadlow, senior fellow, Hudson Institute
.........
Interestingly, i've liked five of the six people with their writings, but Schadlow, i've had some significant issues with.
John Mearsheimer
........
Colby gives us an original and provocative approach to containing adversaries, especially China. . . . [D]istinguished by its moving seamlessly from international relations theory to detailed questions of diplomacy and force deployment.
Robert Jervis, author of How Statesmen Think
There are many ways to lose wars or win them, but only one way to avoid them: to envision closely enough the dangers to be averted by deterrence or defense. This book brings together pure intellect, wide knowledge, and practical experience to show how U.S. defense strategy must change—and fast.
Edward Luttwak, author of The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy
This is an incredibly important book. . . . The definitive work on U.S. defense strategy that should guide our strategic competition with China for the years to come.
Christian Brose, author of The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare
Succeeds brilliantly in the task of building a broad strategic framework—one that is actually new—for how to think about America’s defense in the face of a rising China. . . . The Chinese military are going to translate and classify this book—if they haven’t already.
Michael Pillsbury, senior fellow and director for Chinese Strategy, Hudson Institute
---
The Strategy of Denial is an excellent book and a very important one. Fundamentally, it’s not an argument about ‘global stability’ . . . but rather that we need to think about defense strategy in terms of regions in order to achieve political objectives.
Nadia Schadlow, senior fellow, Hudson Institute
.........
Interestingly, i've liked five of the six people with their writings, but Schadlow, i've had some significant issues with.
May 24, 2022
The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict by Elbridge Colby is a very good advocacy piece for a strategic framework for the United States. The principal thesis is that the United States has been stretched too thin, therefore it needs to decide what its priorities are. Where we have obligations, we must enunciate and safeguard them. Where we do not have obligations, we should not pretend that we do. For any regions and nations where there is ambiguity, that ambiguity must be set aside. Then, once we know exactly who we must protect and maintain our partnerships with, we can then settle on the real challenge of the twenty-first century: containing Russia and China, with China being by far the most important rival. How to contain these strategic competitions is the heart of this book, which is why it is entitled "The Strategy of Denial." This point is made more plain when we come to understand that it is our allies and partners that China and Russia are most likely to invade, coerce, and intimidate. The chapter on escalation traps and fait accomplis is perhaps the best in the book, and very nearly captured what happened with Russia and Ukraine, only it was about China and Taiwan.
There are a couple of gaps in this book though. It is unapologetically martial in orientation, which means that it becomes dramatically less useful for alternative forms of great power competition. Furthermore, I am rather tired of policy makers demanding we double down on our allies and, for lack of a better phrase, leave non-aligned countries to the wolves. We can, and should, do so much more.
88/100
There are a couple of gaps in this book though. It is unapologetically martial in orientation, which means that it becomes dramatically less useful for alternative forms of great power competition. Furthermore, I am rather tired of policy makers demanding we double down on our allies and, for lack of a better phrase, leave non-aligned countries to the wolves. We can, and should, do so much more.
88/100
July 3, 2022
A cogent argument for thwarting Chinese hegemony in Asia by building a coalition of lesser powers such as India, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, and possibly even Russia backstopped by US power. Colby builds his argument logically and if you accept the underlying assumptions about American interests, his prescription for a strategy of denial makes a lot of sense. If one accepts that China has active hegemonic designs on Asia, it follows that the United States has at least some interest in countering China in that goal. Colby sees the threat as real and calls for building a broad coalition of nations with shared interest in countering China and a narrower alliance of nations ready to commit to mutual military defense. Colby argues that although it would be nice if the United States could be a bystander, any coalition of this nature, given China's power, would need to be supported by a cornerstone nation with greater power than even China and Japan can individually muster. The other nations are no match for China absent the United States commitment to backstop the coalition, he argues.
For an effective strategy of the kind he proposes, America's commitment would have to be more solid than it appears to be now. The doves and isolationists in both parties make it difficult to argue that a commitment to support allies with military force against China is credible. Thus this book seeks to convince those who might prefer isolationism or distrust military solutions to foreign policy that the threat from China is sufficient to support such a strategy of denial with its risk of military confrontation with China.
For an effective strategy of the kind he proposes, America's commitment would have to be more solid than it appears to be now. The doves and isolationists in both parties make it difficult to argue that a commitment to support allies with military force against China is credible. Thus this book seeks to convince those who might prefer isolationism or distrust military solutions to foreign policy that the threat from China is sufficient to support such a strategy of denial with its risk of military confrontation with China.
March 9, 2023
Worth a read, but lacks evidence and over focuses on China at the expense of realities that can’t be ignored by the United States.
Colby is an obvious student of Mearsheimer and sees the world (here) through the lens of Offensive Realism. He proposes this strategy of denial for America based on Offensive Realist assumptions, but his book merely presents an application of Mearsheimer’s ideas to a face-value analysis of current China-US relationship.
Why China chose particular ambitions? How long will China continue to rise? How do events in Europe intertwine with Chinese strategy? These questions go unanswered in Colby’s analysis.
His introduction chapter, however, I found outlined a simple and elegant definition for strategy and why having a strategy matters. Colby’s explanation of strategy as a “simplifying framework” that guide unavoidable choices in statecraft makes a concise and memorable explanation.
Overall, a worthwhile read that dives deeper into making practical application of the US 2022 National Security Strategy.
Colby is an obvious student of Mearsheimer and sees the world (here) through the lens of Offensive Realism. He proposes this strategy of denial for America based on Offensive Realist assumptions, but his book merely presents an application of Mearsheimer’s ideas to a face-value analysis of current China-US relationship.
Why China chose particular ambitions? How long will China continue to rise? How do events in Europe intertwine with Chinese strategy? These questions go unanswered in Colby’s analysis.
His introduction chapter, however, I found outlined a simple and elegant definition for strategy and why having a strategy matters. Colby’s explanation of strategy as a “simplifying framework” that guide unavoidable choices in statecraft makes a concise and memorable explanation.
Overall, a worthwhile read that dives deeper into making practical application of the US 2022 National Security Strategy.
June 16, 2022
This book, written by an insider in the Trump government, provides an opportunity to concretely observe how the monopoly capitalist ruling class is preparing the people of the United States for what could be a catastrophic world war. Its purpose appears to be to magnify external threats and increase public fears in order to build support among attentive publics and capitalist ruling class leaders for a possible war, this time with China. Its focus is the perceived danger to U.S. world and regional hegemony that China poses in Asia and, to a much lesser extent, Russia in Europe. It offers policy recommendations on how to stop both powers from becoming regionally dominant through U.S. preparation for and willingness to engage in wars, both limited and, if necessary, nuclear. So, if you are happy to see global thermonuclear holocaust in the name of US capitalist hegemony, this is your book.
April 14, 2023
I believe the book gives plenty for the reader/listener to ponder regarding what the USA faces regarding China. It is not a very pretty picture. And his "strategy of denial" seems a nice hook onto which he hangs an awful lot, but I am less than convinced he has worked most of this through to a successful plan for dealing with the situation. The strategy seem heavily geared to academic exercise and not tightly tied to how the world really works.
Just today I visited the "National Museum of the War in the Pacific" in Fredericksburg, Texas, and as i contemplated the buildup of tensions in Asia in the late 19th and early 20th century could not help buy overlay current events onto the Sino-Japanese parts of that museum's puzzle. As i completed the museum visit I had to wonder if, perhaps, China has truly been playing the long game for more than 150 years getting to this point.
Just today I visited the "National Museum of the War in the Pacific" in Fredericksburg, Texas, and as i contemplated the buildup of tensions in Asia in the late 19th and early 20th century could not help buy overlay current events onto the Sino-Japanese parts of that museum's puzzle. As i completed the museum visit I had to wonder if, perhaps, China has truly been playing the long game for more than 150 years getting to this point.
February 18, 2022
Good analysis of the geopolitical relationship between countries and regions. The problem is this: the author speaks about possible military conflict (conflict between powers such as the US and China no less) as something that can be planned and contained within a manageable limit.
He says a war between the US and China can be waged in such a way that it does not escalate beyond a certain limit. If the relationship between these two countries ever breaks down to the point where they wage war, why in the world does anyone assume that two countries who can't agree in peace will suddenly make agreements in war.
The factors involved in such a regional conflict are so vast, that no reasonable person can plan for its scope in advance.
He says a war between the US and China can be waged in such a way that it does not escalate beyond a certain limit. If the relationship between these two countries ever breaks down to the point where they wage war, why in the world does anyone assume that two countries who can't agree in peace will suddenly make agreements in war.
The factors involved in such a regional conflict are so vast, that no reasonable person can plan for its scope in advance.
March 7, 2023
Colby gives a very in-depth approach towards countering PRC aggression in the Indo-Pacific. I appreciate how specific he was in how to prevent/counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but wish he was less repetitive in his points. I think the book could have been half its length and just as effective. There is clear military bias in his recommended strategy, which makes sense considering his background, but I wish he would’ve included more discussion of how diplomatic and economic tools would play a role in such a scenario. Overall a good read, well-sourced and incredibly thorough, just slightly repetitive and narrow in scope.
January 20, 2022
A very long winded book but basically, China is enemy number 1. America must give up on other areas and focus its full attention in East Asia, and deny China of success and prepare to fight wars. It should become the anchor of all alliance around China to help weaker states stand up to China. China will want to have its sphere of influence and that will be bad for America, locking her out of economic prosperity.
You can just read the first chapter and be done with the book.
Oh, Putin has just upset the whole situation with the Ukraine situation.
You can just read the first chapter and be done with the book.
Oh, Putin has just upset the whole situation with the Ukraine situation.
June 18, 2022
I admit to not reading every page and that in terms of knowledge and insight the author deserves more than 3 stars. It’s just that this was my first time to read a book on the theory of war and military strategy focusing not on what happened but on the developing confrontation between the USA and China. For me, war equals nothing but suffering and to read a cerebral analysis of war strategy and dispassionate references to this or that country not being worth the effort to defend, was a chilling experience.
March 5, 2022
This book was written from the perspective of an almost certain invasion of Taiwan by China and what the US can do to prevent it.
The author games all the options in great detail. contrast this with another book on the same subject “destined for war” by Graham Allison. which mostly states that America should stay out of this Thucydides trap (smaller Allies pulled the Greeks into the catastrophic Peloponnesian war).
The author games all the options in great detail. contrast this with another book on the same subject “destined for war” by Graham Allison. which mostly states that America should stay out of this Thucydides trap (smaller Allies pulled the Greeks into the catastrophic Peloponnesian war).
May 1, 2024
I just finished The Strategy of Denial by Eldridge A. Colby. He argues that the US needs to support Taiwan, Japan, S. Korea, etc.; if China attacks any of them (Taiwan most likely), the US should engage militarily; and if China uses nuclear weapons, the US should use them also.
War is hell! Be strong so that countries do not go to war with you.
War is hell! Be strong so that countries do not go to war with you.
January 7, 2022
The book presents several thought provoking ideas about future US defense strategy, especially in Asia. This is balanced by some redundancy throughout, which makes it longer than needed. I’d also like to have seen a few more recent examples.
March 28, 2022
Written a bit dramatically and high-brow... A lot of "thus," "therefore," and "indeeds" used throughout as if conclusions were self-evident. Not a lot of opportunity in the text to explore alternate explanations or considerations.
December 30, 2022
Very disappointing at first, but I think a lot of that is because I've been thinking about these questions for years. The last chapter or two are good but would need a significant rewrite/reflection in light of the Ukraine conflict.
January 27, 2023
While concept wise this book is good and has an important message and some good ideas behind it there is too much hand waving and assertions that something is the best course of action because one or two examples in history happened that way without much more analysis.
February 10, 2023
Laborious Book About Trouble with China
The book outlines how China is dangerous and what is the response of the USA and Europe to deal with it. The author makes some good points but the book is repetitive. Maybe a more military interested reader would love this book.
The book outlines how China is dangerous and what is the response of the USA and Europe to deal with it. The author makes some good points but the book is repetitive. Maybe a more military interested reader would love this book.
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